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Abstract
In growth theory, convergence analysis tries to answer three fundamental questions 
“Are poor countries catching up with richer ones? How quickly? And what are the 
determinants of this process?” This thesis deals with issues that are relevant to all 
these questions. It begins by setting out the key theoretical contributions to the 
analysis of the role of human capital in growth and convergence. Secondly, attention 
is turned to the way that convergence is estimated from data. The econometric 
techniques used in the convergence literature usually assume that shocks are 
uncorrelated across countries. We claim that this is unlikely for most data sets and 
investigate the use of an estimator so far ignored, namely the annual panel estimator 
where shocks are allowed to be correlated. Our analysis indicates that this estimator 
is more efficient than conventional ones for plausible values of cross-country error 
correlation. The study then turns to the analysis of the third question. Although 
differences in human capital endowments and rates of investment have long been 
recognised as crucial elements for explaining observed GDP gaps, nevertheless, 
human capital proxies are rarely significant in growth regressions. In this study some 
possible solutions to this puzzle are explored. We estimate aggregate returns to 
education in Italy and Spain, and compare our results with the predictions of 
competing theoretical frameworks. In general, our empirical analysis identifies a 
positive role for human capital, and stresses the relevance of theoretical models in 
which human capital has a fundamental but indirect role in the catching up process. 
The final part of the thesis proposes a new methodology designed to estimate 
technology levels and to test whether part of observed convergence is due to 
technology convergence. The results seem to confirm the existence of technology 
catch-up among regions.
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Growth theory has been an active area of research during the last ten years due to the 
development of the endogenous growth literature. In particular, the theoretical 
contributions developed by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) on endogenous growth 
have stimulated a resurgence of interest in this field. The debate that followed 
focussed on theoretical and empirical aspects alike. From the point of view of theory, 
endogenous growth models appeared to be, or rather were simply presented by their 
authors as being “new” developments of the growth literature; new with respect to 
the “old” and still unmodified Solow-type growth model. Nevertheless, these models 
have their roots within the neoclassical solovian growth model. Given the availability 
in the mid 1980s of large international data sets with comparable GDP measures, 
these theoretical developments were soon followed by numerous empirical studies 
focussing primarily on one of the most important implications of the Solow growth 
model: the convergence hypothesis. By ascribing economic growth to the joint 
impact of exogenous technological change and capital deepening on an economy 
with concave short run production opportunities, the neoclassical solovian model 
makes very strong predictions concerning the behaviour of economies over time. In 
particular, the Solow growth model was initially interpreted as predicting that poorer
2countries should be catching up with the richer ones. This hypothesis is called in the 
literature the absolute convergence hypothesis.
Conversely, early endogenous growth models stress the presence of persistent 
differences in per capita income across countries: rich economies may retain a 
constant gap with poorer regions or may even increase it. Theoretically, these models 
emphasise mechanisms which generate divergence across economies. Therefore, 
estimating the convergence equation has become increasingly popular as the 
convergence hypothesis appeared to be a sort of acid test to discriminate between 
endogenous and exogenous theories. In other words, the convergence test was 
considered as the main empirical test of the validity of these modem theories of 
economic growth and this is why, at first, a lot of efforts have been devoted to trying 
to estimate the presence of a convergence/divergence mechanism across different 
economic areas.
In general, stylised facts derived from international data sets showed the 
absolute convergence prediction to be untrue1. Nevertheless, the debate did not 
conclude in favour of endogenous models for various reasons. First of all, it has been 
demonstrated that the Solow model predicts conditional convergence. That is, 
roughly speaking, it predicts that only economies with similar fundamentals 
(preferences, technology as well as institutions, economic structure etc.) actually 
converge towards the same level of long-run output per person. Mankiw Romer and 
Weil (1992) were among the first to stress the difference between absolute and 
conditional convergence. They found that, once we control for savings rates, 
population growth and other determinants of the steady state, economies with low 
initial income tend to grow faster than rich economies. In that case, the Solow model 
with exogenous technical progress was considered to be capable of explaining 
observed cross-country variation in per capita output. Moreover, recent endogenous 
growth models predict the possibility of convergence across economies. In particular, 
models that stress both the importance of technology in explaining long-run growth
1 See Barro (1991).
3and the possibility of transfer of technology among different countries predict that 
countries lagging behind may catch up towards the more advanced areas.2.
Given these developments, simple convergence tests cannot be considered fully 
supportive of one theory against the other and this early approach seems now to have 
found a sort of blind alley. However, this conclusion does not imply that empirical 
investigations on convergence across economies have become an uninteresting issue 
in growth literature. It implies rather that this literature is now called to new 
challenges. In particular, the three fundamental questions of any convergence 
analysis “Are poor countries catching up with the richer ones? How quickly? And, 
ultimately, what are the determinants of this process?” are of primary importance for 
human welfare and, thus, undoubtedly represent crucial issues for growth (and 
perhaps all) economists. In spite of their importance, clear-cut answers are not 
available yet in the literature.
This thesis deals with issues that are relevant to all these questions. The first 
part of the thesis relates to the first two questions. In fact, when we want to deduce if 
economies are converging and how fast this process is, we need to know how to 
estimate convergence. Chapter 2 shows how vast and heterogeneous the 
methodological literature on this topic is. In this study we investigate the properties 
of a new estimator we introduce for detecting convergence. A precise estimation of 
the convergence parameter is important because one is interested in inferring from 
the estimate how rapidly countries or regions will converge and even tiny differences 
in the estimated coefficient imply enormous differences in the predicted patterns of 
convergence. In general, despite the abundance of different econometric techniques 
introduced in the empirical literature on convergence, it is usually assumed that 
shocks are uncorrelated across countries. However, we believe that this is an unlikely 
assumption.
In this study we thus investigate a possibility so far ignored, namely an 
annual panel estimator where shocks are allowed to be correlated across countries.
2 Recent empirical evidence shows that the evolution o f technology represents an important element 
in observed convergence among OECD countries. An interesting reading on the convergence 
hypothesis debate can be found in the “Controversy” o f the Economic Journal (vol. 106, 1996) that 
includes papers by Durlauf, Sala-i-Martin, Bernard and Jones, Quah and Galor.
4More precisely, we analyse by Monte Carlo the properties of a Maximum Likelihood 
panel estimator with an unrestricted variance-covariance matrix. Our analysis will be 
restricted to data sets that have more time periods than countries (T>N) which allows 
us to estimate an unrestricted variance-covariance matrix of cross-country shocks. 
Even if we cannot use this methodology with large international data sets, samples 
such as the OECD, European regions or regional data sets have more time periods 
than countries. We will show that, for this type of sample, our estimator is effectively 
unbiased and more efficient than the cross-section regression or conventional panel 
estimators introduced so far for estimating convergence.
The second part of this study focuses on the third question listed above. 
Among the determinants of the growth and convergence processes identified by the 
theoretical literature, human capital is certainly one of the most important. In fact, 
Chapter 1 stresses how differences in human capital endowments and their rates of 
investment have long been recognised in the theoretical growth literature as being 
crucial elements for explaining observed GDP gaps. Nevertheless, most of the 
empirical evidence is contrary to the predictions of theoretical models: empirical 
studies that introduce international data sets usually find human capital to be 
insignificantly or even negatively correlated with growth. These results have always 
been considered puzzling. This thesis investigates if the observed differences in 
human capital can explain a significant proportion of the observed Italian and 
Spanish regional GDP gaps. Thus, we follow the Klenow and Rodriguez Clare 
suggestion and perform more detailed country analysis a la Young (1995)3
The regional Italian and Spanish cases represent interesting case-studies. First 
of all, unlike in most developed countries, both Italian and Spanish regional 
endowments of human capital are still far from being perfectly homogeneous. 
Secondly, the previous empirical literature is not large and usually confirms the 
puzzling evidence provided by international data sets. Thirdly, these regional 
educational data sets are very detailed and enable us to put forward different 
hypotheses on the role of human capital in growth. Finally, regional data sets 
certainly offer one distinct advantage in the analysis on returns to schooling. Indeed,
5the failure to find significant and positive results in the schooling variables in studies 
that utilise international data sets has been often ascribed to the non homogeneity and 
non comparability of the different national educational systems.
Chapter 3 investigates the effect of education on growth using a sample of 
Italian regions while Chapter 4 replicates the analysis using the sample of Spanish 
regions. Since the characteristics of these two regional data sets are different, we 
cannot really draw parallels from the results obtained with the two samples. 
Nevertheless, these regional data sets enable us to test various hypotheses posited in 
the theoretical literature on human capital and growth. In particular, with its 
emphasis on technology, the so-called Nelson and Phelps approach described in 
Chapter 1 suggests various hypotheses that need to be tested. This literature de- 
emphasises the role of capital (both physical and human) accumulation for 
explaining growth, but stresses the importance of technological change. In particular, 
the growth rate of output will depend on the rate of TFP growth and, subsequently, 
on the level of human capital. These models allow the possibility of “beta 
convergence” or catch-up among countries. Human capital has a fundamental role 
for innovation but also an indirect role in the catch-up process, increasing the 
capacity to adopt and implement innovations or new technologies from abroad. The 
growth rate of an economy depends on its level of human capital and on its gap with 
the technology leader: the higher the level of human capital and the larger the 
technology gap between the follower and the technology leader, the faster 
convergence observed should be. Therefore, these studies suggest using measures of 
the stock of human capital instead of its rate of accumulation as usually done by the 
previous literature.
Following these developments and unlike in other empirical studies on Italian 
convergence, we focus on the stocks of human capital instead of its rate of 
accumulation. To this end, for the Italian regional case we have introduced census 
data on the educational attainment of the labour force and constructed annual 
measures of the regional stocks of human capital, while for Spain very detailed 
regional data sets on educational attainment of the labour force is readily available.
3 See Klenow and Rodriguez Clare (1997b): “...we think the insights gleaned from cross-country 
regressions have run into sharply diminishing returns. We would like to see more detailed country
6These models also suggest that different levels of education could affect growth in 
different ways. To test this hypothesis we divide the measurement of human capital 
into its constituent parts: primary school, secondary school and higher education. We 
expect higher levels of education to be more involved in innovative activities than 
lower levels and, thus, we expect secondary school and higher education levels to 
have a greater influence on growth than, for example, primary school levels. Note 
that these predictions of macroeconomic models dispute the usual micro evidence on 
returns to education, where the latter usually finds that returns to education are 
higher for lower levels of schooling. Secondly, we investigate if the allocation of 
human capital in the public sector may affect the analysis of returns to schooling. As 
noted by Griliches (1997), in many countries this sector often represents the 
employer of most of the skilled labour force and this fact may create different 
sources of distortions when we estimate aggregate returns to schooling. Finally, we 
test if the role of education has been different in different areas of these countries 
considered separately. In fact, while these countries have groups of regions that may 
constitute different convergence clubs, previous studies on regional convergence 
have not investigated if returns to education are heterogeneous in different clubs.
Finally, Chapter 5 proposes a fixed-effect panel methodology to assess the 
existence of technology convergence. As stressed above one of the open problems in 
this literature is how much of the observed convergence is TFP convergence or 
convergence in capital-labour ratios. In fact, unlike in early studies on growth 
differentials, recent works show that differences in TFP levels are a major 
component of the observed large cross-country differences in per capita income. 
However, the answer to the question of whether TFP convergence is taking place is 
not simple and this is largely due to the fact that, given the current availability of data 
in most of the existing cross-country and cross-region datasets, measuring TFP levels 
is not an easy task. In this study we build upon a methodology in which the presence 
of TFP heterogeneity in cross-country convergence analysis is tested by using an 
appropriate fixed-effects panel estimator. Originally, this methodology was designed 
to measure cross-country convergence in capital-labour ratios while controlling for 
stationary differences in TFP levels. We show that the same methodology can be
analysis a la Young (1995)....”, page 614.
7extended to analyse cases in which TFP differences in levels are not stationary, and 
therefore might be converging. The robustness of our results is assessed by 
comparing the estimates obtained using different estimators -  namely, a Least Square 
with Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator, a biased-corrected LSDV estimator and a 
GMM (Arellano-Bond) estimator. Our case-study is Italy and its persistent regional 
divide. From a methodological point of view, using regional data has the main 
advantage that various unobservable components such as culture, institutions, 
geography are supposed to be far more homogeneous across regions than across 
countries, and this feature facilitates the interpretation of results in our empirical 
analysis.
This study is organised into five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces a survey of 
the theoretical literature on human capital and growth. In general, the aim of this 
survey is to pinpoint the precise meaning of the concept of convergence that we will 
introduce into the empirical analysis and to examine the possible links between 
human capital and growth identified in the existing theoretical literature. Chapter 2 
includes a survey of the different econometric methodologies introduced for 
estimating the convergence parameter. We critically evaluate these methodologies 
and identify their possible advantages or disadvantages. Moreover, we propose an 
alternative methodology for estimating convergence. A detailed Monte Carlo 
analysis examines the properties of this alternative estimator. In Chapters 3 and 4 we 
apply our estimator to investigate the returns to education in Italy and Spain 
respectively. We examine the main stylised facts on both regional convergence and 
human capital endowments and introduce an econometric analysis that investigates 
the returns to education in Italian regions. Finally, Chapter 5 proposes a fixed-effect 
panel methodology to assess the existence of technology convergence among Italian 
regions. A critical summary of the main findings and results concludes the research.
CHAPTER 1
CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE IN 
GROWTH MODELS WITH HUMAN CAPITAL
“Knowledge and skills are the product of investments 
and combined with other investments account for the 
productive superiority o f the technically advanced 
countries. To omit them in studying economic growth 
is like trying to explain soviet ideology without Marx.” 
Shultz (1962).
1.1 Modern growth theory: an introduction
The neoclassical growth model, first developed by Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), 
has profoundly influenced the way in which economists think of long-run 
interrelationships in macroeconomies. Solow’s work was not the first formal model 
to try to explain growth1. He was, though, probably influenced by the empirical 
evidence of sustained positive growth rates in per capita output present at that time 
throughout industrialised countries. The Solow model cannot simply be considered as 
an abstract system, because the model’s predictions fit some of the main empirical 
facts on growth. In particular, Kaldor (1961) detected the presence of certain 
regularities among industrialised countries and identified the following main 
empirical facts: a) output per worker shows continuing growth, b) capital per worker 
shows continuing growth, c) the rate of return to capital is steady, d) the capital- 
output ratio is steady, e) labour and capital receive constant shares of total income, f) 
there are marked differences in the rates of productivity growth, both internationally
1 For a complete survey o f the early literature on growth starting from Harrod (1939) to the mid 60s 
contributions see Hahn and Matthews (1964).
9and intra-nationally. These are almost all properties of the balanced growth path 
postulated by the Solow model, apart from the sixth kaldorian fact, which is not 
explained by the standard neoclassical Solow model. Contrary to what Solow 
originally intended, his model has since been used as a means to illustrate the process 
by which poor countries catch up the richest ones. The Solovian model’s inability to 
explain the sixth kaldorian fact is what motivated both subsequent extensions of the 
Solow model and has led to further developments in endogenous growth literature.
While Kaldor's work was dedicated to studying the problem of "the 
tremendous differences that now divide the rich and poor nations...", where these are 
seen as "...the cumulative result of persistent differences in growth rates that went on 
over periods that may appear long in terms of a life-span, but which are relatively 
short in terms of recorded human history"2, in his model Solow was probably more 
interested in the analysis of within country growth than its across country dimension. 
To quote Solow (1970):
“The remaining stylized facts are of a different kind, and will concern me 
less, because they relate more to comparisons between different economies than to 
the course of events within any one economy.”
In this Chapter we introduce old and new neoclassical models that stress the 
importance of human capital. This is a limited survey, which focuses exclusively on 
what the different models predict in terms of the convergence hypothesis. As we shall 
see, different models imply different concepts of convergence. Therefore, it is 
important to stress how convergence has been differently defined and understood.
This Chapter may be divided into four different parts. The first part includes 
three sub-sections that review how the concept of convergence has evolved in 
literature on growth. Section 1.1.1 defines the solovian convergence equation and 
introduces the Solow-Swan version of the neoclassical growth model, briefly 
discussing its extension with utility-maximising agents. Section 1.1.2 introduces the 
notion of conditional convergence, while section 1.1.3 is dedicated to the early
2 Kaldor (1970). He develops a growth theory in which he argues in favour o f the forces that lead to 
divergence instead o f convergence as in the Solow model. In this respect, Kaldor's work on growth 
may be considered as a first step in the evolution o f the "new growth theory", and, in this respect, must 
be considered as highly influential.
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development of endogenous growth literature and to the divergence hypothesis.
The second part is divided into six sub-sections and focuses on models that 
stress the importance of human capital in the process of development of the 
economies. Sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 discuss the main points and predictions of the 
so-called Lucas approach. In this framework, human capital is introduced into a 
growth model as an additional input in a standard Cobb-Douglas production function. 
Sections 1.2.3 and 1.2.4 examine the second class of models whose roots lie in the 
contribution of Nelson and Phelps (1966). This literature de-emphasises the role of 
capital (both physical and human) accumulation as the engine of growth and 
highlights the importance of the process of technological change. Section 1.2.5 
introduces models that stress the importance of trade for technology transfers and 
catch up, while section 1 .2 .6  shows an interesting example where too much human 
capital allocated in the R&D sector can be detrimental to growth.
The final part of this Chapter is dedicated to a summary o f : a) the different 
concepts of convergence encountered during the survey (section 1.3), and b) a 
classification of the theoretical models examined in terms of their ability to explain 
observed convergence or divergence, stressing the role that human capital plays in 
determining either one or the other result (section 1.4). This final section serves to 
provide the necessary link between the theory on growth, convergence and human 
capital and the empirics of convergence, which will be discussed in the following 
Chapters.
1.1.1 The Solow model and the convergence hypothesis: absolute convergence
In the Solow model, capital deepening is at the heart of the growth process. The aim 
of the model is to explain the link between savings and growth, where savings are 
exogenous. This link is the process of capital accumulation. The model describes an 
economy in which the production function of the representative producer is 
Y = F (K ,A L ) , where Y is the flow of output, K  is the stock of capital, L is the 
labour force and A is knowledge or, in general, “effectiveness of labour”. Note that A 
and L enter multiplicatively, in which case technology is known as labour 
augmenting or Harrod-neutral. Both population growth and technological progress 
are exogenous. It is assumed that F( . )  exhibits positive and diminishing marginal
11
products in each input, as well as constant returns to scale. The assumption of 
constant returns enables us to work with the production function in intensive form:
y  = f ( k )  = k °  (1 .1)
where 0  < a  < 1 and, henceforth, the lowercase letters denote a quantity per unit of 
effective labour, with k = , and y  = . Output can be used for investment
or consumption. If depreciation of capital is proportional at rate S , and a constant 
proportion of income, s, is invested in this economy, the derivative of k with respect 
to time evolves in accordance with:
Jc = s f ( k ) - ( n  + g  + 8 )k  (1 .2 )
Equation (1.2) is the resource constraint, where n is the exogenous growth rate of the
labour force and g  is the exogenous technology (or knowledge) growth rate. The 
exogenous growth rate of the labour force can be considered as being a depreciation 
rate because it represents the fraction of resources that we need to pass on to the new 
generation. We can rearrange equation (1.2) to obtain the growth rate of k as:
k !k  = s f ( k ) l k - ( n  + g  + S )  = sk~(l~a) - (n + g  + S )  (1 .3 )
If we consider a log-linear approximation of equation (1.3) around the steady state 
we obtain:
k / k  = d[\n(k)]/dt = - f f l \n (k /k * ) \  (1 .4 )
where
P  = ( l - a ) ( n  + g  + S )  (1.5)
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That is, p  determines the speed of convergence from k towards its steady 
state level, k*. In general, when a country or region starts with k  below its level of 
steady state we should observe positive net investment, which implies positive 
growth of the stock of capital. If we focus on the development of a single country 
over time, the model predicts that the growth rate will be high when capital per 
worker is low and will decline as capital per worker rises. This is due to the fact that 
a low value of capital per worker implies a high marginal product of capital and 
therefore a high interest rate and a high level of investment. Therefore, we should 
observe that the real interest rate declines along with capital marginal product as an 
economy develops. This movement to higher values of k continues as long as k<k* 
where k* is the steady state level of capital. Once the capital stock gets to k=k*, net 
investment becomes zero and k no longer changes over time. That is, capital 
accumulation leads for a while to growth in output, but cannot sustain growth in 
output forever.
The effect of diminishing returns implies that growth due to capital 
accumulation vanishes in the long-run. And this is what ultimately determines the 
convergence mechanism. In other words, the convergence hypothesis arises from the 
transitional dynamics of the Solow model. Assuming certain assumptions are 
satisfied, the process of convergence towards the long-run equilibrium (within 
country convergence) may result in a tendency towards convergence in per capita 
income among economies. Note that given the Cobb-Douglas production function we 
assumed, Y = K a(AL)]~a , the growth rate of (Y/AL) has the same form as equation 
(1.4):
y /  y  = d  [ln( y ) ]  /  dt = - f i [ ln (  y ) - l n ( y * )]  (1 .6 )
This equation indicates that when an economy starts from a level of income in 
efficiency units lower than its steady state level, we should observe a positive rate of 
growth of y  where p  , as before, represents the speed of adjustment towards y*.
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Equation (1.6) also implies that:
]ny(t) = (\-e~pt) \n y  +e ^ 'ln^O ) (1.7)
where y(tj) is income per effective worker at some initial point of time and 
r = (t2- t l). Equation (1.7) can also be rearranged to deduce explicitly an equation 
for the growth rate of income per effective worker within a given time interval x :
Equation (1.8) represents the convergence equation introduced in empirical
studies.
A more complex definition of the beta parameter is found when we assume 
savings to be determined by optimal choices of consumption over time. The previous 
framework must be only slightly modified. In this framework the representative, 
infinite-horizon household seeks to maximize utility, given by
where p  is the constant rate of time preference and the utility function takes the
substitution between consumption at any two points in time is constant and equal to 
1/19 (the marginal utility has a constant elasticity with respect to c). The resource 
constraint is modified thus:




C JLstandard isoelastic form, u(c) = - — —, with & >0 , so that the elasticity of
1 —  ir
k = f  (k ) -  c ~ (n  + g  + S)k (1.10)
where c = C/AL. Given the resource constraint, the first order condition for 
maximising U in equation (1.12) entails:
14
(]/5)[ f \k ) - (6+ n+ p+ g)
The maximisation also involves a transversality condition, which ensures that 
the capital stock grows asymptotically at a rate less than the rate of return, f(k fl .  
Equations (1.10) and (1.11) determine the dynamics of k, y  and c.
As in the Solow-Swan framework, it is possible to reproduce the main 
findings of the convergence hypothesis from the log-linearization of the dynamic 
system and then obtain a relation between the initial level of y  and its following 
growth rate as in equation (1.8). However, in that case the parameter p , which 
governs the speed of adjustment to the steady state, is rewritten as:
Equation (1.12) allows us to identify all the determinants of p  that in the 
empirical analysis represent our parameter of interest. Again, the higher the value 
of p , the greater will be the responsiveness of the average growth rate to the gap
between ln (j/)an d  ln(j>0), that is, the convergence to the steady state will occur 
more rapidly. Firstly, it is clear from equation (1.12) that a higher 8  (depreciation 
rate) raises the speed of adjustment. In the limit, with full depreciation, convergence 
to the steady state would be immediate. A higher 0 (reduced willingness to substitute 
intertemporally) lowers the speed of adjustment towards the steady state, while a 
higher time-preference rate, p , raises it4.
In general, the key force underlying the convergence effect is diminishing
3 This result requires P >n .
4 King and Rebelo (1993) analyzed the transitional dynamics from a quantitative standpoint. They 
conduct dynamics simulations using a range of parameter values that are conventional in 
macroeconomics. They find that it is possible to explain sustained economic growth with transitional 
dynamics only with extremely counterfactual assumptions such as very low intertemporal substitution 
and/or a very high marginal product o f capital during the early stages o f development.
2/5 = (p  -  ri) -  { (p  -  n)2 + 4( ~ j f ) ( / °  + S  + n + g)[(p  + S  + n + g) -  a (S  + n + g)] }1/2
( 1-12)
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returns to reproducible capital. In other words, the extent of these diminishing 
returns, that is, the size of the capital-share coefficient a  in the production function, 
has a strong effect on p  . In particular, it has been shown5 that for small values of a  , 
diminishing returns set in rapidly, p  is large and convergence is rapid. As a  
approaches unity, the convergence becomes less and less rapid and, when a =  1, 
diminishing returns to capital disappear, p  tends to zero and we do not observe
convergence. In early endogenous growth models, it is assumed that a  =16.
In brief, the Solow model has many important implications. First of all, 
savings rates do not affect the long-run growth of per capita income. The crucial 
factor explaining the presence of a sustained long-run growth rate in an economy is 
the presence of exogenous technological progress. However, the savings rate affects 
the long-run level of per capita income. In particular, the Solow model predicts that 
economies converge to a steady state, where the key force that underlies the 
convergence effect is diminishing returns to reproducible capital; the process toward 
the steady state is called transitional dynamics. The steady state growth rate 
explained by the model is equal to zero; it is only possible to obtain continued growth 
in output per head if there is exogenous technical progress. If we have two economies 
identical in all respects, except their initial capital stocks, the one with the lower 
capital stock will grow faster and ultimately converge in living standards to the richer 
one. Thus, there should be a force that promotes convergence in levels of per capita 
income. Empirically, we should observe that the per capita growth rate tends to be 
inversely related to the starting level of output per person. This implication of the 
solovian model is referred to as the absolute or unconditional convergence 
hypothesis.
1.1.2 ...and conditional convergence
We have seen that countries would converge in the absolute sense if the only 
difference between them is the initial level of per capita income. One of the most 
convincing arguments in endogenous growth literature against the Solow model was
5 King and Rebelo (1993).
6 See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
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that the latter cannot account for international differences in income7, since there is 
no evidence of international convergence. However, there are two possibilities for 
reconciling evidence based on convergence, using the Solow model. The importance 
of the capital-share coefficient a  lies in the fact that it may help to compensate for 
this weakness of the Solow model. As previously stated, for values of a  close to one 
the transitional dynamic turns out to take a long time. Therefore, as shown by 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), if  we see the transitional dynamics as protracted, 
the model becomes potentially capable of explaining sustained cross-country 
differences in growth rates, thus providing a Solow-type explanation of these 
differences.
Secondly, economies may differ not only in their capital labour ratio but also 
in the level of technology, savings rate, depreciation rate or population growth rate. 
In particular, it is important to focus attention on the determinants of the steady state. 
From equation (1.3) we can deduce explicitly the steady state level of both k andy:
k '  = [ s l ( n  + g  + 8)-\m -a) (1.13)
The steady state level of per capita income (not in quantity per unit of 
effective labour) can be found simply by substituting equation (1.13) into the 
production function in logarithms:
In Y ( t )
L ( t )
= ln A (0 )  + gt-\— —— I n s ----—— ln(n + g  + 5 )  (114)
1 - a  1 - a
Equation (1.14) states that the steady state level of income per effective 
worker is positively related to the savings (or investment rates) of an economy while 
it is negatively related to parameters n, g  and S . It is also positively determined by 
the parameter A(0) which, as Mankiw Romer and Weil (1992) emphasise, represents 
not only the initial level of technology or knowledge, as previously suggested, but 
also institutions, climate and resource endowments. In general, if countries differ in
7 See Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988).
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one or more of these parameters, it is clear from equation (1.14) that they will end up 
in different steady states. In the latter case, only for given y*  can we say that the 
growth rate is higher the lower y(0), that is, the convergence is conditional in that 
y(0) enters in relation to y*9 which may differ across regions. Empirically, this means 
we would expect to observe poor countries growing faster than rich ones only if their 
respective steady state is similar. Yet if, for example, rich countries have a higher 
steady state level of per capita income with respect to poorer countries, poor 
economies will not necessarily grow faster. Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) were 
the first to examine empirically the conditional convergence relationship described 
by eq. 1.14. They examine empirically the set of countries for which non­
convergence has been widely documented in past work, and find that, once 
differences in savings and population growth rates are accounted for, (conditional) 
convergence does occur, as the Solow model predicts.
1.1.3 Endogenous growth: early divergence, possible convergence
The divergence hypothesis has been explicitly formulated and tested in various 
studies on endogenous growth. As stated above, one of the main motivations for 
further studies in endogenous growth literature has certainly been the model’s 
inadequacy in explaining the absence of convergence among countries Endogenous 
growth models are highly heterogeneous. A simple and unifying definition of the 
endogenous growth models uses their relationship with the Solow "model: what 
distinguishes the endogenous growth literature from the solovian approach is the 
possibility of positive long-run growth rates without the presence of exogenous 
technological progress. Nevertheless, different models within this literature give 
quite diverse interpretations regarding the engine of long-run growth.
Following Romer (2001), we distinguish two different classes of models 
within the endogenous growth literature. The first class assumes that the process of 
capital accumulation is central for explaining long-run growth paths. These models 
differ from Solow’s in that they assume the capital share coefficient to be a > 1, that 
is, they assume that returns to capital are constant or increasing. Non decreasing 
returns are usually explained by the introduction in the production function of a
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broad concept of capital that may include human capital8. In the second class of 
models, technology is a standard reproducible factor of production. In this case the 
process of accumulation of A is the key factor for explaining long-run growth. These 
studies determine how the technology evolves and describe what the possible 
determinants of innovation will be, seen as a distinct economic activity, i.e., they 
focus on the input A of the production function and its evolution over time. However, 
the original contribution of these works is not in their simple emphasis on 
technology. Undoubtedly, even in Solow’s view technological change lies at the heart 
of economic growth since it is the key factor in explaining long run growth. 
Nevertheless, while Solow believes that explaining technological progress is still too 
difficult a task for economic theory, and that the exogeneity assumption is the most 
reasonable one9, this is precisely what most endogenous growth models attempt to 
do. As Romer notes (1990b), technology or knowledge is a nonrival good but it is not 
necessarily nonexcludable as assumed by Solow. In particular, excludability depends 
on the nature of the knowledge produced and on the legal system governing property 
rights (or patenting and copyrights laws). Models assuming that technology shares 
both of these characteristics identify the public support for basic scientific research as 
the driving force for growth. Thus, government decisions become important for 
growth as it is necessary to subsidise the R&D sector. As in Solow, technology (or 
knowledge) is considered to be a purely public good, not something that the private 
sector can provide. Yet here, unlike in Solow’s model, long-run growth needs to be 
sustained. That is, technology is never manna from heaven. On the other hand, when 
knowledge created by R&D is excludable, it is possible to obtain mechanisms in 
which expenditure in R&D is motivated by the desire for private gain. In this case the 
developer of new ideas must have some degree of market power. Innovators can 
charge a fee for the use of the idea, where the fee is limited by the extent to which 
others are prepared to devote resources to learning the idea10.
8See Lucas (1988) and Rebelo (1991).
9 See Solow R. (1994).
lOOther forces which have raised interest because important for governing the allocation o f resources 
to the development of technology include economic incentives and social forces influencing the 
activity o f talented individuals and learning by doing. See Romer D. (2001).
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We include Romer’s model (1990b) in this framework, as it is one of the 
most influential studies of the new growth literature. Romer starts from the premise 
that technological change lies at the heart of economic growth. In particular, it is 
technological change that engenders continued capital accumulation. More precisely, 
the crucial input of production necessary for explaining long-run growth is the 
process of knowledge creation in an economy. Although closely linked, knowledge 
and technological progress are not one and the same thing. In particular, knowledge 
can be divided into two components: human capital and technology. While the first 
component cannot grow indefinitely, the second one can. This is 2m explicit criticism 
levied at the Lucas model, which identifies long-run growth (that grows indefinitely) 
exclusively with the growth of human capital. For Romer (1990b), the interesting 
case is that of a nonrival but not completely excludable good, where excludability 
depends on both the nature of the knowledge itself and on economic institutions 
governing property rights11. The consequence of a nonrival good when used as an 
input of production is that output does not have a constant returns to scale function of 
all inputs taken together. Therefore, technology is characterised by knowledge 
spillovers: the discovery of a new technology will not capture all the benefits of its 
investment. As a result, private efforts at technological improvements will be less 
than socially optimal. As an example of new technologies, Romer introduces the 
design of a new good: in this case technology is embodied in new capital goods. The 
idea is simple: this model shows that productivity increases because of ideas 
embodied in capital and material inputs. We will briefly introduce the main details of 
the model which describes an economy with four inputs of production: capital (K), 
labour (Z), human capital (H) and index of the level of technology (A). As in (1.9) 
households’ preferences are given by:
U  = '\U (c  ) e -“dt (1.15)
0
11 To avoid any confusion, we prefer to distinguish between models that focus on the importance of  
endogenising technological change distinct from capital accumulation and models that instead focus on 
processes o f capital deepening. However, there is a third class o f models that, following Arrow (1961), 
introduce the possibility that accumulation of knowledge occurs in part not as a result o f deliberate 
efforts, but as a side effect o f conventional economic activity; for example, as a side effect o f the
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where p  is the discount rate and U(C) is the usual isoelastic form. The representative 
household supplies skilled and unskilled labour (.H  and L) in perfectly competitive 
markets. Both the supplies of unskilled labour L, and human capital, H, are fixed. 
This is a three sector model including the production of the final good, technology 
(or R&D sector) and an intermediate good. Allocation of H  between the research and 
the final good sector is endogenous. We first analyse the final good sector. 
Households purchase consumption goods in a perfectly competitive final goods 
market. Final goods production function is given by:
where Y is the final good, Hy is the human capital used as an input of production in 
the final good sector and x, denotes the design of K  when technology i is available,
crucial assumptions here. Firstly, capital in (1.16) is disaggregated in an infinite 
number of distinct types of capital goods, x  = {*,}®,,  where all durables have
additively separable effects on output. By assuming that each unit of knowledge 
corresponds to the design for a new good, Romer simplifies the technology: A 
represents a count of the number of designs and, at any moment in time there is a 
bundle of capital goods defined by AP-. Given this assumption, the integrand in 
equation (1.16) implies that technology affects the production of final goods only 
indirectly through the list of intermediate goods used at any point in time, while 
knowledge affects growth via the production of new varieties of goods where the 
potential of developing new goods is limitless. A second important assumption is that 
all the x(i) enter symmetrically in the integrand of the final good production function 




where the design index is assumed to be a continuous variable. We identify two
production o f new capital.
12 Or, more precisely, at each time t there is some value A such that xi =0 for all i>A.
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Therefore:
Jjc(z) 1 “ pdi - A x  P (1.17)
o
The second sector is the R&D sector. In this model new technology can be 
created devoting human capital to research and using the existing technology. 
Allocation of human capital between the final good and the R&D sector is 
endogenously determined by H  =Hy+HA, and Ha. In particular, technology evolves 
according to the rule:
where A is a research success parameter. Human capital is an input into idea 
production function characterised by knowledge spillovers: researchers generate 
more varieties of products (more ideas) the greater the stock of knowledge from 
which to learn. Moreover, there is no uncertainty in the R&D sector: Romer assumes 
that investments would certainly produce innovation given an exogenous success 
param eter^.
We need now to describe the intermediate good sector where Romer 
abandons the perfect competition assumption. Following Schumpeter (1942), he 
characterises the intermediate goods sector by the presence of market power. Physical 
capital is measured in units of consumption good: capital goods are simply foregone 
consumption goods, with both types of goods subject to the same production 
function. This assumption implies that the capital goods sector may be considered as 
a separate sector from the final goods one but with the same technology. However, 
unlike in the final goods sector, for each durable good / there is a distinct firm, so we 
cannot describe the sector in terms of a representative firm. Each firm faces constant 
marginal costs and a constant elasticity demand curve. Therefore, the monopoly price 
of the intermediate good is a mark up over marginal cost. In order to produce, each 
firm needs to purchase the design of a good i from the research sector. This is a fixed 
cost for the intermediate good sector and represents the R&D expenditure of this
A = AH aA (1.18)
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economy. At the individual firm level, the failure of the perfect competition 
assumption is a consequence of the decreasing average total cost of producing x, 
which is given by the initial investment in design costs. Once it has bought the 
design, firm i can convert the design and 77 units of Y  (final output) into one unit of
capital good /. That is9 x = 1/ y - Note that here the developers of a new variety of
'  / 1
capital good are separated from the suppliers thereof 13. In other words, each time a 
new design is invented, its patent is sold. Potential suppliers of the new design bid to 
purchase the patent and become monopolists once they buy it. In this case, a new 
variety of good can be sold in the market at a price that is greater than its unit cost of 
production. But given the initial competition, the price of a new design will be equal 
to the present value of the net revenue that a monopolist can extract. With these 
assumptions, Romer develops a model that allows private profit-maximising agents 
incentives for making investments in the creation of new knowledge.
We now analyse the main implication of the model. First, given (1.17) and 
assuming that each x, is consumed and produced in the same quantity we obtain that 
aggregate capital is, at any point in time t, given by K t -  rpit x , and the final good 
production function may be rewritten as:
Y  = qAa+pH ay Lp0K ,-a-p (1.19)
where q = ij~(I~a~P), a constant. This equation represents the reduced form 
expression of (1.16). Although equation (1.16) is homogeneous of degree one, the 
final goods production function shows increasing returns (is homogeneous of 
degree 1 + a  + f i ). These are caused by the nonrival nature of knowledge, implying 
knowledge spillovers will occur.
Additional results can be described examining the model in the balanced 
growth equilibrium, g \  that is, when g*c -  g*K = g*Y =g*A- It can be shown that the
13 This is not an essential assumption.
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balanced growth rate is determined by:
. = Me + flH^ap ( 1 2 0 )
a0 + p
Equation (1.20) says that the balanced growth rate of an economy depends on 
the amount of human capital allocated in the R&D sector, Ha. Allocation of human 
capital in the R&D sector is influenced by the interest rate. In this model, the 
opportunity cost for H  to be allocated in the R&D sector is the wage that can be 
earned in the final good sector, while the returns to investing Ha in the R&D sector 
are represented by the stream of net revenue generated by a new design. A higher 
interest rate leads the present discounted value of the stream of net revenue to be 
lower and thus results in less human capital, Ha, being allocated as well as a lower 
growth rate. Contrariwise, a reduction in the interest rate should speed up growth. 
The last equality in (1.20) represents the parametrically expressed balanced growth 
rate. It shows that H, total human capital, enters the growth rate equation and that X , 
the research success parameter, has a positive effect on g*, while the discount rate, 
p ,  has a negative effect. Moreover, in (1.20), g  does not represent the efficient 
balanced growth rate because of the presence of a positive externality in research. 
There is a nonexcludable effect of R&D: when a new design is invented it increases 
the productivity of the R&D sector and this effect is not considered in the new 
design’s price. The social optimum can be obtained by subsidizing the accumulation 
of A.
In terms of the convergence/divergence hypothesis, it must be noted that there 
is no convergence mechanism operating here. If we consider two economies, the one 
with the larger Ha will grow faster indefinitely and neither GDP per capita levels nor 
long-run growth rates will converge. Romer explicitly introduces this possibility in 
Rivera Batiz and Romer (1991), where this model is further developed. Moreover, 
even if human capital is important in defining the dynamics of the growth process it 
cannot be considered as the ultimate source of long-run growth. In order for 
unbounded per capita income to grow indefinitely, we need to identify another 
unbounded input, i.e technological progress. Nevertheless, in this study the long-run
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growth rate of an economy ultimately depends on the stock of human capital. This 
assumption may lead us to include this model within the Nelson and Phelps approach 
analysed in sections 1.2.3 an 1.2.4.
The influence of Romer’s (1990b) model may be gauged by the many 
criticisms and extensions it has received. One of the first common criticisms of 
Romer’s (1990b) model within endogenous growth literature is that it has a scale 
effect. Equation (1.20) implies that a country with a larger skilled labour force should 
grow faster, since equation (1.18) implies that the growth of technology should 
follow the same path of human capital over time. In practice, though, this prediction 
is difficult to detect in actual data. This is widely known as the Jones (1995) critique 
and will be dealt with later. Moreover, the model does not account for obsolescence 
of capital goods because it assumes additive separability of durables in the final 
goods production function (in eq. 1.16). More precisely, in Romer, capital goods are 
horizontally differentiated implying that no one capital good is better than the others. 
Indeed, the more capital goods we have the more each type can be used for a specific 
task, thus making it more productive14. This characterisation of the growth process 
has been considered unsatisfactory by advocates of the so-called Schumpeterian 
approach. Aghion and Howitt (1992)15 have tried to overcome this problem by 
introducing the assumption of vertical differentiation of capital goods. Specifically, 
they introduce a mechanism of creative destruction whereby each time there is a new 
quality of capital good it assumes the old types to have become obsolete. In these 
quality ladder models, the variety of capital goods is fixed but the quality remains to 
be determined. Moreover, differently from Romer (1990b), they introduce 
uncertainty in the R&D sector, where uncertainty in the research process implies that 
the growth rate becomes stochastic. This approach is discussed in detail in section 
1.2 .6 .
Despite their heterogeneity, all endogenous growth models are similar to 
Romer’s (1990b) in that they do not sustain a solovian convergence mechanism.
14 Young (1928)was the first to develop the idea that growth is sustained by increased specialisation 
o f labour due to an increase in the variety o f goods produced.
15 See also Grossman and Helpman (1991).
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Nevertheless, even if this literature was at first associated with predicting divergence 
among economies, further developments showed that endogenous models could 
actually produce convergence. This point will be further investigated in the following 
paragraphs.
1.2 Human capital, technology and growth
The emphasis of endogenous growth models for technology is an indication of the 
importance ascribed to human capital as one of the major forces influencing growth. 
This is not to say that the role of human capital for growth was neglected by 
economists prior to 198616. From its earliest beginnings, economic theory has 
stressed the importance of human capital as a key factor for explaining growth. 
Arrow (1961) together with the works of Schultz (1962), Uzawa (1965), Nelson and 
Phelps (1966) are probably the most important early contributions to the theory of 
human capital and growth. Although Arrow (1961) does not explicitly introduce 
human capital in his study, his model does include externalities linked to the process 
of the accumulation of physical capital. It is a learning by doing model where the 
larger the scale of production, the greater the increase of the labour force’s on-the-job 
productivity. We find a different approach in both Shultz (1962) and Uzawa (1965), 
where human capital is explicitly introduced in their analysis and is not considered as 
a mere by-product of production.
In general, human capital should indicate the degree of ability of the labour 
force and is usually measured in terms of formal education levels or on the job 
training. Accordingly, investment in human capital entails investment (education, 
training...) geared to sustaining and developing the ability of individuals. The 
accumulation of human capital is costly (it subtracts time available to production) 
but it represents a remunerative investment. In the following sections we offer a 
selective survey of the more recent contributions of the theory of human capital and 
growth. Our aim is to investigate the role human capital plays in the various growth 
models and to examine specifically the predictions of different models with regard to
16 Romer’s (1986) model is considered as the first endogenous growth model.
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the convergence hypothesis17.
There is a substantial amount of literature on this. In order to classify the 
different models analysed we follow Aghion and Howitt (1998) and distinguish two 
different approaches that analyse the link between growth and education: the Lucas 
approach and the Nelson and Phelps approach. In the following sections we shall see 
that these two approaches include both endogenous and exogenous models. What 
characterises the different models is the assumed relationship between human capital 
and growth. What mainly characterises the Lucas approach (introduced in section
1.2.1 and 1.2.2) is the assumption that human capital enters a growth model simply 
as an additional input in a standard Cobb-Douglas production function and that 
capital accumulation is central force in generating growth. In other words, all these 
models imply there is a positive correlation between human capital accumulation 
and (long or short-run) growth rates. Therefore, empirically, we should observe that 
countries with different rates of investment in human capital grow at different rates.
Conversely, the Nelson and Phelps approach (see sections 1.2.3 and 1.2.4) 
does not emphasize the role of capital accumulation (both physical and human) as an 
engine of growth and stresses the importance of the process of technological change. 
Within this framework, human capital is a prerequisite for economic growth where 
“the growth rate of output will depend on the rate of innovation as well as on the 
level of human capital”18. Thus, (long or short-run) growth rates depend on stocks 
rather than on rates of accumulation of human capital. Moreover, human capital 
stock has two distinct roles in development processes. In particular, it has the dual 
role of increasing the rate of technological innovations, as well of sustaining the rate 
of adoption of existing technologies. The first role is generally related to 
technologically advanced economies or economies that may be considered at the 
technology frontier. The second role identifies a convergence mechanism resulting 
from technology transfers among economies rather than from factors accumulation as 
in the case of solovian convergence and, thus, should be important for less developed
17 Other important recent contributions not included in this survey are, for example, Becker, Murphy 
and Tamura (1990) and Benabou (1996).
18 Nelson and Phelps (1966).
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economies. Stocks of human capital again play a fundamental role since they increase 
the capacity to adopt and implement innovations or new technologies from more 
advanced countries.
Finally, in section 1.2.5 we examine the models that stress the influence of 
trade on technological transfers, while section 1.2.6 focuses in particular on the 
Aghion and Howitt (1998) model, where both human capital and learning by doing 
appear as determinants of the growth rates.
1.2.1 Human Capital and the Lucas Approach
This framework is characterised by the assumption that the role of human capital in a 
growth model is simply as an additional input in a standard Cobb-Douglas 
production function. Therefore, we identify a new input, total capital, which 
represents the sum of human plus physical capital. In general, the presence of an 
endogenous or exogenous growth mechanism crucially depends on how returns to 
total capital in the production function of this economy are viewed. The presence of 
non-decreasing returns in this augmented form of capital cause, as expected, non­
decreasing incentive to its accumulation as the stock of capital increases. Conversely, 
if total capital (human plus physical) is characterised by decreasing returns, 
incentives to its accumulation tend to decrease with an increase in its stock. In that 
case, human capital, even if it does not explain long-run growth, is still crucial for a 
better understanding of the process of transition towards long-run equilibrium. 
However, not all these models introduce augmented forms of capital. For example, 
Lucas (1988) assumes non-decreasing returns in the accumulation of human capital 
only, and identifies in this way the mechanism that causes the presence of an 
endogenous growth process.
Despite the presence of important differences, these models share a common 
assumption and a common testable prediction. First of all, this framework assumes 
that the process of accumulation of human capital is equivalent to that of physical 
capital. Secondly, all these models imply that an increase in human capital 
endowments positively affects an economy’s growth rate. However, it affects the 
long-run growth rate in Lucas, while it influences the short run growth rate or, more 
precisely, the growth rate o f the transitional dynamics in Mankiw, Romer and Weil
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(1992).
We shall first examine the Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) model 
(henceforth MRW), which was already introduced in section 1.1.2 when we defined 
the concept of conditional convergence. In this section we propose an augmented 
version of their model. Here, the standard solovian production function is augmented 
by human capital, H:
Y  = K a H ^(A L )l~a ~^ with ct + /3< 1 (1.21)
and the constraints are:
ic = s ky - ( n  + g  + 8  ) k
h = shy - ( n  + g  + S  )h
(1.22)
( 1.22’)
As in section 1.1, the lowercase letters denote a quantity per unit of effective labour. 
Equations (1.22) and (1.22’) are identical: MRW assume the same dynamics for both 
physical and human capital, where Sk and Sh represent the exogenous and constant 
propensities to invest in both types of capital. Thus, MRW assume the same 
technology for producing human capital as for producing physical capital. This is a 
controversial assumption and has been criticised by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare 
(1997a).19. The steady state values of physical capital, k *, and human capital, h*, are 
determined by:
k* =
s l~ps pdk 0h 
(« + g  + £ )
1/
(1.23)
19 They produce evidence showing that the technology for producing human capital is more intensive 
in labour than is the technology for producing other goods. Their evidence suggests factor shares of 
10%, 40% and 50% for physical capital, human capital and raw labour in the production of human 






(n + g  + S)
\-a-i
(1.23’)
By augmenting the model with human capital, MRW obtain a new expression 
for the steady state (indicated by the asterisk) of per capita GDP:
In Y(t)
L(t)
= lnA(0) + gt + a
1 - a - p
■Ins, +
1 - a - p
■Ins, ± £ - i n(n + g + S) d-24)
1 - a - p
Ultimately, the steady state of per capita income, in addition to the factors of 
the Solow’s textbook model described in (1.14), depends on £/,, the rate of 
accumulation of human capital. Substituting equation (1.24) in the usual convergence 
equation (1.8)20, we obtain a positive relationship between the growth rate of an 
economy and the rate of accumulation of human capital. Note that this is not the only 
possible specification of the convergence regression. MRW also introduce a 
specification of the convergence regression in which the growth rate of an economy 
is a function of the level of human capital. Nevertheless, this alternative specification 
of the growth process involves per capita income growth as a function of the steady 
state level of human capital. In fact, equation (1.24) can be rewritten as:
I n — =lnA(0) + gt-\ — lnsk + — Inh*-------— ln(n + g + S) 0*24)
_L\ 1 - a - P  1 - a - P  1 - a - P
In this case, by substituting equation (1.24’) within the convergence equation, 
we also find there to be a positive relationship between the growth rate of per capita 
income and the steady state level (or stock) of human capital. Note that in their 
empirical analysis, MRW introduce secondary school enrolment rates as a proxy for 
human capital. In other words, they probably consider equation (1.24) as the most
20 See also the section on beta convergence in chapter 2.
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appropriate specification of steady state21. In fact, h* should be considered 
unobservable, since in most countries it is implausible to assume that the observed 
human capital is at its steady state level.22
The MRW model has been highly influential within the growth-convergence 
debate. Theoretically, they have clearly illustrated the concept of conditional 
convergence, emphasizing that the Solow model predicts absolute convergence only 
under very restrictive assumptions. In this way, they provide a better description of 
cross-country data compared to the previous unconditional convergence-exogenous 
growth empirical literature, and show that it is not necessary to rely on endogenous 
models to explain the evident divergences among countries in international data sets. 
In their empirical analysis, they test for the determinants of the steady state including 
data on population growth rates, savings rates and secondary school enrolment 
rates23 and find evidence of conditional convergence. That is, they do not predict 
there will be convergence in levels of per capita income among countries, since 
economies converge towards different long-run levels of per capita income but will 
converge towards the same long-run exogenous growth rate. Moreover, by 
augmenting the Solow growth model with human capital, they predict a larger 
contribution of total capital to transitional growth, and thus predict the existence of a 
prolonged transitional dynamic process. With the inclusion of a human capital 
indicator in their empirical analysis, they also find plausible values for the structural 
parameters of the Solow model24.
Despite the differences existing between the two models, we include the 
Lucas (1988) model in the same class of models as MRW. Unlike the MRW one, this 
is an endogenous growth model where technological progress and, thus, long-run 
growth essentially coincides with the process of accumulation of human capital,
21 More precisely, during their empirical analysis they assume that actual values o f human capital 
stocks represent a good proxy o f their steady state value. However they never include in their 
regressions a measure o f the stock o f human capital arguing for a lack o f data on that variable.
22 On this see Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997a).
23 As a proxy for the accumulation o f human capital, sh.
24 In particular, the value o f the elasticity of output with respect to total capital, with an estimated 
value o f approximately 0.8.
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which is assumed to be unbounded25, and to determine the long-run growth of an 
economy. He describes an economy where human capital is the key factor of 
production and where the production of human capital does not require physical 
capital:
Differently from MRW, lowercase letters denote variables in per capita term; 
y  is the usual GDP, h denotes the human capital stock of the representative agent, u is 
the fraction of time allocated to production and ha represents the average human 
capital stock across individuals. Leisure is assumed exogenous and (1-u) denotes the 
time spent on education26. The presence of the parameter y > 0 implies an 
externality in the model. In this way, Lucas stresses the possibility of the existence of 
“internal” and “external” effects on the accumulation of human capital: the former is 
simply the effect of individual human capital on its own productivity while the latter 
arises from a simple positive externality that the average level of human capital has 
on the productivity of all factors. This assumption implies that competitive 
equilibrium does not equate with efficient equilibrium. Therefore, optimal 
equilibrium will only be obtained by the social planner equilibrium. However, as we 
shall see, the presence of an externality in the production function is not essential in 
order to obtain the main results of this model. In this framework, the representative 
agent maximises the standard constant relative risk aversion utility function given the 
constraints:
(1.25)
k  =  y - c  — nk (1.26)
h = c(l — u)h (1.26’)
25 This assumption has been criticised by Romer (1990b).
26 It is possible to relax this assumption. For a version of the Lucas model with leisure introduced 
endogenously see Solow (1994).
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Equations (1.26) and (1.26’) show that, unlike MRW, Lucas does not assume 
the same accumulation function for h and k. The parameter £ in (1.26’) represents 
the efficiency of the educational system. Equation (1.26’) is the key one: it implies 
the presence of a process of endogenous growth. Endogenous growth is determined 
by the presence of constant returns to accumulation of the existing stock of human 
capital. In this case, the rate of growth of the stock of human capital plays the same 
role as exogenous technological change does in the Solow model. In fact, the 
Hamiltonian of this problem is:
£1-<t -1
H(c,u,k ,h,X, ju)  = ---------------- e~pt + X(Akp (uhf~p hra - c - n k )
1 — O’ (1-27)
where the first order conditions are determined as usual. Rearranging the FOC’s and 
using the relationship between k  and y  we obtain:
.  .  • _ 1 - p  + y  fj T f  ,
g ' = g > = g , =  — — —  g„ O-28)
where g* denotes the steady state growth rates. It can be shown that:
g l  = - -------— -------- ( S  -  p )  (1.29)
<r(i-p + r ) - r
Equation (1.28) is what most interests us here. In this model, the per capita 
income growth rate turns out to be a proportion of the growth rate of human capital. 
In other words, unlike MRW, Lucas endorses the idea that the long-run growth of per 
capita output is driven by the accumulation of human capital. Therefore this model 
predicts divergence across countries: economies that invest more in human capital 
(richer economies) should grow faster. That is to say, there is no convergence in 
levels of per capita income among countries because each country converges to 
different long-run growth rates.
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However, in a more recent work, Lucas (1993) modifies this model including 
a comergence in levels mechanism. More precisely, he explicitly introduces 
knowledge spillovers among economies that cause the presence of a catching up 
process.27 In fact, Lucas (1988) can simply be modified by introducing two 
countries, and transforming equation (1.26’) as follows:
hi = 5 ( 1 — with 0 < / i < l  (1.30)
where the subscripts, 1 and 2, represent the two countries. In (1.30) we still have
constant returns on human capital for country 1 as before, but in this case note that 
•
hi  also depends on the level of human capital in country 2. More precisely, this 
equation captures the idea of possible interdependencies among economies because it 
accounts for ideas developed in one place affecting the development of new ideas 
elsewhere. In terms of growth rates:







Equation (1.31) implies that, if  u 1=112, and hj>h2, country 2 should grow faster until 
hj=h2 . Therefore, this relationship implies convergence in both per capita income 
levels and long-run growth rates between the two countries.
1.2.2 The Lucas Approach: multiple equilibria and clubs
The Azariadis and Drazen (1990) model introduces the existence of positive 
threshold externalities in education technology that lead to the existence of a 
multiplicity of equilibria and, thus, of steady state growth paths. They describe an 
overlapping generation model that allows economies with identical structures but 
different levels of investment in education to experience sustained differences in
27 The following example represents a further simplification o f the model proposed by Lucas (1993) 
but it is still able to incorporate the catching up mechanism.
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income per capita growth rates28. Individuals lives can be divided into two periods: 
when young, they inherit the aggregate human capital accumulated by previous 
generations and decide how much time to allocate to investing in education, w29, and 
how much time to allocate to production activities, (1-u).
As in Lucas (1988), the long-run growth rate, g*, is a function of investments 
in human capital and, more specifically, it turns out to be an increasing function of 
the productivity of education. We focus on the equation that defines how human 
capital accumulates during the lifetime of an individual:
h u = ( 1 + r (  u ,~:)  • ) h „ 0  -32)
where the subscript 1, denotes the individual when young, 2 when old, .9 is a 
parameter strictly less than one and ^represents the productivity of education and 
depends on the fraction of time allocated to education by the previous generation.
The existence of multiplicity of equilibria requires that there exists a positive 
threshold externality such that:
— y  u' - i < u « with 0<uo<l and y  « y  (1.33)
7  i f  > «.
where uo defines the threshold level of u. Suppose that the previous generation 
invested a low fraction of his time in education such that y ( u t_j)  =  y : in this case,
investment in education will be unattractive for the current generation as well, 
because private rates of return on human capital investment depend on the existing 
average quality of h. Therefore, we will observe “ ...a  tendency to perpetuate the 
successes and failures of the development process30”. This analysis of a single
28 We will follow a simplified version o f this model proposed by Aghion and Howitt (1998).
29 That is, as in Lucas (1988), u represents the fraction o f time allocated to education.
30 Azariadis and Drazen (1990).
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economy may be extended to a multiple economies framework. In fact, empirically 
this model implies the existence of convergence clubs. If two countries, A and B, 
have different initial human capital endowments where ua<uq and ub>uo, they will 
experience indefinite growth at different growth rates with g*A<g*B- Without any 
intervention, economies that have not invested sufficiently in education in the past 
will find themselves in a “low development trap”, that is, they will find themselves in 
the “poor countries” club. Moreover, we should observe different returns to 
education for the different clubs, with the rich countries club having the highest 
returns. There are no convergence mechanisms or knowledge transfers. Here, 
differences in actual investment rates of human capital should represent the key 
variable for explaining observed internationally divergent patterns of growth. And the 
policy implication is a simple one: in order to change club the government should 
subsidise education so that ut > uo.
1.2.3 From rates of change to levels: The Nelson and Phelps approach
An alternative approach to growth and education has its roots in the contribution of 
Nelson and Phelps (1966). This literature de-emphasises the role of capital 
accumulation (both physical and human) as the engine of growth and highlights the 
importance of the process of technological change. Within this framework “the 
growth rate of output will depend on the rate of innovation and, subsequently, on the 
level of human capital”31 and not on the rate of change of human capital as in the 
previous studies.
Moreover, the majority of these models stress the importance of a catch-up 
mechanism in which human capital plays a fundamental role. In general, the level of 
human capital determines the capacity to both discover and implement innovations. 
That is, technological improvement is the combination of two distinct types of 
activities, innovation and imitation. The first can be thought as pure research and 
takes place mainly in technologically advanced economies. The latter describes the 
capacity to adopt new technologies from abroad and demonstrates the possibility of a 
process of beta convergence occurring, that is, of a catch up process, among
31 Nelson and Phelps (1966).
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countries. The idea is that less advanced economies may be able to imitate/implement 
foreign technologies, since this process is cheaper than innovate.
Abramovitz (1986) was among the first to develop the idea of technological 
catch up as described above, though in a non-formal setting. He shares some ideas 
with endogenous growth models. Firstly, as were early endogenous growth studies, 
his studies were motivated by the search for a pattern in the observed wide variation 
in cross-country growth rates of output per man-hour. Secondly, he criticises the 
solovian approach, since catching up may explain the observed pattern of growth, but 
it does not represent a movement towards a steady state trend. Those who lag behind 
have the potential to experience higher growth rates. In particular, as in Nelson and 
Phelps (1966), the larger the technological and, therefore, the productivity gap 
between leader and follower, the stronger the follower's potential for growth in 
productivity. The idea is the often cited one: learning and imitating may be cheaper 
and faster than the original discovery and testing. Therefore, the distance between the 
level of development of the leader and that of a follower may be seen in terms of a 
stock of technological opportunities to exploit. Abramovitz distinguishes between 
potential and realised catching up. The former is measured by the gap between the 
leader countries and the backward countries, while realised catching up is the rate of 
exploitation of potential catching up. Actual exploitation depends on "the diffusion 
of knowledge, the rate of structural change, the accumulation of capital, and the 
expansion of the demand"32. More precisely, a country should have the social 
capability or the technological congruence to catch up with the leader; these 
concepts can be broadly identified with and explained in terms of technical 
competence, human capital and political, financial and industrial institutions. 
Therefore, in describing social capability determinants, he identifies many factors 
other than human capital. Despite his influence within literature on catching up, the 
limitation of the Abramovitz approach has been the absence of a clear theoretical 
background.
The following sections introduce different models that explain in a formal 
setting how this advantage of backwardness can lead to catch up. In particular, the
32 Abramovitz (1986).
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higher the level of human capital and the larger the technology gap between the 
follower and the technology leader33, the higher the resulting growth rate will be. 
Hence, it is possible to observe a convergence process: unlike in solovian 
convergence, this process is not produced by the existence of decreasing returns to 
capital accumulation but rather by the presence of knowledge spillovers or 
technology transfers.
1.2.4 The Nelson and Phelps approach: human capital and catching up
As in the Solow model, Nelson and Phelps (1966) describe a standard production 
function where technology is purely labour augmenting, that is, Y=F(K, AL), where A 
is the usual average index of technology. Moreover, they introduce the notion of an 
exogenously given theoretical level of technology T. In particular, T(t) can be seen as 
a measure of the stock of knowledge available to innovators, or as the technological 
frontier at time t, where T  grows exogenously at a constant exponential rate, g. That 
is, T(t)=T(0)e?\ where g>0. The major difference between this and the standard 
Solow model is described by the following equation:
Af t )
Af t )
= ® ( H ) T ( t ) - A f t )
Af t )
(1.34)
Equation (1.34) implies that the growth rate of A, the actual index of 
technology, is an increasing function of H, the level of educational attainment, and is 
also proportional to the gap between the theoretical knowledge, T, and A. Equation 
(1.34) also implies that the long-run growth rate of A is determined by the growth 
rate of theoretical knowledge, g, and that the long-run gap between T and A is 
determined by the level of H. In particular, when an economy has a positive level of
H  (exogenously determined) such that a / A  > g , we would observe a decreasing gap 
between T and A that causes a decrease in the current growth rate of A during the
33 Nelson and Phelps (1966) use the concept o f gap between the theoretical level o f technology and 
the level o f technology in practice. A more explicit definition o f leader and followers is found in 
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Figure 1.1
transition towards the common g. This process will continue until the growth rate of 
A is equal to g. Figure 1.1 describes this dynamic. We can interpret these results as 
implying the existence of a short run and a long-run Solow residual, where the 
former is influenced by the level of human capital while the latter is, as in Solow, 
exogenously determined. Thus, given H, in steady state the economy will grow at the 
rate g and will retain a constant gap between the theoretical knowledge and its actual 
level of technology where the equilibrium gap is given by
T( t )  -  A J t )  _ g  (135)
A ( t )  0 ( H )
where Aa represents actual technology. Equation (1.35) implies that the gap between 
T and A can be eventually reduced to zero by an increase in H, the human capital 
stock. Therefore, in terms of the convergence in levels prediction, the Nelson and 
Phelps model could be collocated within the conditional convergence literature. 
However, in this case the transitional dynamics at work constitute an explicit 
catching up process where the level of human capital plays the key role in defining 
the long-run gap that separates one country from the highest level of per capita
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income attainable. Even if, in comparison with Solow, the Nelson and Phelps model
capital within the growth process, ultimately, as in Solow, the long-run growth rate of 
technical progress is still exogenous. Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) extend this 
framework considering technological progress to be endogenously determined. 
Therefore, as do Lucas (1988) and Romer (1990b), they stress the endogenous nature 
of growth and technical progress, introducing a model in which a higher level of 
human capital, H, causes a higher long-run growth rate of technical progress, where 
H  is exogenously given. They extend the Nelson and Phelps model (hereafter NP) 
assuming an explicit process of diffusion of technology among countries. More 
precisely, following Nelson and Phelps (1966), they explicitly interpret T, the 
theoretical level of knowledge, as the technology level of a leading economy. The 
main difference with the Nelson and Phelps model is illustrated by the following 
equation:
As in equation (1.34), equation (1.36) represents the growth of total factor 
productivity for country Both f(Hj) and c(Hj) are non-decreasing functions of Ht. 
Thus, the growth rate of technology for a follower is given by two elements: the 
endogenous growth rate f(Hj) plus a catch-up factor. The leader will grow at the rate
that is A(t)= AL(0)e^ Hi^ . This hypothesis represents the crucial difference 
with the previous model. In NP f(HJ=0, where this assumption implies that Ht affects 
the growth rate of A,- only in transition. In this case, the more human capital is 
allocated to the R&D sector the better it will be for long-run growth. As a 
consequence, the dynamics among countries are here more complex, and the 
convergence to a common growth rate may be an extremely long process34. Despite 
the differences, both the NP model and the Benhabib and Spiegel (hereafter BS) 
model share the same conclusions. First, if a group of economies shares the same
represents a richer framework for understanding the role of technology and human
4(0 'm axA jX O  > (1.36)
4(0 f(HX0) + c(HX0) 
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level of human capital we should in the long-run observe complete convergence in 
both per capita income and growth rates. Secondly, if  we assume that Hf remain 
constant in each country (or that the ranking of Hi does not change across countries 
over time) the mechanism of technology diffusion and catch-up will at least 
guarantee convergence in growth rates: all countries eventually grow at the same rate 
as the leader, the latter acting as the locomotive. Their contribution is also of an 
empirical kind. In particular, their study was one of the first attempts to estimate the 
NP approach and to distinguish between what they call the neoclassical convergence 
effect and catch-up due to technological transfers. They use the standard growth 
accounting methodology, where the production function is given by 
Yt = At{Ht) K*t f  and obtain the following regression equation:
(log yr -  log y0) = c + (g -  m)H, +TnH,(Ymax/Y,) + a  (log Kr -  log K0)
+P (log Lj -  log ) + (log eT -  log e„)
where the stock of human capital enters twice among regressors. Firstly, it acts as a 
determinant of endogenous technological progress and measures the ability of a 
country to innovate. Secondly, it enters the regression multiplied by the technological 
gap of country i from the leader, and test for the ability of a country to catch up. A 
positive and significant coefficient on this interactive term implies that the more 
educated the population the greater the catch up effect will be (or that the effect of 
education will be proportionately greater when the productivity gap is large). Note 
that, in this specification, given that technology is unobservable, BS use, as a proxy 
of technology gap, the difference in GDP levels between country i and the leader. 
Interestingly, they find that, using a sub-sample of poor countries, only the catch up 
term has a significant effect on the regression, while the first term is significant and 
positive only for a sub-sample formed by rich countries. However, among rich 
(mainly OECD) countries the catch up term is not significant. While they claim that 
these results are consistent with their theory35, with rich countries that innovate and
34 This is true if, for example, we assume that f(Hi)>c(Hi).
35 As in BS (1994) “We obtain the most striking results from the richest third of the sample,...”.
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poor countries that imitate, we find the absence of evidence of technology transfers 
among rich economies not totally convincing. Evidence of the presence of a 
convergence process among rich countries dates back to Baumol (1986) and, in 
general, one assumption that is usually found in this literature (this study included) is 
that technological transfers are likely among similar countries. Less convincing 
results also include the evidence for middle-income countries, where they do not find 
any significance for human capital variable. Finally, this study stresses the danger in 
empirical analysis of the possible observational equivalence between technology 
transfers and the neoclassical convergence mechanism, that is, convergence due to 
capital accumulation in transitional dynamics. In fact, the catch up term in eq. 1 
could capture the effect of both. To evaluate this problem, they introduce initial 
income as a further regressor in eq. (1.37), and show that the result on the catch up 
term is not influenced by this new variable.
In a more recent paper, Benhabib and Spiegel (2002) examine an alternative 
formulation that introduces a mechanism whereby the rate of technological diffusion 
decreases as the distance to the leader increases. A logistic model of technology 
diffusion is given by:













The difference between eq. (1.36) (defined as the exponential model of technology
diffusion) and this logistic model is the term 4 ( 0
max A At)
v j .
. In this formulation, the
second term of the RHS includes two contrasting mechanisms. The first is the 
standard catch-up mechanism, but the extra term acts in an opposite direction since 
the positive contribution of human capital to TFP growth tends to be smaller, the 
greater the distance between the leader and the follower. This implies that the usual
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catching-up mechanism is therefore more effective at intermediate distances from the 
leader, while is less effective for both very laggard and advanced countries. 
Therefore, the logistic model further stresses the importance of investments in human 
capital: countries with a very low level of human capital may become unable even to 
exploit their advantage of backwardness and risk being “trapped in the wrong club”. 
That is, this model identifies an explicit ‘club convergence’ mechanism. Assuming 
that the ranking of Ht does not change across countries and over time it is possible to 
show that if a country i has c(//,.) + f ( H i) - f ( H leader) > 0  then this country will
converge in growth rates with the leader, while if c ( //J) + / (Ht) -  f  (Hleader) < 0
growth rates diverge, and the laggard country will continue to further distance itself 
from the leader.
Again, in their study BS make an interesting empirical contribution. In 
general, the empirical literature on convergence clubs has probably not evolved pari 
passu with its theoretical developments. Evidence of divergence and, in particular, 
“twin peaks” evidence in cross country analysis that use the income distribution 
dynamics methodology developed by Quah36, is certainly consistent with the club 
hypothesis. Nevertheless, there are very few attempts to estimate what is one of the 
main implications of these models, which is the presence of thresholds that cause a 
country to settle in either the poor or rich countries club. As observed by Azariadis 
and Drazen (1990) for their “ ...model to have sharp predictions, one would need to 
know the location of such human capital thresholds...and if they differ across 
economies”.37. Unlike Azariadis and Drazen, they use empirical analysis to derive a 
point estimate for the minimum initial human capital level necessary for a country to 
exhibit catch-up in TFP relative to the leader economy.
Instead of proxying TFP with GDP levels as in BS (1994), they estimate TFP 
levels as the residual in a standard level accounting framework:
36 See Quah (1996), (1997) and (1999).
37 And they conclude that “In the absence of such information, the working hypothesis that emerges is 
that economic growth should be correlated with human investments relative to per capita income”.
(1.39)
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with A representing TFP. More precisely, they assume a constant returns Cobb- 
Douglas production function with capital share set at 1/3 and labour share at 2/3, 
equal for all countries. With this TFP measures they may estimate:
( fc} ( A }s= b + g + - K + K + £i
l  SJ  ^"^max j
(1.40)
where a represents the log of TFP and Amax is the TFP level of the leader economy. 
They show that this specification nests both the exponential and the logistic 
functional form of technology diffusion. In particular, when s=-l this specification 
corresponds to the exponential model defined by eq (1.36), while if we assume s=l, 
we obtain the logistic model of eq. (1.38).
They use a cross country dataset of 84 countries from 1960 to 1995 and 
estimate this nonlinear specification using maximum likelihood. The values obtained 
for s seem to favour using the logistic model38. Moreover, the coefficient of the catch 
up term is negative and significant while that of human capital is positive and 
significant as the theory would predict. These results are fairly robust to the exclusion 
of the constant term, the use of different proxies for h and are not dependent on the 
non-linear specification 39. However, apart from the catch-up term result, other 
results are not robust to the inclusion of other conditioning variables. Finally, they 
obtain a point estimate for the minimum initial human capital level necessary for a 
country to exhibit catch-up in TFP relative to the leader economy. At each point in 




38 Their point estimate of s is equal to 2.304.
39 They use both the initial level and the average level o f human capital and estimate eq.(1.40), 
imposing s= l.
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where hmaxt is the log of human capital of the leader at time t. Thus, if Hit > H* an
economy should experience a faster TFP growth than the leader and viceversa. They 
estimate these thresholds in terms of average years of schooling for 1960 and 1995, 
and find H*960 =1.78 and H*995 = 1.95. They observe that, in 1960, 27 nations had
Hit< 1.78 and find that 22 out of 27 actually showed slower TFP growth than the 
leader nation (USA). Moreover, in 1995 only 4 nations (Mali, Niger, Mozambique 
and Nepal) had Hu < 1.95 and thus, are predicted to stay behind exhibiting a slower
TFP growth than the leader. If confirmed, the observation that the poor club currently 
include only 4 nations is certainly reassuring, with eighteen nations that moved from 
the poor to the rich club. We will have to wait a few years to find out if this 
reassuring prediction is confirmed by data.
Finally, we conclude this introduction to the NP approach with the Jones 
(1995) critique. Jones observes that the NP approach implies counterfactual 
predictions. With the exception of BS(2002), in this approach the growth rate of A, 
an index of technology, is an increasing function of H, the level of educational 
attainment. Thus, we should observe in actual data that increased research effort 
causes an increase in the growth rate. But this is not the case. In most developed 
countries human capital and research effort have increased continuously in the last 
decades but these countries did not experience accelerating growth rates. Thus, to 
reconcile theory with data it is necessary to assume some form of decreasing returns 
in the R&D sector, with new discoveries becoming increasingly hard as the stock of 
existing knowledge (or human capital) increases. Otherwise, as noted by Cannon 
(2000), to be consistent with the stylised facts concerning human capital, the 
relationship linking technology to human capital should be modified. The growth rate 
of A should be an increasing function of the human capital to output ratio40 with an
A(t) (  H  ^"augmented Nelson-Phelps (NP) approach" characterised by ------= y — , where
A(t) y Y
y is some function with a positive first derivative. However, in this case it becomes 
impossible to distinguish this augmented NP approach from Lucas, as Cannon shows
40 See Segestrom (1998) and Howitt (1999).
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that the Lucas approach implies an identical relationship between A and H/Y unless 
we assume that there is no variation in the ratio of human capital to output. But this, 
again, seems a counterfactual assumption.
1.2.5 Human capital, catch up and openness to trade
The models reviewed above describe a catch up mechanism resulting from 
technology transfers with human capital levels acting as the main determinant. 
However, these models do not describe any mechanisms that may affect the existence 
of transfers of technology among countries. In the models analysed so far, with the 
possible exception of BS (2002), where human capital needs to exceed a certain 
threshold for catch up to take place, transfers of technology and catch up are 
considered as inevitable or automatic. In contrast to this approach, other studies focus 
specifically on the possible existence of barriers to the adoption of technology from 
abroad. Quoting Parente and Prescott (2000): “The relevant question is: Why don’t 
poor countries use the existing stock of usable technology more efficiently?” 41 Many 
factors have been identified as important for a country to be able to imitate and 
implement new technologies from abroad. We saw in section 1.2.3 how Abramovitz 
(1986) distinguishes between potential and realised catching up and how the latter 
depends on the social capability of a country identified with its technical 
competence, human capital as well as the structure of its political, financial and 
industrial institutions. Parente and Prescott [(1994) and (2000)]~ have further 
developed this idea. They focus in particular on the existence of barriers to the 
adoption and efficient use of more productive technologies, where such barriers are 
the primary result of country-specific policies. Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes 
(2003) focus on the effect of financial development on convergence and examine 
how financial constraints may prevent countries from taking full advantage of 
technology transfer.
However, among the factors influencing technology diffusion, trade policies 
have been identified as one of the main determinants, since they are a sort of
41“ ...This is why the focus o f the book is on barriers to the adoption and efficient use of more 
productive technologies, and not on the creation o f  more productive technologies.” Parente and 
Prescott (2000) page 5.
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necessary vehicle for technological spillovers to take place. For Abramovitz (1986), 
trade helps to explain why we observe catching up among western economies. He 
identifies the years following World War II as an exceptional period, where many of 
the elements required for rapid growth and catching up came together. There was a 
group of countries with similar economies, large technological gaps but with a 
relatively (highly) educated labour force that opened them to trade. In general, 
theoretical models have identified different positive channels through which trade 
affects an economy’s productivity42. Firstly, the larger variety of products and 
intermediate capital goods available to an open economy may enhance its 
productivity. Secondly, trade is usually associated with cross-border learning of a) 
new product designs, b) new production and organisational methods and c) market 
conditions. In other words, we can think of technology transfers as taking place 
directly through flows of ideas or indirectly through flows of goods, where both are 
enhanced by trade-friendly policies. All these factors increase the efficiency with 
which domestic resources are allocated, and enable a laggard economy to learn and 
imitate foreign technologies. Thus, trade-induced technology transfers may lead to 
cross-country convergence. However, the standard international trade literature 
stresses also another effect o f trade. In fact, in a multi-sector framework, trade may 
induce a country to specialise and, thus, allocate its factors of production to specific 
sectors, determined by its comparative advantages. As we shall see later, if different 
sectors have different growth potential, this allocation effect may induce divergence 
instead of convergence.
The idea that trade is both 1) a necessary vehicle for technological spillovers 
that bring about convergence and 2) a possible cause of divergence due to the 
specialisation induced by the working of the law of comparative advantage, was the 
subject of a study by Rivera Batiz and Romer (1991). They looked in particular at 
how two economies interact through trade and investigate the possible effects of 
competition, market size and trade policy on both long-run growth rates and steady 
state levels of per capita income. Human capital factors are of fundamental 
importance in explaining both the long-run growth rate as well as convergence.
42 See also the discussion in Coe, Helpman and Hoffinaister (1997).
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Countries will only converge towards the same level of per capita income if they 
have the same stock of human capital allocated to the R&D sector. The model is 
based on Romer (1990b)43. Within this framework, we explicitly consider two 
different countries (1), home country, and (2), foreign country and their interactions 
through trade. If we extend the nonrival nature of technology to this two country-two 
sector case44 we should observe the presence of increasing returns due to 
international knowledge spillovers. We focus here on the so-called knowledge 
driven45 specification of the R&D process that represents a simple extension of 
Romer (1990b) to open economies. Moreover, we assume that countries are identical, 
that is, they have similar endowments and technologies. This assumption is essential 
since we need not be concerned with the “comparative advantage” effect that would 
arise in a multi-sector trade model and can thus focus on the pure scale effect of 
trade. Countries produce only one final good by means of raw labour, human capital 
and the stock of capital, where K t =rjAtx in both countries as in Romer (1990b). To
examine the main features of this model we focus on the R&D sector. In autarchy 
this process will be characterised, for both countries, exactly as in equation (1.18):
A  (with i=l,2) will be influenced by A the research success parameter assumed 
constant between countries, H*A and A . After trade this process is characterised
differently. Rivera Batiz and Romer (1991) distinguish two possibilities: 1) free trade 
of goods with no flows of ideas and 2) free trade of goods and ideas. The first case 
implies there will be a level effect of trade. In fact, given the view of technology 
assumed in eq. (1.18), growth rates are not affected by trade. However, free trade of 
goods implies that the number of machines used in each country approaches twice 
the number that have been produced domestically since in their pursuit of monopoly
43 The description o f the structure o f production technology in the manufacturing sector is based on 
equations (1.15), (1.16), (1.17), while (1.19) describes the structure o f production technology in the 
manufacturing sector in both countries.
44 As shown in section 1.1.3, Romer’s model (1990b) can be reduced to a two-sector model, where 
the manufacturing sector includes both the final good sector and an intermediate good sector.
45 We find similar conclusions with the so called lab-equipment specification o f the R&D process. In 
this specification o f  the model it is not necessary to observe a free flow o f ideas for catching up to take 
place. It is sufficient that there be o f free trade o f goods. See Rivera Batiz and Romer (1991).
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rents, researchers in both countries will avoid redundancies. Therefore, trade affects 
the level of output produced in both countries46 but does not have any effect on 
growth rates.
In contrast to the previous case, the second case involves a growth effect. In 
particular, if we define Aworld=A1+A2, free flows of ideas imply:
A1 =XH\AwoHd and A2 = XH2AAworld (1.42)
As compared with equation (1.31), in this case the rate of growth of new ideas in 
each country depends not only on the human capital allocated to the R&D sector, HJa 
and H2a, as before, but also on Aworld, which represents the sum of the stock of 
knowledge of both countries. In other words, the entire stock of knowledge can be 
used in both countries47 at the same time. But, if economies are identical then 
Aworld = 2A . Therefore, eq. (1.42) implies the presence of knowledge spillovers and, 
as described, the R&D sector is characterised by the presence of a scale effect. 
Integration immediately raises the long-run growth rates of these countries, purely 
because it increases the extent of the market. In fact, economic integration with 
knowledge spillovers improves the efficiency of the research sector. In autarchy, we 
would observe redundant efforts, with one economy devoting resources to 
discovering a design that already exists in the other country. Finally, note that, in the 
long run growth rates will be equal in both countries as the technology growth rate 
may be rewritten as:
(1.42’)
As in equation (1.31) the presence of the ratio of to on the RHS in (1.42’) 
implies that the free flow of ideas/technology would finally equate the long run
46 See eq. (1.19).
47 And also in both sectors.
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growth rates in both countries.
However, Rivera Batiz and Romer (1991) develop other interesting cases that 
imply different results. In particular, when countries are not similar, there is another 
possible effect of trade liberalisation to consider, i.e. the so-called allocation effect. 
This effect may explain how specialisation creates persistent growth differentials 
and, thus, shows when interaction among countries is not beneficial. As stated above, 
trade can also influence the allocation of human capital among sectors, thus affecting 
a country’s pattern of growth. The idea is a simple one. Trade may strongly affects 
the reallocation of inputs of production between sectors on the grounds of 
comparative advantage. In these models, comparative advantage can be determined 
by different initial conditions. Therefore, the flow of goods that follows from the 
opening to trade could induce an increase in specialisation and the presence of 
increasing returns with specialised inputs in the manufacturing sector. In this case, 
we can hypothesise two different scenarios. Firstly, if trade causes Ha to expand as a 
result of increased specialisation, assuming the absence of knowledge spillovers 
among sectors, the allocation effect increases the long-run rate of growth of one 
country. Conversely, the allocation effect has a negative influence on growth in the 
other trade partner, because trade causes Ha to fall. In other words, the different 
allocation of basic inputs between the two sectors affects sectoral output which in 
turn affects long-run growth. In conclusion, it is only in the absence of the allocation 
effect, that the scale may turn out to be the source of large dynamic gains, uniformly 
distributed among countries with similar economic structures. Therefore policy 
implications in this case are not so simple. A country should open to trade only if the 
resulting allocation effects are small, and this will be true only if  trade occurs among 
similar countries. Note that this model assumes absence of spillovers across different 
sectors. In this case, we may even observe two countries converging to different 
steady state levels of per capita income but towards the same long-run growth rate. 
When trading partners have different initial conditions, Lucas (1988)48, Grossman 
and Helpman (1991) and Young (1991) show the conditions under which 
comparative advantage produces large allocation effects and growth can be larger




Empirical evidence of the presence of R&D spillovers through trade among 
different countries may be found in Coe and Helpman (1995) and Coe, Helpman and 
Hoffmaister (1997)49. Using different samples50 these studies find evidence of R&D 
spillovers where international trade plays an important role. These are present among 
the group of industrialised economies, but there is also evidence of developing 
countries benefiting from R&D investments realised in industrialised economies.
1.2.6 Human Capital, R&D and learning by doing
Finally, let us look at Aghion and Howitt’s (1998) model since, unlike all the models 
examined so far, it introduces the interesting possibility of the role of human capital 
allocated in the R&D sector not being strictly positive for growth and, in addition, 
stresses the importance of learning by doing processes for growth51. In particular, 
they further develop the idea of the existence of many kinds of innovative activities 
generating many kinds o f knowledge and distinguish between fundamental 
innovative activity, represented by the R&D sector, and secondary research, which 
includes all improvements in technology due to learning by doing activity. Any 
innovation resulting from R&D could potentially lead to a new product while 
innovations, resulting from learning by doing, bring about new ways to improve the 
quality of the goods that have already been invented. Thus, there is a clearly 
observable link between research and learning by doing. This is_ a two-sector 
shumpeterian model with a final good sector and an intermediate good sector. That 
is, there is a mechanism of creative destruction, where entrepreneurs continuously 
look for new ideas, or new products and new ideas affect the profit potential of rivals 
because old ideas (products) become obsolete. The final goods sector is governed by 
perfect competition. The unique final consumption good is produced with a
49 More recently, the positive role played by trade in the adoption o f new technologies is also stressed 
in Cameron, Proudman and Redding (1999) and Comin and Hobijn (2003) among others. On this, see 
also Chapter 5.
50 21 OECD countries plus Israel in Coe and Helpman (1995) and a large sample o f 77 developing 
countries in Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (1997).
51 This model has been firstly developed in Aghion and Howitt (1996) but it is widely discussed in 
their 1998 book.
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continuum of intermediate goods of different vintage. In this second sector each 
intermediate goods producer has some monopoly power. There are only skilled 
workers H  and each worker decides whether to engage in research or production. The 
flow of new products is described by XrH r , where L f  represents workers employed 
in the research sector, and Xr is the Poisson arrival rate of fundamental innovations, 
a fixed exogenous parameter. Newly invented goods are potentially better because 
they incorporate a higher level of general knowledge. The model is not described in 
detail here and we include only two explicit equations. First, the aggregate final 
output that is given by:
Y, = I  X H ' A tZ,_ (x,_t ) - d r  = £  Y„dr  (1.43)
where At represents the general knowledge in date x , xa is the labour input used in
production of each intermediate good of age “a” and Za represents the quality of the 
good. The second equation represents the growth of general knowledge that is given 
by:
—  = G(ArH r, Learning -  By -  Doing)  0  -44)
4
where G=0 if Hr=0 or LBD=0. The function G strictly increases in both arguments. 
In steady state, the economy’s growth rate will equal A ,  or the growth rate of
4
general knowledge. As previously stated, one of the most interesting implications of 
this model is that there is a possible negative effect on the growth of human capital 
allocated in the R&D sector. There exists an optimal level of research, L f*, that 
maximises the steady state long-run growth. Beyond this threshold level, Lf*, too 
many resources in terms of human capital are devoted to research at the expense of 
production. Therefore, because G depends also on secondary innovations, or learning 
by doing, we observe that, beyond this threshold level, the growth rate of innovations 
and ultimately the growth rate of the economy tend to decrease as Lf  increase.
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In conclusion, this model has many virtues since it stresses the importance of 
both R&D and learning by doing in the growth process and describes how an 
economy can risk allocating too much of its qualified labour force to the research 
sector. Nevertheless, originality of results has probably been achieved at the expense 
of plausibility. At present though, it seems that most economies are far from running 
the risk of allocating too much their qualified labour force in the research sector.
1.3 Summary: different notions of convergence and predictions of exogenous 
and endogenous models
So far in this Chapter we have seen that there is no single concept of convergence 
and that each possible concept of convergence is associated to dissimilar patterns. To 
clarify this question, this section will try to summarise some of the differences-^. 
Among exogenous models, we have seen that in his influential studies Solow was 
probably more interested in the analysis of within country convergence than in its 
across countries dimension. The concept of within country convergence should 
actually relate to the transitional dynamics of the solovian model, where each 
economy converges towards its dynamically stable equilibrium whatever its initial 
condition. In other words, each economy inevitably converges towards its long-run 
equilibrium. At first, the notion of within country convergence was associated with 
the concept of across country convergence. Indeed, if a group of economies share the 
same long-run equilibrium we should observe poor countries catching up with the 
richer ones. We have called this hypothesis unconditional or absolute convergence 
hypothesis. However, later developments showed that the presence of within country 
convergence will not necessarily mean that across country convergence will take 
place.
The conditional convergence literature demonstrates that there is not 
necessarily a unique equilibrium among countries, since each country tends to 
converge to its own equilibrium level of income. In particular, this hypothesis 
assumes that, across countries, convergence is valid only if factors affecting the long- 
run equilibrium are the same. Note then that, despite the possibility of different
52 Additional definitions, prominent in empirical literature, will be examined in chapter 3. A survey of 
the different concepts o f  convergence can be found in Islam (2003).
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steady states, the conditional convergence hypothesis assumes that each country 
converges towards its own unique equilibrium. This specification is important if we 
want to distinguish the concept of conditional convergence from the notion of 
convergence clubs. In fact, the two concepts are often assumed to carry the same 
meaning. Nevertheless, there is another possible interpretation, where, unlike 
conditional convergence, the convergence clubs hypothesis implies the possibility of 
the existence of multiple equilibria for each country.
Further, it is important to distinguish between convergence in growth rates 
versus convergence in levels. In general, we have seen that both the concepts of 
conditional and unconditional convergence imply that, in the long-run, each country 
converges towards the same, exogenously given growth rate. Therefore, it is 
sometimes said that conditional convergence models entail convergence in steady 
state growth rates of per capita income, while they do not assume convergence in 
steady state levels o f income.
Finally, the sections above show endogenous growth models characterised by 
both divergence and catch up. Divergence implies that each country converges 
towards its own long-run level of income and its own long-run growth rate. 
Conversely, the catch up hypothesis implies convergence in levels and growth rates 
but must be distinguished from standard solovian convergence, since the first is due 
to technology transfers while the latter to capital accumulation. In other words, a 
process of convergence in steady state levels across countries may be due to these 
different mechanism:
1. Convergence due to capital accumulation;
2. Convergence due to technology transfers (catch up);
3. Convergence due to both (1) and (2).53.
Conversely, evidence of the absence of convergence in steady state levels across 
countries may be theoretically explained by models implying:
• Divergence (or absence of convergence in both steady state levels and growth 
rates across countries);
• Conditional convergence (with the presence of convergence in steady state
53 See also Chapter 5.
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growth rates across countries);
• Convergence clubs (with the presence of convergence towards different 
steady state growth rates depending on the club).
Finally, Table 1.1 offers a brief summary of some of the most important 
endogenous and exogenous models characterised in term of their ability to explain 
the observed convergence in per capita GDP levels. In general, we focus on the 
across dimension of the convergence process in terms of per capita income levels. 
This is the notion of convergence related with the first of our starting questions: Are 
poor countries catching up with the richer ones? This final section reviews the 
predictions of the different models examined so far with respect to this specific 
concept of convergence. We may also refer to this notion in terms of observed 
convergence as we shall refer specifically to the idea of a group of countries 
converging towards the same level of per capita GDP. From now on, in this Table we 
use the word “convergence” without any further specification with this meaning 
while we introduce the term divergence in a broad way as implying the absence of 
convergence in levels.
We identify the following four different possible categories: a) exogenous 
models predicting convergence, b) exogenous models predicting divergence, c) 
endogenous models predicting convergence, d) endogenous models predicting 
divergence. We should note that there are many models that can belong to more than 
one category. In fact, the prediction of convergence/divergence depends on initial 
assumptions since the same model may describe both mechanisms. Therefore, we 
specify the main assumptions that lead these models to predict convergence or 
divergence. For example, among exogenous models, the Solow model is able to 
explain both observed convergence and divergence. Assuming countries share the 
same technology and preferences (and possibly, other determinants of the steady 
state) the transitional dynamics of the solovian model imply convergence will occur. 
Nevertheless, Mankiw Romer and Weil (1992) show the assumptions required for the 
Solow model to explain the observed diverging pattern in per capita GDP in 
international data sets. In fact, when countries are dissimilar, the Solow model 
predicts conditional convergence, since in this case transitional dynamics cause 
different countries to converge towards different steady state levels. Among
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exogenous models we have also included NP (1966): assuming countries have the 
same stock of human capital, this model predicts convergence due to technology 
catch up. Conversely, when countries have different human capital endowments, this 
model implies what we have called conditional catching up: laggard countries still 
enjoy the advantage of backwardness and still converge towards the same 
(exogenously given) long-run growth rate, but they never reach the steady state level 
of per capita income of the most technologically advanced economies.
Within endogenous literature, models are more complex and the classification 
becomes more puzzling. Endogenous growth studies suggesting the possibility of 
convergence in per capita levels of GDP among different countries usually assume 
the existence of knowledge spillovers from rich to poor countries that eventually 
generate a catching up process. In general, these models share the idea that, unlike 
Solow (1956) but similar to NP (1966), the pace at which the potential for catch-up is 
actually realised in a particular period does not depend on the accumulation of 
capital. However, even in this class of models, convergence is not the only possible 
outcome. To be able to explain convergence, these models need to assume that 
different countries are somehow “similar”. In particular, we would only observe 
convergence (and also convergence in growth rates) when different countries share 
the same stock of human capital. In other words, when countries are not similar, 
these models predict divergence. In general, we may divide endogenous models 
predicting divergence into two categories. The first is the one just described. It 
includes models characterised by the presence of transfers of technology but absence 
of convergence. The second category stresses the presence of non-decreasing returns 
to inputs in a standard production function. Therefore, there is no emphasis on 
transfer of technology or, in general, interdependencies among countries. When 
incentives to factor accumulation are non-decreasing, the gap between poor and rich 
countries stays constant or continues to increase. If a rich country invests more than a 
poor one, long-run growth rate of the former will be indefinitely larger than that of 
the latter. Among the most influential studies we can cite Rebelo (1991), Lucas 
(1988) and Romer (1986, 1990). A final observation concerns the hypothesis of 
convergence in growth rates: unlike in exogenous literature, endogenous models 
predicting divergence emphasise the absence of convergence in growth rates as well
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as that in levels.
Summarising with a play on words, we might conclude that during the last 
fifteen years there has been a convergence of ideas between endogenous and 
exogenous models with respect to the convergence hypothesis. Despite the still 
theoretically important difference between models that assume exogenous versus 
models that assume endogenous long-run growth rates, both theories predict that a 
mechanism of convergence is possible, but it will only be so among similar 
economies. In particular, most theoretical literature assumes that similar levels of 
human capital are fundamental for catch up to take place. Therefore, both theories are 
currently able to explain a stylised fact of the empirical literature on growth, namely 
the observed convergence among groups of homogeneous countries and the absence 
of convergence when large and heterogeneous data sets are introduced. This 
observation explains why, with current econometric techniques, it is not possible to 
discriminate endogenous versus exogenous models by simply using a convergence 
regression. The following Chapter is dedicated to the various problems relating to the 
empirical literature on growth and convergence.
Table 1.1
Exogenous models Endogenous models
Cause of observed 
convergence
Absolute convergence=convergence towards a unique steady state 
income level and growth rate -> transitional dynamics or catching 
up.
Emphasis on: Solow (1956): decrasing returns with identical 
technology and preferences. Nelson and Phelps (1966): 
technological catching up and similar countries
Possible convergence in levels=unique steady state income level and 
endogenous growth rate —> transfers of technology.
Emphasis on: Romer and Rivera Batiz (1991): transfers of technology due to 
trade, similar countries (//,=/(,); scale effect on R&D. Lucas (1993): 
catching up similar countries (w;=m2). Benhabib and Spiegel (1994): 
technological catching up with similar countries (Hj=Hj).
Cause of observed 
divergence
Conditional convergence=convergence towards different levels but a 
unique exogenous steady state growth rate —> transitional dynamics 
or conditional catching up.
Emphasis on:
- Solow (1956): decreasing returns with different technology and
preferences.
- Mankiw Romer and Weil (1992): decreasing returns with
different determinants of the steady state (human capital).
- Nelson and Phelps (1966): technological catching up but
1) Divergence=convergence towards different steady state levels and 
endogenous long run growth rates —> non decreasing returns to reproducible 
factors of production (a>l). Emphasis on:
Romer (1986): constant returns due to learning by doing. Romer (1990): 
constant returns in technology production function.
Lucas (1988): constant returns in human capital production function.
Rebelo (1991) models.
Azariadis-Drazen (1990): multiple equilibria due to threshold effects in H.
2) Absence of convergence in levels with transfers of technology = different 
steady state income levels and growth rates: Emphasis on:
- Romer and Rivera Batiz (1991): and, eventually, large allocation 
effects.
Lucas (1993): (ulAt2)> catching up but absence of convergence in levels 
and growth rates.
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994): (H^Hj), catching up but absence of 




“There is some correspondence between the 
convergence concepts, on the one hand, and the 
methodologies used, on the other... This 
variety o f  concepts and methodological 
approaches has led to a plethora of empirical 
results.” Islam (1998b).
2.1 Convergence regressions: an introduction
The endogenous growth literature that emerged in the mid 80s was evidently 
motivated by the apparent inability of the standard neoclassical growth model to 
explain observed cross-country growth patterns of international data sets. The 
ensuing resurgence of the debate on growth theory and the availability of new data 
sets resulted in numerous empirical studies. In particular, the convergence hypothesis 
became the litmus test for endogenous versus exogenous growth models. Baumol 
(1986) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin1 were among the first to investigate the 
convergence hypothesis by regressing growth in a collection of regions over certain 
time intervals on the initial level of GDP per head. The equation that is estimated, 
usually called the Barro regression (henceforth B-regression) or /^-convergence 
cross-section regression, is deduced from the transitional dynamics implied by 
neoclassical growth theory2. The B-regression approach was at first considered as the 
benchmark in empirical studies on growth and convergence. Its advocates stressed
1 See Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1995).
2 See Chapter 1 equation (1.8).
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the existence of a process of convergence at the rate of 2-3 percent per year as one of 
the strongest stylised facts on convergence. To quote Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995):
“One surprising result is the similarity of the speed of ^ -convergence across 
data sets. The estimates of ft  are around 2-3 percent per year in the various contexts. 
This slow speed of convergence implies that it takes 25-35 years to eliminate one- 
half of an initial gap in per capita incomes.”
However, the B-regression is no longer considered as the benchmark. As we 
saw in Chapter 1, during the last decade the concept of convergence has evolved 
continuously over time, and econometric methodologies applied for estimating the 
convergence parameter have consequently evolved with it. Despite methodological 
differences, these studies usually stress the same general stylised facts that a process 
of convergence in levels tends to exist for homogenous regions (the states of the 
U.S., Japanese Prefectures, European regions) but not for more heterogeneous units 
(the world as a whole). Nevertheless, there is no wide consensus on these 
conclusions. Not surprisingly, general consensus on the more appropriate 
methodology for estimating convergence is lacking and, therefore, so is any 
agreement on the most reliable values of estimated convergence rates. In general, 
there is now a vast amount of literature on this topic3, and a number of econometric 
techniques have emerged. It is natural to ask which of these methods gives the best 
results in estimating convergence rates because of the need to infer from the estimate 
how rapidly countries or regions will converge; even tiny differences in the estimated 
coefficient imply enormous differences in the predicted patterns of convergence and, 
possibly, even different interpretations of the convergence process.
This Chapter examines the main features, and, thus, the main 
advantages/disadvantages, of some of the (possibly) most influential econometric 
techniques proposed for estimating the convergence parameter. In order to compare 
these different methodologies we need to introduce some additional concepts of 
convergence. In the final section of Chapter 1 we looked at a survey of different 
notions of convergence that can be found in theoretical growth literature. We can 
now increase the list with three further possible distinctions important for empirical
3 See e.g. the survey by de la Fuente (1995) and, more recently, Durlauf and Quah (1998).
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analysis: stochastic convergence, /^-convergence and cr-convergence. The concept of 
/^-convergence is related to the methodology that investigates convergence across 
countries and attempts to deduce how fast economies will converge. Most current 
research in this field uses this approach. In particular, both cross-section and panel 
methodologies examined in this survey introduce this so-called classical approach*. 
The concept of stochastic convergence is related to the time series approach for 
estimating convergence. We then examine an alternative approach that investigates 
convergence across countries. This is known as the distribution approach and is 
strictly related with the concept of cr-convergence. Similarly to the time series 
approach but unlike in /^-convergence, the distribution approach does not claim to 
produce answers regarding structural parameters of the growth models. As we will 
see, this line of research has almost exclusively been developed by one researcher, 
Danny Quah.
Finally, in this study we investigate a possibility so far ignored in the 
convergence literature, namely the annual panel estimator where shocks are allowed 
to be correlated across countries5. Indeed, while panel methodologies are widely used 
in the growth and convergence literature, they usually assume that shocks are 
uncorrelated across countries, surely wrong for most of the macro data sets 
considered.
This Chapter may be divided into two parts and is structured as follows. The 
first part includes a survey of the different econometric methodologies proposed to 
estimate convergence. Section 2.2 specifies the concept of /^-convergence and deals 
with the cross-section approach to /^-convergence. Sections 2.3 to 2.5 introduce the 
panel approach. As we will see, different sections are necessary to survey this 
heterogeneous framework and in Section 2.6 we focus on the main criticisms that the 
panel literature has received. We then introduce the cr-convergence approach and the 
distribution approach developed by Quah in section 2.7, while Section 2.8 analyses 
early time series approaches used to estimate convergence. In the second part of this 
Chapter we propose a new estimator to analyse convergence namely an annual panel
4 This definition is given by Sala-i-Martin (1996) as an alternative to the so-called, non classical 
approach pursued by Quah.
5 A first version of this work may be found in Di Liberto and Symons (2003).
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estimator where shocks are allowed to be correlated across countries. Sections 2.9 
and 2.10 describe the characteristics of this estimator, while sections from 2.11 to 
2.15 present a Monte Carlo analysis that examines its robustness against possible 
misspecifications The last section presents a summary of the results and makes some 
concluding observations.
2.2 The P-convergence approach: early cross-section regressions
/^-convergence is currently the prevailing approach for investigating across countries 
convergence. In general, the /^-convergence approach entails estimating growth- 
initial level regressions. We saw in Chapter 1 that the transitional dynamics of the 
Solow model implies there is a clear relationship between the growth rate of income 
and its initial level. In particular, from equation (1.8), we may rewrite our 
convergence regression equation as:
y, . ,2-y,j ,=(i-e~*)(y-y,j ,)+u», (2 ->)
or
y U2= ( l - e ^ ) y + e ^ y w +uu , (2.1’)
where y iitj is the logarithm of per capita GDP in the initial year and y* is the 
logarithm of the steady state per capita income and «, is the error term. This 
specification assumes absolute /^-convergence, with countries sharing the same 
steady state level of income. Equation (2.1) introduces the average growth rate within 
the given period as a dependent variable, while equation (2.1 ’) represents the usual 
regression equation in levels. Beta is the parameter governing the speed of 
convergence (see equations (1.5) and (1.12)) and can be deduced by the estimated 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable6. Therefore, a /^-convergence test 
assumes that data under study are generated by economies far from the steady state. 
We obtain evidence of convergence if we find that the convergence coefficient is
6 The convergence parameter beta is computed using the formula b = - ( l-e ~ fiT)/T  • Otherwise, it is 
also possible to estimate beta directly by Nonlinear Least Squares.
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negative and significant. We will see in the following sections that both cross-section 
and panel methodologies reviewed in this Chapter use this approach.
Most of the early empirical literature on convergence introduces cross-section 
analysis to estimate a parameter that captures the existence of convergence among 
different economies. The estimation of a process of absolute or conditional 
convergence is the goal of the cross-section approach. That is, this literature is 
usually linked with Solow-type explanations of the convergence process. Equation 
(2.1’) is rearranged to obtain:
y,.T -y,.„ = ( ! - * ' *  ) ( y , ’ - y , ( 2-2)
or:
yi j  -  y IJt = a + bylt + u, (2.2’)
with a - ( 1  -  e ~ ^ ) y * , b -  - (1  -  ) .  For a given T a higher estimated parameter
implies a higher convergence coefficient. With respect to conditional convergence we 
can identify two approaches: Barro’s semi-structural approach and Mankiw, Romer
a
and Weil’s (1992) (henceforth MRW, as in Chapter 1) structural approach . Starting 
from equation (2.2’), Barro simply assumes that the steady state levels of income, y t*, 
depend on country specific factors (such as schooling, institutions or political 
stability8). Therefore, to investigate conditional /^-convergence he simply introduces 
into equation (2.2) the relevant conditioning variables to control the existence of 
different steady states. The estimated equation becomes:
M
y,.r -  y,.o = a ‘ + £  VjX j + by.,o + " , (23)
j=i
with X  being a vector of additional explanatory variables. Regressors are assumed to 
be independent of country specific factors shifting the production function, so that 
this equation can be estimated by OLS.
7 See Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992).
8 They test for many additional factors. See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
63
The MRW structural approach is very similar, but implies the substitution of 
equation (1.14), which precisely defines the steady state, into the solovian 
convergence equation (1.8). They estimate the following specification:
y ,T - y i0 = a - b - ^ — ln(si) + b - ^ — ln(ni +g + S )  + by0i + w, (2.4)
1 - a  1 -  a
This is a cross-section regression specification where technological progress, 
g, is constant across countries: that is, gt in equation (1.14) is just a constant. 
Equation (2.4) is again a conditional convergence equation, where the conditioning 
factors are the saving rates and population growth. In Chapter 1 we also saw the 
augmented version of this regression equation that includes human capital9. As in 
Barro, they assume lnAito=a+Ui where a is a constant and w, is the idiosyncratic shock 
term. In MRW the term Aito represents the combination of technology, resource 
endowments, climate and institutions. These country-specific factors are considered 
as part of the error term. Assuming that w, the error term, is independent from 
explanatory variables, s and w, equation (2.4) may be correctly estimated by OLS.
The main advantage of the MRW approach compared to Barro’s is that it 
enables us to directly estimate the structural parameters of the Solow model and tests 
if these estimated parameters satisfy the model assumptions. For example, we might 
test if  the coefficients on the saving rate, s,, and on population growth, nh are equal 
but have opposite signs as expected. Moreover, from the estimated coefficients of 
equation (2.4) it is also possible to deduce the value of the elasticity of output with 
respect to capital, a. As we saw in Chapter 1, the value of this parameter is strictly 
linked with the convergence hypothesis: for small values of a, diminishing returns 
set in rapidly, while as a  approaches unity, the convergence slows considerably. 
Empirical studies deduce a  from the estimated value of the convergence parameter. 
In particular, early empirical analyses on unconditional convergence usually find a 
rate of convergence of 2 percent together with counterfactual high values of the 
elasticities of output with respect to capital. This evidence has always been 
considered a problem of cross section unconditional convergence estimates. In fact,
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only protracted transitional dynamics are able to explain observed cross-country 
differences in growth rates. MRW (1992) argue in favour of the use of their 
augmented version of the Solow model because it produces more plausible values of 
the parameter a. In other words, this implausible result has always represented a 
source of embarrassment for the B-regression advocates. In fact, the next section 
shows how this particular point has been one of the main criticisms of the panel 
literature against the cross section approach10.
2.3 Panel studies of (3-convergence (1): heterogeneous intercepts
Recent empirical studies on convergence exploit both the time series and cross- 
section nature of data sets. One of the reasons for implementing a panel approach is 
to improve estimates. The use of panel data enables us to examine a combination of 
cross-section and dynamic information, thus providing greater precision in the 
estimation of parameters. Nevertheless, this is not the main motivation that we 
observed in panel studies on growth and convergence. We can distinguish two 
different approaches within this literature. The first approach employs standard 
microeconometric panel techniques. It usually introduces five-year averages in the 
estimation and completely ignores the possibility of the non-stationarity of the series 
introduced. Conversely, the second approach is more time series oriented and 
stresses the non-stationary time series panels methodology as the most appropriate 
for estimating convergence.
This section introduces what we have called the microeconometric approach. 
Advocates of this approach stress that the advantage of the panel methodology is that 
it can control for possible bias present in the cross-country approach. We have seen 
above that cross-section models, including conditional convergence models, assume 
parameter homogeneity in the production function across countries. However, both 
Barro and MRW do not exclude the existence of country-specific factors. They 
simply assume that these factors are part of the error term, where the latter is
9 See equations (1.24) and (1.24’).
10 This approach has been also criticised since it assumes that the f i  term is constant across countries, 
while as specified in equation (1.5) it involves the term «, that causes the model to be mis-specified. 
On this see Dowrick and Rogers (2002). See also section (2.5) on the econometric problems related 
to the existence o f a /? parameter heterogeneous across countries.
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independent from included regressors. The panel framework considers this 
hypothesis unlikely. First of all, they assume that permanent cross-economy 
differences in per capita output (representing, for example, differences in technology, 
institutions or tastes) are difficult to measure or completely unobservable. Secondly, 
they consider these characteristics as correlated with included regressors. Therefore, a 
cross-section (or a simple OLS pooling analysis) would produce estimates plagued by 
omitted variable bias". By introducing a fixed effects Within Group estimator, or 
Least Square with Dummy Variables (henceforth LSDV) estimator, it is possible to 
relax the assumption of strict parameter homogeneity introducing individual effects 
that account for this problem. In this case, parameters are estimated by OLS, but, 
unlike in cross section analysis, they account for unobservables with individual 
intercepts. Thus, this panel specification of the convergence equation is given by:
y,., -  y,j-r = a, + by,„  + dx,,_ + v: J (2.5)
where, as usual, b=-(l- e ), while r  determines the time span considered. For
example, v=l implies the estimation of an annual panel. Again, equation (2.5) is
based on the usual approximation around the steady state of the Solow model and
should thus capture the dynamics around the steady state. Assuming that the
character of the process remains stable, it must be valid for short periods as well12.
However, this estimation procedure is not free of possible mis-specifications
and problems. The estimate of equation (2.5) by OLS involves problems of
11consistency typical of a dynamic panel framework . In fact, in a typical 
microeconometric panel where the temporal dimension is assumed as fixed, the 
LSDV estimator is a consistent estimator only assuming strictly exogenous 
regressors. But the presence of a lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of 
the convergence equation implies that this assumption is not valid.
11 The extent and direction o f the bias will depend on the precise nature o f the relationship between the 
individual specific effect and the lagged dependent variable regressor.
12 Therefore, from the estimated parameter of the lagged dependent variable we can, as usual, calculate 
our beta “speed o f convergence” parameter defined in section (1.1.1).
13 See Baltagi (1995).
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For the sake of simplicity we can rewrite equation (2.5) in levels as:
y„ = a, + p y ,j- .+ A. , - r + (2-6)
where p  =(l+b)=e^‘. In this case, when asymptotic is considered in the direction of 
N —>oo, equation (2.6) produces inconsistent estimates of the parameter p. This 
problem is usually solved using alternative estimation procedures14. Nevertheless, 
Amemiya (1967) showed that, when the relevant asymptotic is in the direction of 
T—>oo, the LSDV estimator is in fact consistent and asymptotically equivalent to the 
Maximum Likelihood Estimator15. These studies exploit this result. It is true that 
within the growth literature framework, data sets are different from the typical 
microeconometric panels in which T  is usually short. Here, both N  (the number of 
individuals) and T (the number of time periods) are considered sufficiently large. In 
this case the asymptotic analysis must be considered in the time series dimension of 
the data, while N  (the number of countries) should be considered as fixed16. 
However, as shown by Nickell (1981), while the LSDV estimator is consistent for 
large T, small sample problems may still badly affect these estimates. Later in this 
Chapter, we shall use Monte Carlo to analyse at length the extent of this possible 
small sample bias.
This approach was first applied to the convergence framework by Knight, 
Loayza and Villaneuva (1993). This survey though, focuses on two later but more 
influential studies o f this microeconometric panel approach, namely, the 
contributions of Islam (1995) and Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996). Islam (1995) 
was among the first to introduce an LSDV technique for estimating the convergence 
parameter. He builds on the MRW structural approach described by equation (2.2) in 
which the saving rate and the population growth rate are assumed to vary across 
countries.
14 A possible solution is to use the Anderson-Hsiao estimator, or a Generalised Method of Moment 
procedure. See Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996).
15 See Amemiya (1967) for the proof.
16 On dynamic panels when T is large see also Pesaran and Smith (1995).
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His dynamic panel data model can be represented thus:
OL OL
y u - y , J- , = ai +by l. , - s -b -  lnsu_ ,+ b -  ln(nIJ_1 + g  + S )  + 7j, +u  (2.7)
1 - a  1 - a
where uit is the transitory term that varies across countries and periods, rft is the time 
trend component and b is the usual speed of convergence coefficient as in (2.5). Data 
are in five-year time intervals17, to account for business cycle fluctuations and serial 
correlation, more likely in a yearly data set-up. The only difference with the MRW 
specification lies in the time trend component and the constant term that Islam 
assumes country specific. In fact, a, = ( l - e _/" ) l n 4 0 is a time-invariant component that
varies across economies. This term should account for various unobservable factors
like institutions or climate.
Nevertheless, he does stress the importance of technology. Technology is
unobservable and likely to be correlated with regressors and, in particular, lagged per
capita GDP. This is why Islam proposes the LSDV methodology as an alternative to
standard growth accounting methodologies and considers estimated fixed effects as a 
18good proxy for TFP, . The presence of a significant coefficient in the country specific 
intercepts should reveal the presence of different steady states among economies, 
where long-run equilibria are determined by these unobservable fundamentals.
During his analysis, Islam introduces two different econometric techniques: 
he applies an LSDV estimator and Chamberlain’s Minimum Distance estimator 19. 
To test for this hypothesis, he compares the results obtained by these procedures, but 
does not find significant differences. While the LSDV estimator directly introduces 
individual specific dummies and is based on the direct estimation of equation 2.7, 
Chamberlain (1982) formalizes the idea of the fixed effect models and assumes that:
17 During his econometric analysis Islam (1995) introduces other variables and uses both series in 
levels at the beginning o f the period or five year averages.
18 On this see also Chapter 5.
19 See Islam (1995). In general, unlike in the LSDV procedure, the Minimum Distance estimator 
allows for individual effects to be correlated with the included exogenous variables.
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(Xj = Xq + + Xj2 ^2  +... + xjTXp + ^  (2.8a)
and
y-i o = 0o + fan  + — + fa ir  + Vi (2.8b)
where the fixed effect depends linearly on all leads and lags of the exogenous 
variable x, ^ [ ^ |x ;1...x;T] = 0 , and E ^ y i|jcn...xjT] = 0 . If we consider
xit = ln(s) -  ln(« + g + S) it is possible to substitute af in eq. (2.7). Moreover, the
lagged dependent variable in eq. (2.7) can be replaced (by repeated substitutions) by 
the initial value, y to, and then by eq. (2.8b). Chamberlain (1982) suggests reducing 
the problem of estimating eq. (2.7), a single equation model involving two- 
dimensions, into a one-dimensional problem of estimating a T-variate regression 
model with cross-sectional data, that is combining all equations of a single individual 
into one system of equations. In order to obtain Chamberlain’s minimum-distance 
estimator we must first obtain the unconstrained reduced-form coefficient matrix, 
called the n  -matrix. Each element of this matrix is a function of the structural-form 
coefficients that can be summarized by a vector 0. To estimate 0 from the elements <|> 
of the n-matrix, we must impose restrictions by using a minimum-distance 
estimator20.
Both the Minimum Distance and the LSDV estimator reveal a much higher 
rate of convergence in comparison to the simple cross-section OLS estimator. The 
speed of convergence coefficient jumps from a value of 0.0161 for the OECD sample 
in the simple pooled regression to a value of 0.0926 when a LSDV model is 
introduced. Similar results have been found for two additional samples, non-oil 
producing countries (98 countries), where the parameter increases from 0.0048 of the 
cross-section estimates to 0.0467 using the fixed effect model, and a subsample of 
this group (comprising 74 countries) in which the relevant parameter shifts from 
0.0074 to 0.0458. Moreover, unlike in the cross section approach he obtains values of 
the elasticity of output with respect to capital which are nearer to their usually
20 More on this estimator in Chamberlain (1982), and Hsiao (1986).
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91 •accepted empirical values . In general, he suggests that both his convergence 
parameter and elasticity values are plausible: that is, his econometric methodology 
for conditional convergence solves one of the problems affecting cross-section 
convergence estimates.
Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996) stress the importance of more than one 
source of inconsistencies in cross-country regressions. First, as does Islam (1995), 
they conclude that cross-section regressions are plagued by omitted variable bias. 
However, they argue that a second problem makes even Islam’s estimates 
inconsistent22. In fact, they emphasise the possibility that most regressors introduced 
in growth studies are predetermined but not strictly exogenous regressors. This 
characteristic would cause the MD estimation procedure introduced by Islam to 
produce inconsistent estimates because it requires strictly exogenous regressors. The 
procedure in question substitutes out a, using both past and future values of included 
regressors23.
Following Arellano and Bond (1991), Caselli et al. suggest to control for both 
omitted variable bias and endogeneity problems using a procedure based on a 
Generalised Method of Moment (GMM) estimator. Basically, the idea is the same as 
that of the Anderson-Hsiao estimator, i.e. to check for the presence of fixed effects by 
taking data in first difference and then to use the instrumental variables technique to 
purge the correlation between the dependent variable and its lag. However, unlike 
Anderson-Hsiao, who favour the use of Ayl t_2 or y i t_2 as instruments, Arellano and
Bond (1991) suggest exploiting all the orthogonality conditions existing between y t ,
and the disturbances ult24-
Specifically, they use the Summers and Heston international data set and 
focus on a sub-sample of 97 countries. As in equation (2.6) they rewrite the growth 
equation as a dynamic model in levels:
21 The values are respectively: OECD sample a  =0.067, NONOIL countries a=0.4397, 78 countries a  
=0.4245.
22 This is true also for the Knight, Loyaza and Villaneuva (1993).




y„ =  a, +p y„-,+ Z Xi ( )  +L>u <2 -9)
j=J
N
where y :, = y., - y „  and J  = .
N
The use of demeaned value of per capita output allows time specific constants 
to be eliminated . The coefficient p  allows us, as ever, to deduce the convergence 
parameter, while the M  included variables are additional determinants of the growth 
rate. They apply a first-difference transformation in order to eliminate individual 
effects and subsequently rearrange equation (2.9) to obtain:
M ~J
A y„ = pa y„~,+’Z XJA + a > ,, (2 -1 °)
j=i
Equation (2.10) cannot be estimated as it stands since E(AyitAuit) * 0; that is, 
the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term through the 
contemporaneous terms in period t-r. However, assuming the absence of r-order 
serial correlation (where r=5 in their study, as in the previous study) in the transient 
errors of the equation in levels we have
E(yit_sAuit) = 0 for t=3,..., T and s > 2
so that it is possible to use the lagged levels dated t-2 and earlier of the dependent 
variable as instruments. With respect to the other regressors, Caselli at al. (1996) 
distinguish between stock variables and flow variables. The former, measured at the
beginning of the period, are assumed as predetermined variables, while the latter
24 See Baltagi (1995).
25 On this see also Evan and Karras (1996) in the following section.
26 The use o f a first-difference estimator also allows us to test for the presence o f permanent additive 
measurement errors that are eventually absorbed into the fixed, time-invariant effects. See Bond S., 
Hoeffler A. and Temple J. (2001).
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(usually measured as averages within the time span considered) are not 
predetermined for uu but are assumed to be predetermined for oit+r In that way they 
conveniently instruments the right hand side of equation (2.10) using all past values 
of regressors assumed exogenous. The consistency of their estimation procedure 
crucially depends on the identifying assumption that lagged values of both income 
and other explanatory variables are valid instruments in the growth regression. 
Specification tests suggest their methodology is correct. Following this procedure, 
Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort find a speed of absolute convergence coefficient 20 
times larger than the usual cross-section result. In addition, they introduce an 
augmented version of the Solow model (including both a set of variables accounting 
for the economy’s initial conditions and a second set capturing the differences in 
steady states across countries) and find results similar to Islam’s, with a convergence 
coefficient of about 10 percent a year.
However, recent studies criticise the use of the GMM-Arellano and Bond 
(henceforth GMM-AB) estimator in frameworks such as the standard growth- 
convergence analysis. Blundell and Bond (1998) and Bond-Hoeffler-Temple (2001) 
stress that the GMM-AB estimator may perform poorly with datasets that use either a 
small number of time periods or persistent time series. Unfortunately, these are 
typical features of growth datasets. In this case, these authors suggest that, with 
persistent and relatively short time series, the Arellano-Bond estimator may be 
plagued by weak instruments bias and would produce large finite sample biases. In 
particular, they show that when T is small, and a) the autoregressive parameter is 
close to one (highly persistent series) or b) the variance of the individual effect is 
high relative to the variance of the transient shock, the lagged levels of the series will 
tend to be only weakly correlated with subsequent first differences and the GMM-AB 
estimator may produce downward biased estimates . Bond, Hoeffler and Temple 
(2001) stress that a sign of the bias in the GMM-AB estimates is an AR(1) coefficient 
close to the LSDV one. Thus, to detect the bias, they suggest using the following 
“rule of thumb”. Given that we know the OLS is biased upwards in dynamic panels 
and LSDV is biased downwards, a consistent estimate should therefore lie 
(somewhere) between the two. In other words, we may expect that the true parameter
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values lie somewhere between p ols and p LSDV • Note that this is not the case in
Caselli et al. (1996), given that the estimated AR(1) parameter is close to the LSDV 
value. When there is evidence that lagged levels of the explanatory variables provide 
weak instruments for the model in first difference as in equation (2.10), the inclusion 
of additional explanatory variables among regressors and the inclusion of additional 
lags of these regressors among instruments may improve the performance of this 
estimator28. Moreover, Bond, Hoeffler and Temple (2001) suggest employing a 
system-GMM estimator in growth regressions. In very simple terms, this estimator 
specifies a system of equations in both first difference and levels where the 
instruments of the levels equations are the lagged first-differences of the series29.
Kiviet (1995) advocates a more direct approach to the problem of the finite 
sample bias in dynamic panels by estimating a small sample correction to the LSDV 
estimator. As noted by Kiviet (1995), although Anderson-Hsiao and GMM-AB are 
consistent estimators, their small sample properties are far from reassuring. In his 
study he performs a Monte Carlo analysis comparing the finite sample performance 
of his corrected LSDV estimator with the GMM-AB and Anderson-Hsiao IV 
estimators. The main conclusion is that for very small T (as we find in convergence 
literature) corrected-LSDV seems more attractive than GMM-AB. But the most cited 
evidence in favour of the Kiviet correction is found in Judson and Owen (1996). 
They explicitly analyse a typical macro-panel and found that for samples with 
relatively small T and N (T<20 and N<50) LSDV and Anderson-Hsiao estimators 
consistently outperform GMM-AB. Moreover, despite having a higher average bias, 
LSDV is even more efficient than Anderson-Hsiao and the authors conclude that 
when T is small, the corrected LSDV estimator should be preferred to other 
estimators.
27 See Bond-Hoeffler-Temple (2001).
28 See Blundell and Bond (1998).
29 To estimate equation (2.10) by system GMM, it is necessary to make additional assumptions on the 
series. See also Chapter 5.
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2.4 Panel studies of p-convergence (2): stochastic and deterministic 
convergence
As in previous studies, the second panel approach to estimate convergence considers 
OLS estimates of equation (2.2’) as being incorrigibly biased. However, this 
approach differs from micro-econometric panel techniques in that it explicitly 
investigates the stationarity of the series included and employs recently developed 
panel unit root methodologies for investigating cross-countries convergence. 
Examples of this approach include Evans and Karras (1996) and Lee, Pesaran and 
Smith (1997) among others30.
This section distinguishes the concepts of deterministic and stochastic 
convergence as defined by Evans and Karras (1996). Formally, the Solow model with 
a common exogenous technological progress, as described in Chapter 1, implies that 
a set of N  countries will exhibit the presence of a process of conditional convergence 
if:
= n=l,2....N  (2.11)
r —>co
•   ^1 where y  is the logarithms of per capita output in country /, at is the common trend
and pn is the country’s n long-run equilibrium. We have absolute convergence if pn is
equal to zero for all countries. Otherwise, different countries converge towards
different steady states levels determined by p. Moreover, when a group of countries
shares common or identical structures they will converge towards the same steady
state. This assumption is related to the convergence club hypothesis. Contrariwise, in
a stochastic framework, a group of countries is said to converge if and only if a
common trend and finite parameters pp PN exist such that:
lim £ ,0 „ ,+, -  aM ) = (2.12)
oo
30 See also Bernard and Durlauf (1996), Bernard and Jones (1996), Pedroni (1997) and, more recently, 
Gerosky et al (2003).
31 Within the Solow model, at can be thought as the logarithm o f an index o f  Harrod-neutral 
technology.
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In that case at is unobservable. Therefore, it is necessaiy to account for this 
problem. One possibility is demeaning each single series. That is, we calculate 
average values over the N countries:
lim E ( y Hr —a, )  = n  (2.13)
r-*co
N N
where y t = ^Tylt / N , and fi = ^ /u ,  / N ■ Consequently, the appropriate series
/= / =
introduced in the empirical analysis is:
lim £,0„, = (2-14)
Other researchers prefer to take data in difference from a reference economy 
but these two methodologies for transforming data are equivalent. More precisely, 
this analysis suggests that, even if series are non-stationary, if  the difference
(y»/+r ~ y  i+r) or (y»i+r ~~ yji+r) y u  as reference economy is stationary, 
series are said to be converging towards their steady states. As before, we obtain a 
process of unconditional convergence if /in is equal to zero for each n.
In their convergence analysis Evans and Karras (1996) introduce an annual 
panel of demeaned data. They propose a four-step procedure as the correct test for 
estimating convergence. They firstly consider 1,2...N countries in their sample and 
apply OLS to the equation:
Ay„ = a, +s , y,.l-,+'£<p,jAy,.,-i + (2 -15>
A
on each series to obtain, <ji the standard error of estimate for the i= l...N  series.
N
_
Again, y jt = ( y u — y f) ,  and y  = m — . Lagged values of the dependent variable are
' N
32 See Evans and Karras (1996) for further details.
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introduced to control for autocorrelation. Moreover, they calculate the normalised
A -  A
series Zu = ( y it)  /  <Ji for each country. As a second step they apply OLS to the 
following annual panel of N countries:
A  A  A  P A  A
A z  it = a / + p  z ,v-i + 2 ] <PijA z  v - j +  v *  (2.16)
7=1
A  A  A  A  A
where a, = ai l a / and v, = l>, /<7/, and obtain the convergence parameter ft and its 
t-statistics. Thirdly, if the t-statistic exceeds an appropriately chosen (by Monte 
Carlo)33 value, they reject H 0 : V(/?( = 0  in favour of H l : V,/?( < 0 . In that case, they
obtain evidence of convergence34. Finally, if the convergence hypothesis is accepted, 
a test for conditional convergence is given by the estimate of the F-ratio:
<P(a) = -^— Y[r('a, ) /  (2-17)
N - l  i=j
A
where r (a*) is the t-ratio of the estimator of a, obtained by applying OLS to equation
A
(2.15) for each country. If O(u) exceeds an appropriately chosen (by Monte Carlo) 
critical value they accept the hypothesis of significant individual effects and conclude 
in favour of a conditional convergence process. Otherwise, absolute convergence is 
accepted. Using this procedure and introducing two different samples (48 contiguous 
US states and 54 countries from the Summer and Heston data set), Evans and Karras 
(1996) find evidence of conditional convergence in both samples. The estimated
A  A
convergence parameter increases from /?=-0.011 (using cross-section) to p  =-0.0826
(with their procedure) for US States and from P  =-0.012 to /? =-0.0430 for the 
international data set.
33 Because o f the presence o f small sample bias. See next Chapter for more details.
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2.5 Panel studies of P-convergence (3): further parameter heterogeneity
In Chapter 1 we distinguished between the concept of convergence in levels and 
convergence in growth rates. We observed that while conditional and unconditional 
convergence models always predict convergence in growth rates, part of the 
endogenous growth literature is characterised by divergence in both: each country 
converges towards its own long-run level of income and its own long-run growth rate 
of income. However, the empirical literature we have surveyed above assumes 
convergence in long-run growth rates of income. The study carried out by Lee, 
Pesaran and Smith (1997 and 1998) (henceforth LPS) differs from these studies 
because they test for an unrestricted specification of the transitional dynamics of the 
Solow model. In particular, they criticise previous methodologies for their cross­
country parameter homogeneity, where the simple cross-section approach represents 
an extreme, assuming complete parameter homogeneity. Conversely, starting from 
the usual conditional convergence framework35, they allow not only for individual 
intercepts, as do previous panel studies, but also for both the convergence parameter 
and exogenous long-run growth rates to differ among countries. Their unrestricted 
version of the convergence equation is thus given by:
y„ = a, + + P,y,.,-, + v„ (2.18)
where, pj=l+bj , $i=(l-pi)g, and the country-specific intercept is now defined by:
g  + lnAl0- - ^ —ln(n,+g + S)  + - ^ —lns, 
1 - a  1 - a
(2.19)
If, as implied by the theory, different countries share a common steady state 
growth rate, the ratio 3i/(l-pi) should be identical across countries. Assuming series 
are trend stationary processes, they apply Exact Maximum Likelihood36 to equation
34 This is the panel unit root test developed by Levin and Lin (1993).
35 See the Mankiw Romer and Weil (1992) structural approach.
36 Thus, constraining the coefficient p  to be less than unity.
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(2.18). Therefore, LPS compare results arising from both the restricted 
(homogeneous parameters) and unrestricted version of the Solow model using three 
different samples: 102 non-oil producing countries of the Summer and Heston data 
set, a subsample of 61 countries , and the OECD data set (22 countries). More 
precisely, they compare four different specifications of equation (2.18): a) an 
unrestricted model, with heterogeneous parameters, b) g  constrained to be equal 
across countries, c) p  constrained to be equal across countries, d) both g  and p  equal 
across countries. They find evidence of heterogeneous growth rates gt in all samples, 
while the hypothesis of homogeneity in the speed of adjustments, p, was not rejected 
only by the OECD sample. In conclusion, the unrestricted version of the model 
should be considered as the correct one. In that case their estimated speed of 
convergence is approximately 30 percent per year, a very high value even compared 
to other panel studies.
Given these results, the LPS study is highly critical not only towards the cross 
section approach but also towards previous panel studies. In particular, they argue 
that in dynamic models if we ignore the presence of coefficient heterogeneity we may 
obtain inconsistent estimates. When regressors are serially correlated, coefficient 
heterogeneity induces serial correlation in the disturbance term, causing estimates to 
be inconsistent even as T  —> oo. For example, assuming bt=b, that is, assuming a 
unique long-run growth rate, the false imposition of a common growth rate g would 
produce inconsistent estimate of b because it adds a term (grg)t to the disturbance for 
each country, where this term is serially correlated .
Finally, we briefly introduce the second argument put forward by the LPS 
study, i.e. that possible non-stationarity of the series could further complicate this 
analysis. In particular, they stress that it should be necessary to test the possibility for 
the series to be difference stationary because, under a stochastic version of the Solow 
model, the convergence coefficient as deduced from the log linearisation around the
<JQ
steady state no longer has its usual interpretation . As in Evans and Karras (1996), to
37 They exclude countries for which quality o f data is thought to be poor.
38 They show that in that case the estimate o f p= (l+ fi)  in (3.15) would tend to unity as N  and T grow 
irrespective o f its true value.
39 See Lee Pesaran and Smith (1997).
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overcome the problem of the low power of standard unit root tests they propose an 
alternative test that exploits the panel structure of the data: the so called t-bar test. 
This test is based on the average value of the DF or ADF statistics obtained across
apply the t-bar test to demeaned data to eliminate common technological trends and 
shocks influencing all countries in the sample. They find that none of the sample 
rejects the null.
Nevertheless, they stress the presence of possible problems. In particular, this 
test is very sensitive to underestimation of the degree of augmentation and the likely 
presence of a moving average component could further complicate the analysis. Their 
conclusion is that all unit root tests (including their panel test) are not conclusive41. 
In summary, this study endorses two main arguments. First of all, it is unlikely that 
the parameters of the convergence equation are homogeneous across countries. The 
correct model specification is the unrestricted one with heterogeneous parameters and 
previous studies on convergence all produced inconsistent estimates. Moreover, it is 
necessary to take into account the possible nonstationarity o f the series introduced. 
However, given the low power of standard unit root tests and panel unit root tests, it 
is first necessary to find better tests able to discriminate between difference and trend 
stationary series.
Finally we briefly introduce the methodology proposed by Canova and Marcet 
(1995). Using a Bayesian procedure to estimate convergence rates and steady states, 
Canova and Marcet (1995) obtain results similar to LPS. Like both Evans and Karras 
and LPS, they estimate an annual panel, that is, they use information available for all
40 Assuming no autocorrelation (and thus no need to augment the DF test) the t-bar statistic is defined
Under the null, each o f  the DF statistics, tjT can be viewed as a random draw from DF distribution, 
where the underlying DF regression contains an intercept and a trend and is based on T observations. 
The DF distribution relevant to each draw has mean and variance E [tT]  and V[iTJ. They show that, 
under the null hypothesis, for large N  and T>6, this is an exact test with a standard normal 
distribution.
41 “In these circumstances, trying to determine whether there is a unit root against the alternative of a 
root very close to unity is likely to be impossible with available samples and techniques.” See Lee 
Pesaran and Smith (1997).
countries and inference is built on H0: pi=l against H}: pi<l for i=l,2...N*° They
by:
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periods and all cross-sectional units. Moreover, as do LPS, they estimate a flexible 
statistical model allowing for parameters on both the lagged dependent variable and 
the intercept to vary among cross-sectional units, thus allowing the presence of 
heterogeneous convergence parameters. However, unlike LPS, they do not introduce 
the possibility of heterogeneous long-run growth rates into the regression equation. 
That is:
= ° j + PVi j-\ + £i,i (2.20)
They argue that equation (2.20) cannot be estimated by standard econometric 
methodologies. In fact, standard procedures have too many parameters relative to the 
number of time series observations for each cross-sectional unit. To solve this 
problem they introduce a Bayesian approach. Since Bayesian estimates are exact 
regardless of the sample size, they impose a Bayesian prior on parameters and 
combine it with sample information to construct posterior estimates. In other words, 
they do not impose the equality of the coefficients but they impose possible 
differences among parameters. Their prior distribution is based on the belief that 
parameters in the different units are similar but not identical. The main point within 
this framework is how to select these differences. We do not describe their procedure 
in details but we focus on their results. Their empirical analysis introduces two data 
sets: the first consists of regions of the 14 EEC members, while the second includes 
17 western European countries. Therefore, unlike in previous studies, they do not 
extend their analysis to large international samples because they want focus on quite 
homogeneous samples in terms of institutions and economic structure. Following 
standard procedures, they compare results arising from standard cross-section 
methodologies with the results generated by their bayesian approach. The European 
Regions sample shows that when the equality in the parameters is imposed to 
equation (2.20) the average rate of convergence is around 2 percent per year, the 
usual Barro-Sala-i-Martin result. However, using their bayesian methodology and 
allowing for some difference among both individual constants and intercepts in 
equation (2.20), the average rate of convergence increases from 2 percent a year to 23
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percent a year. This result is similar to LPS’s result and much higher compared to the 
9 percent result found in other panel studies.
2.6 Panel literature: some criticisms
In general, the survey on the panel literature discussed above shows that, despite 
consistent differences, a common feature of all panel data methods is the estimate of 
a veiy high rate of conditional (to country specific steady states) convergence, with 
values reaching 30 percent per year. This conclusion is different in comparison with 
previous cross-country absolute/conditional convergence type estimation procedure, 
with its 2 percent result. The former findings have always been interpreted as 
evidence in favour of the persistence of inequalities among countries, where poor 
countries do not converge towards the rich. More precisely, high values of the 
convergence parameter would imply that countries are almost in their long-run 
equilibrium (indeed, they will reach their long-run equilibrium in a very short period 
of time) and that differences tend to remain in the long-run. Further, rates of 
convergence of 23 percent or 30 percent per year as found in this literature have also 
been interpreted by their advocates as favouring open economy versions of the 
neoclassical growth models42. However, we have previously seen that they have also 
been interpreted as a sign of the presence of a small sample bias.
The use of the panel approach for estimating growth has been strongly 
criticised for several reasons. For example, one of the problems of assuming 
complete parameter heterogeneity as in LPS, is that this procedure assumes that 
actual growth rates (the g, introduced in the regressions) represent a good proxy of 
steady state growth rates. However, this is not necessarily the case. In particular, 
Islam (1998a) observes that actual g, are usually a combination of steady state and 
transitional growth rates. This observation introduces more than one doubt in LPS’s 
results of heterogeneous steady state growth rates. Secondly, Durlauf and Quah 
(1998) argued that the panel fixed effect (within group) approach, introducing 
deviations from time-average sample means for each country and then applying OLS 
to the transformed data, may discharge the long-run variation across countries. This 
may be seen as a gross mis-specification because, when we examine intra-countries
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convergence, we need to examine the variation across countries with some precision. 
Thus, the implied transformation of the fixed effect model would probably eliminate 
the phenomenon we want to analyse when we consider convergence. Finally, high 
rates of convergence would imply implausible low values of the parameter a, the 
capital share parameter of the Solow model. That is, one of the problems of the cross- 
section approach is once again evident.
Finally, there is another important criticism that has cast some doubts on the 
economic interpretation of panel results. Again, Durlauf and Quah (1998) noted that 
this evidence says nothing about the possibility of catch-up (or not) of the poor 
countries towards the rich. Basically, these results are unable to capture the presence 
of a catching up relationship among countries. This problem is more obvious when 
we allow differences in the steady state growth rates and/or convergence rate 
parameters as in LPS or Canova and Marcet. In this case, estimates rely solely on 
each country’s individual history. That is to say, “ ...this leads to a virtual collapse of 
the concept of convergence, so far as its across-dimension is concerned43”. Durlauf 
and Quah (1998) conclude that this approach renders the concept of convergence 
hollow. In short, when we allow individual intercepts to capture the possibility of 
individual steady state for each country and heterogeneous convergence parameters 
to capture the individual speed of convergence, it becomes very difficult to interpret 
the results within standard convergence literature. Thus, for these authors, if  we want 
to investigate how different economies perform relative to each other or if we want to 
focus on the analysis of convergence clubs it is better to introduce alternative 
approaches.
2.7 Further methodologies: a-convergence and the Quah approach
We saw in the previous sections that ^-convergence should relate to mobility of 
different individual economies within the given distribution of income. As is clear 
from equations (2.3) and (2.4), these regressions examine the cross-section 
correlation between initial per capita output levels and subsequent growth rates for a
42 See Caselli, Esq uivel and Lefort (1996).
43 See Islam (1998).
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group of countries. A negative correlation is taken as evidence of convergence as it 
implies that, on average, poorer countries are growing faster than the richest ones. In 
other words, if we estimate a negative and significant p we should conclude that poor 
economies were growing faster with respect to economies with a higher level of per 
capita GDP in the initial year. However, this evidence does not necessarily imply a 
well-behaved process. Well-behaved in this framework means the concomitant 
presence of a catching up process. In particular, evidence of /^-convergence implies 
an explicit catching up process only if there is also a reduction in the dispersion of 
GDP levels among the different countries. That is, /^-convergence is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for catching up.
Friedman (1992) was the first to observe that these tests turn out to be 
plagued by Gabon’s fallacy of regression towards the mean. He shows that the right 
sign on the initial-condition coefficient does not indicate a collapsing cross-sectional 
distribution. Using the same argument, Quah (1993) showed that we can find a fi- 
convergence result (that is, a negative P-coefficient) even when the cross-section 
distribution of per capita income remains invariant over time or even if it diverges. 
Moreover, cross-country methodology is inappropriate when we have the presence of 
converging clubs in the sample. It is indeed possible to have a group of countries for 
which only a subset of them is truly converging while others are completely 
independent from the attractor and still obtain a negative p. But we could also 
observe the opposite situation i.e. a non-significant coefficient that hides the presence 
of a small subset of converging countries. In general, when the existence of 
convergence clubs is evident, the cross-country regression is not the appropriate 
approach to employ. Quah (1995) concludes that ^-convergence, or, more generally, 
looking at coefficients in a cross-section regression, is uninformative for a 
distribution’s dynamics and is thus uninformative on the presence of convergence.
Friedman (1992) argues that a good description of the existence of a catch up 
process across economies is given by sigma convergence analysis. In fact, cr- 
convergence measures the standard deviation of the logarithm of per capita GDP. A 
group of economies is converging in the sense of sigma if  the dispersion of their real 
per capita GDP levels tend to decrease over time, cr-convergence is thus a synthetic 
measure of the behaviour of cross-country income dispersion. However, this
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methodology has also received some criticism. First, whether dispersion increases or
or greater than the steady state dispersion. Moreover, the presence of cr-convergence 
can be interpreted as evidence in favour of catching up only if we are assuming that 
countries are converging towards the same equilibrium. In other words, as in ji- 
convergence methodology, this measure is not a good representation of a 
convergence process when we have convergence clubs. In fact, we could observe that 
countries are converging to their own equilibrium but cross-country equilibria are 
diverging. In sum, cr-convergence relates to whether or not the cross-country 
distribution of different economies shrinks over time but it does not provide an 
exhaustive description of the phenomenon we want to capture. In fact, from the time 
path of this measure we can infer nothing about the presence of a process of catching 
up of the poorest country toward the richest.
Departing from standard techniques of econometric analysis Quah (1997) 
further develops the cr-convergence approach. Instead of exclusively concentrating on 
the variance of the cross-countries distribution over time, he studies the entire shape 
of the distribution and intra-distribution dynamics. The focus of this study is more on 
what Sala-i-Martin (1996) called the non classical approach to convergence analysis. 
Thus, we follow Islam (2003) and include just a brief introduction of this approach. 
Quah’s research focuses on the determinants of the dynamics of cross-economy 
income distributions. In simple terms, defining Ft as the cross-section distribution at 
time t and Ft+j at time t+1 he describes:
where M is the operator that maps Ft onto F,+/. Assuming that M  does not change 
over time we obtain:
decreases towards its steady state value depends on whether initial dispersion is less
F  = M Fx l+l xvxx t (2 .21)
(2 .22)
Modelling M  as a Markov transition matrix, Quah (1997) calibrates it 
introducing actual data and finds that the distributions tend towards shapes that stress
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the presence of clusters44. In particular, he identifies two main stylised facts. The first 
concerns mobility and states that countries tend to stay in the same position as the 
distribution. Moreover, despite this observed persistency, the distributions show 
polarisation or, more precisely, tend to “thin out the middle”. In sum, this analysis of 
the cross-economy income distributions stresses the presence of an “emergent twin 
peaks in the cross-country distribution”45, where the implied limit distribution F l+s,
s —> oo, would then be bimodal: in other words, he shows a tendency for economies 
to join one of two clubs, either rich or poor countries.
2.8 Further methodologies: a brief look at time series methodologies and 
within countries convergence
Early empirical studies on convergence that use a time series methodology usually 
assume that series are already in their steady states. More precisely, these tests 
assume that series have already converged and then convergence is interpreted with 
the meaning that initial conditions have no effect on the expected value of output 
differences. This assumption is not present in the cross-section literature where data 
are seen in transition towards a limiting distribution. In fact, as we will see below, p- 
convergence tests assume data under study are generated by economies far from the 
steady state, Most of these time series studies are based on the estimate of a 
cointegration relation46:
y „ = a  + Pytl + s, (2.23)
where i and j  are two different countries (where j  can be explicitly considered the 
attractor). First, stationarity of the series is investigated using standard Dickey-Fuller 
(DF) or Augmented DF statistics for testing the presence of unit roots in per capita 
GDP series. Second, stationarity of the error term in (2.23) is investigated within the 
cointegration framework, while convergence may be tested through the value of the
44 On this see also Islam (2003).
45 See Quah (1997).
46 See Bernard and Durlauf (1996). Cellini and Scorcu (1997) apply this methodology to estimate 
convergence among Italian regions
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long-run parameters. We say that y it converges towards yjt if  a= 0 and p=\. Note that 
if the relationship:
y„ -  y Jt = e, (2.24)
is not stationary it is impossible to conclude in favour of convergence since the series 
may evolve further apart from the relationship, even if they satisfy it on average47. 
Further developments of this approach introduce a multivariate Johansen procedure.
The main problem of this approach is that it cannot be considered a good 
methodology if series have not yet converged. For example, an estimate of a  and /? 
different from these expected values does not necessarily imply a lack of 
convergence but could be the result of the fact that countries are converging towards 
their steady state. More precisely, a  and p  can be evolving over time tending toward 
the expected values of a=0 and p= l. To take into account this possibility, more 
recent studies try to model this transitional dynamics . However, an even more 
damaging problem within the time series framework is represented by the low power 
of DF or alternative unit root tests against the alternative49. The short time dimension 
of GDP and other relevant series mainly for developing countries makes this a 
relevant problem. As we have seen in the previous sections, one alternative is to 
introduce more powerful unit root tests that exploit the panel structure of data sets.
2.9 An alternative Methodology
In this study we investigate a possibility so far ignored in the convergence literature, 
namely the annual panel estimator where shocks are allowed to be correlated across 
countries. As we have seen in sections 2.3 to 2.5, other authors have used panel 
methods but have assumed effectively that shocks are uncorrelated across countries, 
surely wrong for most of the data sets considered. In particular, we consider this
47 See Bernard and Durlauf (1995).
48 For example, Hall and St. Aubin (1995) introduce Kalman filter techniques for estimating this 
evolving relationship o f the parameters
49 Lee Pesaran and Smith (1995) stress this problem. Bernard and Durlauf (1995) try to overcome this 
problem using a small sample o f 15 industrialised countries: for this sample GDP series are available 
from 1900 to 1987.
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assumption unlikely, mainly when convergence is investigated across groups of 
relatively homogeneous economies such as OECD countries or regional data sets. In 
principle, panel data approaches exploit more data than the Barro’s type regression or 
cross-section regression50 (henceforth B-regression) and hence might be expected to 
be more efficient. Against this, the B-regression is likely to be more robust against 
certain possible mis-specifications. There have been some suggestions that panel 
estimates are incorrigibly biased51 together with recent arguments in favour of the B- 
regression . Indeed, we show below that estimating the B-regression is more 
efficient than maximum likelihood on the full panel, provided that shocks are not too 
correlated across regions or countries. For cross-correlations of the order that arise in 
OECD countries, however, maximum likelihood dominates the B-regression. It is 
also true that maximum likelihood is more efficient than panel methods which do not 
allow for correlations in cross-country shocks. Ignoring cross-sectional correlation 
leads not only to efficiency losses: it means also that inference is distorted, given 
that, as is easily demonstrated, important cross-correlations exist in OECD data. It is 
fair to say that there is hardly a consistently estimated standard error in this entire 
literature. The study examines these issues by Monte Carlo. We apply our findings to 
a panel of OECD countries. On balance we find some evidence against convergence. 
Our analysis will be restricted to the case that there are more time periods than 
countries (T>N) which allows us to estimate an unrestricted variance-covariance 
matrix of cross-country shocks. In the opposite case, N>T, some restriction of the 
covariance matrix is necessary for the analysis. We do not discuss this case.
Our main contribution is to show that, for data-sets such as the OECD, 
maximum likelihood is effectively unbiased and more efficient than the B-regression 
or conventional panel estimators. Our analysis indicates moreover that both the B- 
regression and maximum likelihood estimates are robust to plausible measurement 
error and variation of convergence rates across countries. We show the reason these 
estimators are so well behaved is that many OECD countries were far from their
50 See equation (2.2’) in Chapter 3.
51 See sections (2.5) and (2.6).
52 See Shioji (1997a) and (1997b).
53 This case is analysed in Robertson and Symons (2000).
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equilibrium values in 1950. Our contribution here is consider in detail the 
relationship between the distribution of the maximum likelihood (henceforth ML) 
estimator and the initial conditions54. We show that, unless initial conditions are 
sufficiently extreme, confidence intervals for the convergence rate are 
unsatisfactorily wide. We offer a likelihood ratio test of the fixed-effects model (a 
general test of the convergence hypothesis), and show why, in small samples, the true 
size of the test is much lower than nominal levels. We construct tests of correct size 
by Monte Carlo. This analysis is similar in some respects to a test proposed by Evans 
and Karras (1996), except that we allow for a general cross-sectional covariance 
matrix.
2.10 Econometric Issues in Convergence Regressions: testing absolute 13- 
convergence
In this study we analyse unconditional convergence, having in mind the OECD 
economies or the regions of a given country. The general point that efficiency and 
inference are improved by exploiting the cross-sectional correlations of groups of 
economies applies also to studies of conditional convergence and it may well be that 
our findings provide a useful direction for future work in this area. Thus the 
convergence discussed in this study is absolute /^-convergence.
As in Evans and Karras (1996), to estimate the /^-parameter we argue for the 
use of demeaned data as the correct convergence test. It is also possible to choose at 
random a comparator country j  and replace the logarithm of per capita GDP, y ih by55:
y 'u -yu -1 =-A>V,+v„ (2.25)
where y]t is output in i less output in j  and vit = uit -  ujr Note that absolute /?-
convergence, as we have defined it, amounts to asserting p>0. If N<T, (2.25) can be 
estimated by maximum likelihood (henceforth ML) techniques with an unrestricted 
covariance matrix, allowing shocks to be correlated across countries, which is almost 
certain to be true. Expressing the data as deviation from a comparator country will
54 Shioji (1997b) has considered the importance of the initial conditions in bias reduction.
55 See also Section 2.4.
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eliminate some of the cross-sectional error correlation but not all, unless 
vit = T]t + £it, where rjt is a time-varying common stochastic component56. This
could not hold when international shocks impinge differently on different countries.
2.11 Possible mis-specifications
The B-regression has a number of things in its favour. First, the method has no 
difficulties with N>T where an ML attack on (2.25) will encounter problems in this 
case57. Second, as we shall see below, the method is robust to a number of plausible 
specification errors. The obvious weakness with the approach is that it is a non­
standard method of estimating the family of time-series given by (2.25) and is hardly 
likely to be efficient. A development of this method, presumably to increase 
efficiency, is to construct observations for shorter time periods, decades say. As we 
have previously seen in this Chapter, a related method is to average (2.25) over time 
periods and estimate using the initial value as an instrument for the period-average 
GDP.
Using the ML approach, we shall regard the vector process yt as having 
commenced at t -0  and conduct inference conditional on yo. We do not regard the 
data as a realisation of a stationary vector process commencing in the distant past. 
For our sample, and in most samples in this literature, the presence of undeveloped 
regions which are many standard deviations from the assumed long-run mean makes 
this assumption essential. Thus many of the i processeis in (2.25) are not even 
approximately realisations of a stationary time-series but are best thought of as 
exponential decay. As it happens, as we shall see below, this leads to increased 
efficiency in estimation.
The problem with estimating (2.25) is that one is trying to obtain precise 
estimates of the autoregressive parameter of a process close to the unit circle. Usually 
this is tricky because the estimator is badly behaved in small samples. For example,
in the univariate case, the OLS estimator p  of
56 As assumed by Lee, Pesaran and Smith (1997).
57 A possible argument against the adoption o f an ML or SUR approach is that, assuming series are 
stationary, the SUR estimator has low power unless N  is appreciably less than T, while it does not 
even exist when N>T. See Evans and Karras (1996) on this point.
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z l = p z t_l + £ t (t=l,...T, z0fixed) (2.26)
is biased down by 2p/T for p  < 15S. This is a large T result. For given moderate T and 
p  close to unity, the distribution of p  will be indistinguishable from the Dickey- 
Fuller distribution (for which this bias formula is a little different). What is 
mitigating in the cases we have in mind is that considering a panel of countries 
reduces bias considerably. Thus with, for example, N=20 and T=40 we have 
effectively 800 observations so that such bias is of the order of .002, non-trivial but 
unimportant in context. One should note however that if included regressors have 
genuinely different parameters then the false imposition of equality in estimation can 
bias p  in the opposite direction, that is towards 059. It is likely that the B-regression
(2.25) is more robust against this mis-specification.
A second mitigation is the initial conditions: z0 in (2.26) or the set y*i0 in
(2.25). The bias estimates discussed above are for large T and the contribution of the 
initial conditions is of lower order than 1/T. However, for fixed T, the distribution of 
p  in (2.26) concentrates on p  with variance proportional to a  /zq2 as zq grows60. 
Thus the relevant parameter is the initial condition measured in units of the 
innovation standard deviation and, for typical samples, values of this can be 40 or 
more. In these circumstances the estimate will be accurate and precisely determined. 
It follows that the small sample properties of the ML estimator of P  are subject to 
two conflicting influences : the closeness to the unit circle induces the distribution to 
behave like a multivariate Dickey-Fuller distribution, while the extreme initial 
conditions induce normality. In such circumstances, Monte Carlo seems the only way 
to deduce the properties of the distribution.
Finally one might want to test Ho: p - 0  in (2.25). In these circumstances,
(2.25) is a family of random walks and a version of the Dickey-Fuller test would
58 See Grubb and Symons (1987) for a general discussion.
59 Robertson and Symons (1992) discuss this possibility. In the event that the forcing variable is a 
random walk, the false imposition o f parameter equality across countries will produce an estimate 
P=0 in large samples.
60 Evans and Savin (1983).
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need to be performed. If one took seriously the possibility that the vit are correlated 
across /, critical values could be calculated by Monte Carlo, wherein the artificial 
random vector v( would be selected with contemporaneous covariance matrix given 
by the sample covariance matrix ofy*it- y * it.r  hi the case we shall study, and in like 
work, one is certain to reject the null, because under Ho:fi=0, the B-regression (2.25) 
should return an estimate on y*to of zero and the graph of growth against gap should 
reveal no systematic relationship. Neither is remotely the case.
2.12 ML versus the E-Regression and Pooling: a Monte Carlo analysis
Table 2.1 sets out some Monte Carlo experiments to investigate the properties of the 
estimators of p. We consider three values of P (.04, .02, .00) and four sets of initial 
conditions for the y ih -A(l,2,...,20) for A = .5, 1, 2, 4. A value of A somewhere 
between 2 and 4 would characterise differences from US GDP (per head) in OECD 
data. Each of the 12 cells reports the results of 5000 experiments. The first entry in 
each cell gives the average of 5000 estimates of the cross-section equation (2.25), the 
second entry the corresponding average for method (2.2’), while the final entry gives 
the relative root mean squared error for the two methods. By construction, the vit are 
orthogonal at different i and different t. In general both estimators are negligibly 
biased over the range of parameters considered but it is possible to identify several 
patterns.
Bias and estimate imprecision are increasing in p  and decreasing in A. For 
P=. 04 the B-regression is always worse in Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) terms. 
For p=. 02 or smaller this result is reversed except for small A. Thus neither method is 
unambiguously superior. For A=2, more or less the OECD value, ML is slightly 
better for p=. 04 but becomes decidedly worse for smaller values. The reason for the 
relative diffuseness of the ML estimates is that they entail calculation of a large (20 x 
20) covariance matrix of errors. If it is assumed in estimation that this covariance 
matrix is scalar (as is true in fact for the generated errors v#), ML becomes better in 
terms of root mean square error, only by 10 -14% for the values tabulated of A and p.
However ML improves its performance when the v// are correlated across i. 
Table 2.2 sets out some experiments varying the correlation ( y./) between the v//. We 
find that ML dominates the B-regression once the average cross-correlation becomes
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greater than .25. Correlation of this order and greater characterizes many data sets, 
including per-capita GDP. We also include in Table 2 some experiment with a 
conventional pooling estimate of (2.25) (that is, stacking and OLS, thus ignoring 
cross-sectional correlation). ML dominates pooling once cross-country correlation 
becomes greater than .25 .
2.13 Serial Correlation
We have noted above that the B-regression is more likely to be robust against the 
false imposition in estimation of parameter equality across conditioning variables. 
Robustness against mild mis-specification is a very useful property in this context. 
One likely form of mis-specification is the presence of serial correlation in v/Y in
(2.25). Indeed, Barro (1997) argues against panel estimates of (2.25) on the grounds 
that (2.25) pertains, not to GDP itself, but to GDP purged of its business cycle 
component. In this case, if observed GDP is used in estimation, bias is expected
because of measurement error61. Specifically, assuming y.t = y it + w.f where y u is
the value of per capita GDP appropriate to equation (2.25), the error term in (2.25) 
becomes
e„ = v„ + w „ - ( l -  P)w„_, (2.27)
where wit is the business cycle component of output. Thus if v and w are independent 
white noise processes, serial correlation in € is negative and fitting (2.25) will lead to 
estimates of p  being biased upwards. If one is willing to assume a value of p, the 
serial correlation of
s« = y ' , - ( l -  P ) y ’,., (2-28)
may be directly investigated. For real OECD data and values of p  in the internal (0,
A
0.1), 8 n is well represented by an AR(1) with parameter ranging from about 0.2 to
61 Note however that, since y * it is a difference from a comparative country, common business cycle 
components are automatically eliminated.
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0.3. The implication is that estimates of p  would tend to be biased down if 
anything62.
To deal with measurement error Shioji (1997a) proposes a “skipping”
♦ fiX • •estimator . The skipping procedure consists of estimating
/ "  = ( 1 ~  P ) my»-m + emil (2.29)
by OLS, where emit = vjY + ( 1 -  p ) v it_j + ... + (1 -  p ) m~1v.lm+r A decreasing pattern
on the estimated coefficient as m increases suggests the presence of an important 
measurement error bias.
Another mis-specification that could have important effects occurs when p  
varies across countries or regions, a point made by Lee, Pesaran and Smith (1997). If 
the variation is random then estimates of the average p  deduced from (2.2’) will not 
be importantly biased64. If however there is correlation in the sample between p t and 
y  *io then bias can be expected for both methods. The ML estimate of p  deduced from
(2.25) may be thought of as a weighted average of OLS estimates of each i equation 
taken singly, wherein the weights are proportional to the sample variance of y*it (if 
the vit are orthogonal). Thus, if slow adjusters (low p) tend to be undeveloped regions 
(low jy*/o), as seems quite plausible, the estimate of P  will be biased towards 0.
We study the effect of serial correlation on the ^-coefficient by Monte Carlo 
in Table 2.3. The error processes are scaled to have unit unconditional variance (not 
unit innovation variance) and we denote the autoregressive parameter by a. Both 
estimators are relatively immune from bias, with the estimates derived from the 
B-regression somewhat more efficient. Note that, if the series y*it were realisations 
of stationary AR(l)s, we could expect strong biases in ML estimates of p in  the
62 Thus, if v and w are independent AR (l)s, it must follow that the serial correlation in v„ is o f the 
order of 0.2.
63 See Shioji (1997a) on this point. Using a skipping procedure, he finds evidence of possible 
measurement error in the US states and the Japanese prefectures. Evidence is less clear cut for the 
OECD.
64 Though see Lee, Pesaran and Smith (1997).
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presence of autocorrelated errors. The lack of bias in Table 2.3 is due completely to 
the initial conditions.
Table 2.4 gives the results of variability across i in the parameter /?. We have 
taken 20 different values of pi, evenly spread between .01 and .03. In terms of the 
usual economic interpretation, this is fairly extreme variability since at the lower end, 
gaps have a half-life of 70 years versus 23 years at the higher end. The first cell 
assumes the order of the Ps corresponds to the initial conditions, that is, the lowest p  
is the least developed etc. Note that p  is biased towards zero by about 0.005. The 
second cell reverses the assignment: the lowest ps go with the most developed. In 
this case the bias is reversed. It seems to us that these results are quite reassuring 
since the tabulated biases are very much worst case outcomes.
Finally, Table 2.5 investigates the relationship between the initial conditions 
and the distribution of the ML estimator p . We compute indices of skewness and 
kurtosis. We compute also confidence intervals for p  = .02, defined as the points 
between the 2.5 percentile and the 97.5 percentile of these empirical distributions. It 
will be observed that p  is effectively unbiased once X rises above about 2.0 but the 
distribution still manifests skewness and excess kurtosis. Even for X as high as 8.0, 
the distribution is leptokurtic. For low values of X, 95% confidence intervals for X are 
quite wide, indicating that tight estimates of convergence rates require wide variance 
in initial conditions.
2.14 Bias and fixed effects
A natural test in the general convergence proposition is to insert constants on 
the right in (2.25), that is to allow for fixed effects. In Chapter 3 we have seen that, if 
such constant are present in the true model, different countries will differ in per 
capita income in the long-run, perhaps due to semi-permanent aspects of institutional 
and technological structure65. In this case estimates of p  from (2.25) will be biased 
towards zero if constants are not included. On the other hand, if  constants are 
included, estimates of p  will be biased up, whether the constants are present in the
65 See Islam (1995), section 2.3.
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true model or not66. In the univariate case, (2.26) bias is (1 +3p)/T when a constant is 
included. With K  extra regressors on the right, the maximum bias is [K(l+p) + 
2p]/T. In the multivariate case, allowing each country to have its own constant will 
bias p b y  approximately 4/40 = .10 given that the constants are in fact absent.
We analysed this latter bias by Monte Carlo. In the notation of Table 2.1 with 
/K 02, X=2 and orthogonal v//, we found with 5000 Monte Carlo replications an 
average estimate of .102 with sample standard deviation of .086 when each country 
was allowed its own constant. Examinations of parameter estimates for these 
artificial data showed that the constants were almost invariably statistically 
significant, despite being genuinely absent in the model. The magnitude of the fitted 
constants was correlated with starting conditions y*io, so that countries behind at t=0 
were falsely predicted to be behind in equilibrium (t=oo). Reflection reveals why this 
must occur. Our initial conditions y*io are negative and, since p  is biased up, the 
predicted path (with a zero constant) for a given country from t=0 to T  must lie on 
average above the path in the data. It follows that the least-squares fit will be 
improved by choosing a negative constant. Thus bias to p  creates bias to the fixed 
effects parameters.
This can also be seen heuristically by examination of (2.26). If p  is derived 
with a fitted constant, a, then, since a regression line passes through the sample 
means, we must have
z, - p z , - i - v a  (2.30)
Thus, with no constant present in the true model, we have
E ( a )  = E( (p - p) ~z , - , )  (2.31)
Given that p - p  is almost always positive, it follows that, for countries whose 
relative GDP/head is negative over the whole sample, we expect to find negative 
constants.
66 See Nickell (1981).
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2.15 Case Study: convergence in the OECD
As an example we have applied both methods of estimation to income per capita in 
23 OECD countries (the whole set excluding Turkey and Yugoslavia) . The sample 
thus consists of developed capitalist economies for whom the assumption of common 
tastes and technology is fairly supportable. The sample runs from 1950 to 1990. In 
1950 these economies had been variously affected by the cataclysms of the first half 
of the century and thus are suitable for study of convergence in a homogeneous set of
AScountries disturbed from equilibrium . The United States was chosen as the 
comparator country.
Table 2.6 sets out estimates obtained by Shioji’s skipping procedure. 
Equation (2.29) has been estimated using different values of m. The absence of any 
downward trend in the J3s as m grows confirms the absence of measurement error 
bias in the estimates69. An OLS regression of y*iT-y*to on y*io gave a parameter of - 
.39 with a standard error o f .03 so the hypothesis of p  =0 in (2.2’) is decisively 
rejected. The non-linear least squares estimate of P  in (2.2’) was p  = .023 (.002). 
The estimate of P  from (2.25) was quite different, p  = .028 (.0019). Which do we 
believe? The Durbin’s h test for the 7 equations in (2.25) was .86 on average 
suggesting that bias arising from serial correlation in the residuals is not a problem.70. 
Thus we can comfortably accept the null of absence of first order serial correlation.
67 We use the Penn world tables (Version 5.6).
68 One might seek to argue that Portugal and perhaps Greece and Ireland were not developed 
economies in 1950, by such measures as proportion o f the workforce in agriculture, literacy, and 
female education. Our results are not overly sensitive to this assumption.
69 The inclusion o f fixed effects in (2.30) does not affect this result.
70 The Durbin’s result shows that, under the null o f absence o f first order serial correlation, with d  
corresponding to the Durbin Watson statistic (in our analysis, the average Durbin-Watson is 1.73) 
and s2 to the estimated variance o f the least square regression coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable, the statistic:
is distributed as a standard normal. If /?> 1.645 we reject the null at the 5% level.
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In any case, this should bias the estimate towards zero. Similarly, variability across 
the ps will bias the estimates towards zero if the undeveloped regions are slow 
adjusters, as seems the most likely case. It would seem therefore that ML is fairly free 
of the mis-specification biases we have considered. The sample correlation of the vit 
was about 0.4 on average so, according to Table 2.2, ML on (2.25) is more efficient 
and to be preferred.
When we include individual constants on the right of (2.25) we found p  = 
.068. The constants were always negative (the US always remains richer) and 
significant in all countries except Switzerland. The likelihood ratio test for the 
exclusion of all constants gave a reading of 77 which indicates a massive rejection 
Of2 oi= 40-3)' However, the discussion in section 3.2 leads us to expect bias and 
falsely significant constants in a regression such as this. To illustrate this problem for 
the OECD, we generated artificial data taking y*io at its 1950 value, with shocks uit 
drawn from a multivariate normal distribution with the covariance matrix of 
ujt = y*t -  0.98y]t_, in the sample. The results are given in Table 2.7: the inclusion of 
constants, though genuinely absent in the true artificial data, introduces a substantial 
upward bias to p , with an estimated convergence parameter of p  = .079 .
Accordingly, we have constructed a critical level for the likelihood ratio by 
Monte Carlo. We first estimated p  under the null of no constants and computed the 
residual variance-covariance matrix. We then simulated (2.25) using random vit with 
the computed covariance matrix and the initial conditions y*io observed in our data. 
Equation (2.25) was then estimated with and without constants. Repeating the 
process 5000 times, we found for the likelihood ratio test a 1% critical level of about 
70 and a 5% level of 61.3. Thus unconditional convergence is comfortably rejected at 
conventional levels though nowhere near as decisively as with the conventional . 
The problem countries are Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain: their growth has been 
too low, given their relative poverty over the sample. Without these countries, 
absolute convergence is accepted at the 1% level by a conventional test and at the 
5% level by Monte Carlo. It is noteworthy that, if we look at the data set, these four
71countries had the lowest secondary school enrolment in 1965 .
71 World Development Report (1991).
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An alternative estimate of ft in (2.25), robust to the presence of fixed effects, 
can be based on the Anderson-Hsiao estimator wherein the equation is differenced 
and estimated using appropriate lags of y*u as instruments. We compute a standard 
error for this estimate taking into account the cross-correlation between country 
shocks. Specifically, the asymptotic variance of the estimate is:
Var(j) )  = (Ay'.i ’Ay'.,)'2 (Ay., * ’(Z<8U) Ay'.,) (2.32)
where J  the usual Anderson-Hsiao moving average-matrix, and I  is an estimate of 
the cross-sectional covariance matrix, given by the residual covariance matrix 
factored by 0.5. The vector Ay*.j is the stacked Ay*.j, instrumented by two lags of 
y \ . We find p  = .031 (08). The point estimate is very close to that obtained by 
ML, despite being free of the possible bias introduced by missing fixed effects. Table 
2.8 sets out the values for p  obtained by the four methods we have considered.
2.16 Summary of results
This Chapter has analysed the main features of some econometric techniques 
proposed for estimating the convergence parameter. We have seen that there is no 
consensus on which is the more appropriate methodology for estimating 
convergence. It is probably fair to say that “As yet, no technique is available that has 
shown uniform superiority in finite samples over a wide range of relevant situations 
as far as the true parameter values and the further properties of the DGP are
72
concerned. Perhaps such a technique is just impossible.”
However, different methodologies may imply very different values of the
convergence coefficient. These disparities in estimated coefficients imply significant
differences in the predicted patterns of convergence and, possibly, even dissimilar
interpretations of the convergence process. Despite these differences, the
methodologies summarised in this Chapter share the common characteristic of
placing no emphasis on the possibility that shocks are correlated across countries. In
particular, all panel methods summarised so far have in fact assumed that shocks are
uncorrelated across countries. While for more heterogeneous data set this assumption
72 Kiviet (1995), page 72.
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may be considered acceptable, it is surely unlikely when quite homogeneous data sets 
like OECD, European countries or regional samples are introduced. We have 
examined this point extensively and proposed an alternative panel estimation 
procedure. In fact, we have investigated a possibility so far ignored by all the 
empirical studies on convergence, namely, an annual panel estimator where shocks 
are allowed to be correlated across countries. In particular, we analyse by Monte 
Carlo the properties of the ML panel estimator with an unrestricted variance- 
covariance matrix in estimating the convergence parameter. We have found:
1. Both ML and the B-regression have various things in their favour. The B- 
regression is robust against some possible mis-specifications.
2. ML is a better estimator for cross-country correlation likely to be observed in 
most work.
3. The natural test for convergence in the ML approach of including country- 
specific constants has problems because bias to the lagged dependent variable, in 
conjunction with initial conditions, creates bias and false significance in the 
estimates of the constants.
4. Monte Carlo study of the likelihood ratio statistic suggests that the value obtained 
for the exclusion of the constants in the OECD data is statistically significant at 
conventional levels. In other words, unconditional p  -convergence is rejected in 
these data -  but only just.
The next Chapter introduces this alternative methodology for estimating the 
process of convergence among Italian regions. As we will see, the characteristics of 
this sample imply that this estimator should perform better than other conventional 




Estimates of E(/?) obtained from (2.2’), from (2.25) & the root mean 
square errors of the estimates of (2.25) as a proportion of (2.2’).
£= . 04 £=.02 £=.00
A=5 .0415 (.0126) .0212 (.0100)
?Y': • ... : : \ •
.0009 (.0074)
.1003 (.236) .0252 (.0606) .0007 (.0062)
19.1 6.02 .83
>1=1 .0406 (.0074) .0205 (.0058) .0003 (.0042)
.0407 (.0215) .0200 (.0048) .0002 (.0029)
2.88 .82 .70
X=2 .0401 (.0038) .0201 (.0029) .00010 (.0022)
.0393 (.0040) .0196 (.0023) .00005 (.0014)
1.06 .79 .68
X=4 .0400 (.0019) .0200 (.0015) .00002 (.0010)
.0391 (.0019) .0195 (.0011) .00003 (.0007)
1.11 .82 .67
Notes:
1. For each X and each /? the cells contain, respectively, the estimate o f  E(J3)  from 
(2.25) (in the background), from (2 .2 ’) and the relative root mean square errors 
(rm se), (2 .2 ’)/(2 .25) (in italics). Sample standard deviations are given in brackets. 
Equation (2 .25) was estimated by maximum likelihood, with free covariance matrix 
o f  v„. Equation (2 .2 ’) was estimated by non-linear least squares. Both equations 
were estimated using the LSQ option in TSP 4.2 (5000 replications).
2. Initial values o f  (A ylh...,Ay2ot) = A (l,2,...20).
3. Convergence tolerance for estimator convergence = .0001. All calculations 
performed in double precision.
4. The covariance matrix o f  the was taken to be 120 to generate the data.
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T ab le  2.2
Estimates of bias and RMSE for different methods of estimating 
the convergence parameter p with cross correlations of the v//
(A=2, J3=.02)
y .^OO y^.25 V=-5 y/=.75
(1) ML .0200 (.0029) .0202 (.0043) .0202 (.0040) .0201 (.0030)
(2) B-regression .0195 (.0022) .0202 (.0043) .0205 (.0074) .0209 (.0157)
(3) Pooling .0201 (.0020) .0205 (.0051) .0210 (.0060) .0212 (.0072)
rmse(2)/rmse(l) .77 1.16 1.86 5.27
rmse(3)/rmse(l) .68 1.01 1.52 2.46
Notes:
(i) Convensions as for Table 1, (l)-(3 ).
(ii) (n ) y/ is the average cross-country correlation coefficient.
(iii) The Pooling estimator is OLS on the stacked data.
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T ab le  2.3
Effect on E(P) of serial correlation in v// (k=2, p=.02)
a=. 25 a=.5
ML .0196 (.0039) .0183 (.0055)
B-regression .0197 (.0030) .0200 (.0046)
.77 .80
Notes:
(i) Conventions as for Table 1, (l)-(3).
(i) (uj a  is the first order serial correlation coefficient of the vit process.
T ab le  2.4
Effect on E(p) of /^-variability (A=2)
high initial gap = slow adjusting high initial gap = fast adjusting
. .: • • -•J.r-: v -  f-*?, 
.0155 (.0028) .0249 (.0035)
.0150 (.0020) .0245 (.0025)
.93 .85
Notes:
(i) Conventions as for Table 1, (l)-(3).
(ii) The first cell computes p  when /?, ranges from .03 to .01 for starting values -2(1,2,
20);
(ii) the second cell reverses this assignment.
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Table 2.5
Properties of ML estimator as initial conditions vary (/K02)
mean Std. Dev. skewness Kurtosis (-3) 95% confidence 
intervals fo r (3
X=. l .0216 .0265 -.6280 1.1719 [-.0247, .0792]
II .0221 .0160 -1.0061 3.2365 [-.0036, .0589]
2=1 .0209 .0083 -.6893 2.1411 [.0065, .0392]
<NII .0202 .0042 -.4673 1.6036 [.0124, .0299]
II ■fc. .0200 .0021 -.2378 .9502 [.0160, .0243]
II oo .0200 .0010 -.0695 .6628 [.0181, .0222]
Notes:
(i) Conventions as for Table 1, (l)-(3).
(ii) Standard Errors for the skewness and kurtosis statistics are .04 and .08 respectively.
Table 2.6
Estimated ^-parameter: results from skipping estimation





10 m u (.0283)
Notes:
(i) Method of estimation: OLS (Pooling Estimation).
(ii) m defines different samples (data are taken every m years).
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Table 2.7
Estimates of P with and without fixed effects in OECD data
Mean Standard Deviation Bias
p  (fixed effects fitted) .079 .0262 .059
p  (no fixed effects) .020 .0049 .005
Notes:
(i) The Table g ives the results o f  M onte Carlo estim ations o f  p  in artificial data, taking 
as initial conditions those observed in the O ECD and covariance matrix 
corresponding to p = .0 2 .  There are no fixed effects in the artificial data.
Table 2.8
Sample OECD (1950-90)
Estimates of the convergence coefficient by different methods
P coefficient Std. Error
B-regression .023 (.030)
OLS pooling .027 (.003)
ML procedure .028 (.002)
Fixed Effects .068 (.005)
Anderson-Hsiao .031 (.080)
Notes:
(i) Number o f  countries 22, number o f  observations 41. The sample includes the OECD  
countries with the exception o f  Y ugoslavia and Turkey. Data are in difference from 
US levels.
(ii) The estim ated value o f  the average Durbin’s h test (M L procedure) is .86.
CHAPTER 3
THE ROLE OF HUMAN CAPITAL IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF ITALIAN REGIONS
“In reality, other factors could mean that the potential 
growth benefits o f a highly qualified labour force could 
be wasted. We therefore think o f a highly qualified 
labour force as a necessary but not a sufficient 
precondition for growth. Wasteful economic policies, 
wars and other political upheavals, natural disasters, and 
other events may delay progress in an otherwise 
promising economic environment.” Azariadis and 
Drazen (1990).
3.1. Introduction
As seen in Chapter 1, differences in human capital endowments and their rates of 
investment have long been recognised as an important element in explaining 
observed GDP gaps. A number of growth models imply that public returns to 
education exceed private returns thus stressing the presence of positive externalities 
to education. For example, Lucas (1988) assumes that high average levels of human 
capital throughout the economy increase the productivity of any given worker. One 
could think of this as a positive peer-group effect. But there are a number of other 
possible mechanisms. A higher level of education could be associated with a 
reduction in crime, increased social cohesion, more informed political decisions, 
inter-generational benefits (assuming parents’ education is transmitted to their 
children) and technological and organisational improvements not captured by private 
returns. In contrast, traditional signalling models of education may generate a socially 
sub-optimal outcome. In this case, education does not directly add to productivity. 
Rather it confers credentials used in the labour market to be selected as able workers: 
private returns to schooling can be high at the same time as social returns are 
nugatory. Signalling models are usually associated with higher levels of education.
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Some authors have even argued that higher education tends to create rent-seekers 
who do not add to the genuine output of the economy.1 But we may think of other 
mechanisms concerning lower levels of education. More prosaically, recent work 
suggests that conventional schooling may have harmful side effects by creating peer- 
groups with rival values to those of parents and adults generally. One could think of 
this as a negative peer-group effect. There is a vast amount of literature on the 
increase in adolescent psychological problems due to their separation from the
•j
influence of adults .
Note that individual-based micro analyses will be useless as a guide to public 
policy when there are important externalities, as such analyses will only measure 
private returns. Conversely, macroeconomic studies have a role to play in the analysis 
of returns to schooling , since these studies consider the data of direct interest, 
namely the returns at the level of the economy. Indeed, the existing empirical 
literature on macro growth and human capital shows substantial differences in the 
microeconometric evidence on returns to education4. In general, while Mincerian 
regressions5 indicate the existence of positive private returns on educational 
attainments in both developed and developing countries, often of the order of 10% 
for each extra year, cross-country studies of aggregate returns to education (typically 
using the standard growth-regression approach) usually find that education is not 
strongly associated with per capita income growth.
In other words, empirical macro studies on aggregate returns to education 
show puzzling results. Too often education seems not to influence per capita income 
growth and, sometimes, it even seems to wield a negative influence on the 
development process of an economy. Different reasons have been put forward to 
explain this puzzle. Firstly, it has been claimed that the main problem causing the
1 See W olff and Gittleman (1993). See also Lodde (1995) for a specific example on Italian regions.
2 Thus Hargreaves (1994): “If one wanted to create a separate teenage culture, if  one wanted to make 
adolescents feel cut-off from adult responsibilities, the best way would be to do as we now do: 
segregate them for most o f  their lives outside the family with those who happen to have been bom in 
the same year”. See also Rutter and Smith (1995).
3 See Temple (1999a).
4 See Psacharopoulos (1985), Pritchett (1996) and Krueger and Lindhal (2001) among others.
5 See Section 3.3.
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observed lack of empirical support is that most growth regressions, while using large 
international datasets, incorrectly impose a single coefficient and thus equal returns 
on schooling among different countries. This problem is likely to arise when the 
quality of education is influenced by differences in educational institutions making 
national statistics on education difficult to compare. To test for this problem different 
authors suggest to focus on “ ...the most coherent part of the data set rather than the 
whole sample”6. Moreover, it may well be that the quantity of education affects its 
quality: returns to education may be higher in more educated areas as usually 
predicted by growth models . In both cases standard regressions would produce 
distorted estimates on education due to the presence of parameter heterogeneity and 
measurement error problems8.
A second problem that may arise when we estimate returns to schooling is 
that in some cases the acquisition of educational skills is not necessarily linked with 
productivity. As noted by Shultz (1962), education may represent not only an 
investment for individuals, but can also be considered as a consumption good and, 
thus, be privately valued for its own sake9. But another interesting example is found 
in Pritchett (1996), who cites the case of Saudi Arabia where in 1988 fifty percent of 
university students were studying “Humanities, Religion and Theology”. While this 
kind of degree probably provides good credentials in the Saudi Arabian job market, it 
does not guarantee an obvious acquisition of growth enhancing skills10. A related 
problem has been emphasised by Griliches (1997). He observes-that in many
6 See Temple (1999). But see also Bond et al. (2001) “One potentially fruitful line o f research would 
be to develop specifications that allow for some limited heterogeneity in slope coefficients, and to 
investigate the extent o f such heterogeneity using sub-samples o f countries where longer time series 
are available.” pag.22, and Klenow and Rodriguez-CIare (1997b) as in Chapter 5, footnote 8.
7 Among them see Azariadis and Drazen (1990).
8 See Pritchett (1996), Temple (1999b), Krueger and Lindhal (2001) and Kyriacou (1991).
9 For example, some schooling may be acquired by persons who are not income earners and should 
not be included in the analysis o f returns to schooling. This may be the case especially for women This 
is why we use variables on educational attainment of the regional labour force instead o f using per 
capita schooling indicators as found in most macro studies.
10 In Saudi Arabia even in Western-oriented schools a large part of the new curriculum is devoted to 
religion. In particular, the memorization o f the Quran, interpretation and understanding o f the Quran 
and the application o f Islamic tradition to everyday life are stressed. Religion is also studied at the 
university level alongside other subjects, and is compulsory for all students.
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countries, and especially developing countries, the public sector employs most of the
skilled labour force. This fact may create three sources of distortions when we
estimate returns to schooling11. Firstly, the output of the Public Sector is certainly
badly measured in National Accounts and, possibly, underestimated. Further, the
literature on developing countries shows many examples where the growth of the
Public Sector with the “absorption” of a skilled labour force in this sector has not
been motivated by any efficiency criteria. Lastly, the Public Sector is not obviously
an innovative sector while, as predicted by theoretical growth models a la Nelson and
Phelps, educational capital is growth enhancing only when allocated to innovative
sectors. These are all examples where the potential growth benefits of a highly
qualified labour force could be wasted.
In this Chapter we investigate if, screening for the problems described above,
a standard macro analysis of returns to education would produce significant results.
To begin with, we deal with the first problem focusing on a more homogeneous data
set rather than the whole international sample and ask what role human capital has
had in Italian regional economic development. We claim that Italian data are most
suitable for a macro study of returns to education. Unlike most regional data sets, the
Italian regions are quite diverse in their endowments of human capital - among the
European countries, Italy has one of the highest rates of dispersion in regional 
1education attainment - and, since the 60s, has experienced vast increases in the 
average duration of education at all three levels. Secondly, the Italian regions have 
common institutions13 so that, in large part, the data represent a controlled 
experiment in ceteris paribus variation of labour force educational endowments in a 
developed economy. Further, there is a large amount of literature showing a clear 
divide in the Italian economy between the developed North/Centre areas and the less 
developed South, suggesting the presence of two convergence clubs. These two clubs 
are also characterised by the existence of homogeneous educational institutions in 
both areas, together with substantial differences in human capital endowments. In
11 “I would like to suggest another possible answer to this puzzle....much if not most o f the growth in 
human capital was absorbed in the Public Sector of many o f these economies”. Griliches (1997).
12 See Lodde (1999). The sample includes Germany, France, UK, Belgium and Italy, 1981-1991.
13 Not to mention capital mobility.
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fact, compared to the less developed South, the richer North/Centre can tap larger 
stocks of human capital. Therefore, this is an ideal sample to test the relationship 
between quantity and returns to education. Allowing for parameter heterogeneity in 
the two clubs, we analyse if  returns to education have been different in these two 
areas of the country considered separately. Also, we suggest testing for the second 
problem by introducing a measure of the Public Sector into our empirical analysis 
and checking if this may possibly affect our estimates on returns to schooling.
Our investigation differs from previous studies on Italian convergence in that 
we use a measure of the stock of human capital rather than the flow. We have census 
data on average years of schooling and different levels of schooling distinguished by 
gender and use information on enrolment rates to construct a yearly dataset. Thus, we 
follow the standard development literature that predicts larger externalities for 
educated women than men and investigate if differences in male and female 
education have different impacts on the development of Italian regions. Further, we 
ask if different levels of education produce different impacts on growth. In fact, due 
to their emphasis on the role of technology, most of the theoretical growth models 
implicitly expect that higher levels of educational attainments act more powerfully on 
growth than, say, primary school. This prediction contradicts microeconometric 
evidence, where returns to investments in primary education are usually estimated as 
the largest14.
This Chapter is organised into nine sections. The next section introduces a 
descriptive analysis of the Italian regional convergence process, while the third 
section stresses the distinction between private and social returns to education and 
briefly describes the results found by previous studies on private returns to education 
in Italy. Section four summarises the previous evidence on the effects of human 
capital on regional Italian convergence, while section five presents the main 
characteristics of our human capital data set. Section six explains the econometric 
methodology used, and the remaining sections discuss the major results of our 
empirical analysis. In particular, section eight proposes a new methodology for the 
analysis of convergence clubs and tests if different levels of educational attainment 
have different impacts on growth. The last section offers some conluding
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observations.
3.2 The distribution of Italian regional per capita GDP: stylised facts
A distinguishing feature of the study of convergence among Italian regions is the 
high inequality in the distribution of per capita income among regions. In 1950, Italy 
shows twice as much the dispersion calculated for other European countries. Even 
today, the degree of regional inequality in Italy is higher than in many EC countries15. 
Its high inequality in the distribution of income reflects the persisting gap (with an 
approximate but clear division) between the North and the South of the country. This 
is still true notwithstanding the fact that the Italian Government has always reported 
the development of the Mezzogiorno area as a key objective of its economic policy16.
Among the most influential studies on regional convergence are the Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin papers (1991 and 1995). They examine convergence among US states 
and European regions and find a speed of convergence of 2 percent in all regional
17samples examined, including Italian regions . Therefore, they conclude that the 
south of Italy has not yet caught-up because it started far behind the north, and the 
rate of beta convergence is only 2 percent a year.”. In other words, they see no 
evidence that poor regions, such as those in southern Italy, are being systematically 
left behind in the growth process: convergence for southern regions seems to be just a 
question of time. By now many other authors have disputed these somewhat
1 fioptimistic conclusions . In this section we stress the main stylised facts about Italian 
regional convergence and compare our descriptive evidence with that of previous
14See Psacharopoulos (1994), Pritchett (1996) and Krueger and Lindhal (2001).
15 See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991).
16 See Graziani (1978). He also includes the official view o f the Italian Government from 
«Programma Economico, 1971-75», Ministero del Bilancio» and «Studi per il Programma Economico 
Nazionale, 1971-75», ISPE.
17 This conclusion is found also with international (or cross-countries) samples. For the Italian case 
they found an estimated convergence coefficient o f 0.015, a lower speed o f convergence with respect 
to the rest o f Europe.




The first stylised fact on Italian convergence concerns the non-homogeneity 
of the process of regional convergence: decreasing dispersion in regional per capita
9 0GDP, while strong during the 60s, all but ceased after 1975 .
This pattern is confirmed by the cr convergence analysis in Figure 3.1. As we 
have seen in Chapter 2, the cr convergence is an accepted descriptive measure of 
convergence. Two series are converging if their difference is decreasing on average 
and has a decreasing variance: that is, we test if the series tend to be equal in time 
and if this tendency towards equality is stable. The dispersion among Italian regions 
seems to have decreased until early 70s. Afterward, the dispersion is fairly stable,
9 1with some tendency to increase in the last few years. It is impossible then, to 
conclude in favour of a strong and/or continuous process of sigma convergence. 
Explanations abound. There was a decrease in migration from the South to the North; 
there were efforts directed towards achieving a uniform wage 
between the northern and the possibly less productive southern labour force22; there 
was a change in policies directed to fostering the development of more backward 
regions. In particular, the Italian Government sought to boost industrial investment 
(especially in heavy industries like chemicals and steel) in the South during the 60s
9<n
and part of the 70s . After that period, there was a shift in policy from investment to 
income-maintenance in the form of direct transfers and an expansion of the public 
sector, also associated with an acceleration in the process of- administrative 
decentralisation.
19 Our analysis is based on annual data on per capita GDP, covering the period 1963-1994, which has 
been collected and organised by Prometeia. See the appendices for more information about the data 
set.
20 See Mauro and Podrecca (1994), Di Liberto (1994), Boltho, Carlin and Scaramozzino (1997), Paci 
and Pigliaru (1995) among others.
21 The downward peaks in ‘75 can be explained by the strong negative effect that the oil shock had in 
the northern, more industrialised, regions.
22 This policy started officially in 1969.
23 See Graziani (1978).
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Fig. 3.1- Time path of the standard deviation of the logarithm of GDP across 
Italian regions 1963-94.
All this notwithstanding, this non-homogeneity of the convergence process 
has been found in studies of other countries. For example, the Spanish regions seem 
to have experienced a similar pattern24, and many OECD economies experienced a 
stop in their process of regional convergence somewhere in the mid-1970s25. The 
rapid increase of oil prices in 1973-74 presumably influenced investments, 
technology and additional factors that most probably affect the convergence process 
internationally. In particular, the observed Italian sigma-convergence pattern may 
have been affected by a different sensitivity to oil shocks among regions due to the 
disparity in industrial development between north and south.
Table 3.1 compares (with respect to the Italian average) per capita income in 
each Italian region. During the 1960s, the richest regions, Valle d’Aosta and 
Lombardy, were respectively 42 and 34 percent wealthier than the average Italian 
region. The poorest regions of Calabria and Basilicata, registered 38 percent less
24 See Chapter 4.
25 See Sala-i-Martin (1996).
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income per capita than the Italian average. This is a large gap for a relatively small 
industrialised country. This difference has lowered during the last three decades, but
Of*the decrease was not smooth throughout the period analysed .
Moreover, we have already seen that Italy underwent relative economic 
decline of the north-west regions (traditionally the most industrialised area of the 
country called “industrial triangle”), due to the success of a group of newly 
industrialised regions located in the north-east and central areas of the country. 
Therefore, even where there is evidence of sigma convergence in the first period, we 
have to be cautious in concluding in favour of a global catching up process. As we 
will see from the econometric results, a lot of the observed decrease in the dispersion 
is probably due to a process of convergence among northern regions while the 
traditionally poorest areas of the country have seemed to lag behind.
3.3 Private versus Social Returns to education in Italy: the Mincerian 
earning function
The literature on private returns to schooling investigate if educated workers receive 
a higher wage rate compared to uneducated workers, where the wage rate differential 
represents the direct benefit resulting from investment in education. Assuming that 
relative earnings effectively reflect labour force productivity, the wage rate 
differential should represent the increase in productivity resulting from improved 
levels of education. The micro labour literature usually estimates returns to education 
introducing the so-called Mincerian earning function. In his work Mincer (1974) 
showed how it is possible to estimate private returns to education using the following 
wage equation:
w, =  y„ + r,s, +r ,x ,+  r,x ? +  *, (3 - 0
where wt is the logarithm of the wage of individual i, S, represents years of schooling,
26 For example, Campania and Liguria experienced a constant deterioration o f their relative position. 
Three regions, Abruzzi, Molise and Basilicata had a tendency to narrow their differentials with respect 
to the national average, even during the last twenty years. We also observe changes in the relative 
positions among richest regions. Northwest (Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, Lombardia, Liguria), the richest
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Xt is experience and e is the disturbance term. The quadratic term should measure 
returns to on-the-job training. That is, log of earnings are linearly related to an
97individual’s years of schooling , where students choose the level of schooling that 
maximises their lifetime income. More precisely, in this model the time spent in 
school affects individual abilities, productivities and, consequently, earnings. Other 
factors may be included among regressors, such as family background, proxies for 
individual ability (such as IQ scores) and other observable individual characteristics 
that may help to determine earnings.
In recent years, a number of empirical studies have introduced the Mincerian 
earning function to investigate the (private) returns to education in Italy. Brunello, 
Comi and Lucifora (1999) offer an exaustive survey of this literature. In this survey 
they distinguish between a) early studies carried out in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, based on OLS estimates and on unrepresentative data sets, and b) more recent 
studies that use nationally representative samples and employ more suitable 
econometric techniques such as Instrumental Variables (IV) and panel data 
methodologies.
In this Chapter we will focus only on the second most recent type of studies 
and briefly review the results found in terms of private returns to schooling. In 
general, these studies find that private returns to education are higher than previously 
suggested by early OLS studies. Nevertheless, estimates of Italian returns to 
education are still lower than those generally computed for other, countries, especially 
the US. IV estimates of returns to years of schooling range from 5.7% to 7.6%, while 
studies that use longitudinal data find lower returns of approximately 4%. Morever, 
studies that investigate private returns for different levels of schooling suggest that 
that the expected returns from a year of tertiary education is 7.9%, higher than the 
expected returns from secondary education (4,3%) and in primary school (5%). 
However, as stressed by these authors, given that the expected duration of a college 
degree is much higher than the statutory duration, the computed number of years
area during the 60s, decreased its relative advantage. The opposite is true for the Northeast part of 
Italy (Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Trentino Alto Adige, and Emilia Romagna).
27 This specification is valid if the only cost o f attending school one additional year was the 
opportunity cost o f students’ time and if the proportionate increase in earnings caused by this 
additional year is constant over time.
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spent in tertiary education may carry an important measurement error affecting the 
estimated returns on tertiary education.
The earning function may also be introduced to estimate the social returns to 
education28. Empirical studies on international datasets show the presence of 
differences between estimated private and social returns to schooling. For example, 
Psacharopoulos (1985), using data from forty-four countries that include both 
developing and developed countries, compares private versus social rates of return to 
education distinguished by educational level and find that: a) returns to primary 
education (whether social or private) are highest among all educational levels, b) 
private returns are in excess of social returns, especially at university level, c) returns 
to education in developing countries are higher than the corresponding returns in 
more advanced countries. These results have been confirmed by more recent 
studies29.
However, the use of the Mincerian earning function to estimate social returns 
to schooling has been criticised. Firstly, the use of the earning function for estimating 
social returns to schooling is justified only under the assumption that earnings 
represent a good proxy for productivity. In other words, we need to assume perfectly 
competitive markets and absence of externalities. Only in this case, would the extra 
earnings of educated workers represent their additional contribution to output. As we 
have already stressed before, growth models with human capital are often 
characterised by the presence of positive externalities. Thus, we claim that the 
standard convergence equation is more appropriate to estimate social returns to 
schooling.
3.4 Human capital and the development of Italian regions: previous 
empirical evidence
Most studies on growth and convergence that introduce international data sets find 
that human capital is insignificantly or even negatively correlated with the process of
28 Krueger and Lindhal (2001) show how to compute the “Macro-Mincer” wage equation.
29 See Pritchett (1996) and Krueger and Lindhal (2001).
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development30. This fact has always been considered as an enigma since the 
predictions of theoretical models stress the important and positive role of human 
capital in the growth performance of an economy. One of the arguments for 
explaining the observed weak positive correlation between human capital and growth 
relies on the heterogeneity of international samples. In particular, Temple (1999b) 
argues that considering large samples of very heterogeneous countries may cause 
serious distortions during empirical analysis. The coefficient on human capital may, 
in fact, differ across different subsamples due to the presence of even a small number 
of influential outliers. Temple (1999b) replicates the Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) 
regressions. Using a robust estimator he excludes observations with the largest 
residuals, and the resulting homogeneous sample consists of 64 countries. Using this 
sub-subsample he finds a positive and significant coefficient on human capital. Thus, 
he stresses that researchers should focus on “...the most coherent part of the data set 
rather than the whole sample”.
Note that focusing on a single country regional sample should help to control 
for this mis-specification. With respect to large international data sets, the quality of 
data is homogeneous, and even the quality of schooling itself should not differ 
significantly among the different regions. Nevertheless, similar puzzling evidence on 
human capital is also common in studies on Italian regions.
Most of these studies on Italian convergence use the secondary school 
enrolment ratio as a proxy for human capital. This flow indicator was firstly 
introduced by Mankiw et al. (1992) and its use is consistent with the convergence 
equation deduced from the augmented Solow growth model31. In particular, 
enrolment rates have been considered as a good proxy for the flow of investments in 
human capital. However, in Chapter 1 we distinguished two main approaches 
analysing the relationship between growth and education. The Mankiw et al. (1992) 
study is part of the first approach, where human capital is considered as an additional 
factor of production in a standard production function. Within this framework, the 
process of accumulation of human capital is congruent to that of physical capital: it is 
costly, it subtracts time available to production, but it represents a remunerative
30 See Islam (1995), Pritchett (1996) and Griliches (1997) among others.
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investment. The second class of models has its roots in the work of Nelson and 
Phelps (1966). This literature de-emphasises the role of capital (both physical and 
human) accumulation and stresses the importance of technological change. As we 
have seen, these models allow “beta convergence” (catch-up among countries) but 
this is not caused by capital deepening in the presence of decreasing returns but by 
knowledge spillovers (or technology transfers). In this framework we expect that the 
higher the level of human capital and the larger the technology gap between the 
follower and the technology leader, the higher the resulting growth rate will be. More 
precisely, human capital stock is a proxy for technological advancements, which 
represent the ultimate source of growth. Thus, it is the level of human capital that 
affects the possibility of innovation and ultimately growth prospects. Hence, while 
these two approaches characterise the empirical analysis differently, with growth 
rates across countries explained by a) differences in human capital stocks in the 
Nelson Phelps approach and by b) human capital rates o f accumulation in Lucas, 
most studies on Italian regions seem only to test the hypothesis o f the first approach.
Other observations justify the use of stocks instead of flows. Apart from the 
theoretical reasons introduced above, Pritchett (1996) highlights that the use of 
enrolment rates as proxies for the rates of investments in human capital, as in 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) is justified only if the corresponding stock of 
human capital in each economy is (at least approximately) at its steady state . This is 
obviously not true in the case of Italian regions where, as we will see in the following 
section, during the 1960s and 1970s, there was a massive expansion of schooling 
mainly in the South.
Secondly, it has been argued that the connection across time between growth 
and educational enrolment is likely to be very weak. Why should a change in regional
33school enrolment rates instantly produce an increase in the growth rate? Moreover, 
even if the augmented Solow model theoretically justifies the use of enrolment rates,
31 See Chapter, equation (1.24).
32 In particular, Pritchett (1996), using international data sets, shows that enrolment rates are usually 
negatively correlated with the rates o f growth of human capital, that is, with investments o f human 
capital. As he says, a terrible proxy would be at least uncorrelated.
33 See Temple (1999a).
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this characterisation of the growth process is nevertheless not obvious within a 
regional framework. The closed economy assumption in these models is particularly 
implausible given the mobility of capital, both human and physical. Indeed, labour 
mobility within the Italian regions is well documented, at least up to 197534. The 
implication is that human capital accumulation in one area does not necessarily 
contribute to its growth. The regional stock of human capital represents the 
educational attainments of the labour force effectively present in an area and able to 
contribute to its productivity.
Table 3.2 summarises the main empirical results found by the previous Italian 
regional literature on this topic. In particular, we specify the type of human capital 
variables introduced in each study together with the sign and significance of the 
coefficients, as resulting from the regression analysis. None of these studies focuses 
specifically on the role of education in the process of regional development. In most 
cases the coefficient on the human capital variable is not significant or even shows 
the wrong sign. There are two exceptions: Cellini and Scorcu (1997), where human 
capital is positive and significant in a subperiod of the sample and Lodde (1995). 
However, Lodde’s (1995) is a specific study on the allocation of talent between rent- 
seeking activities and entrepreneurial activities, and does not analyse general returns 
to schooling. He introduces two particular indicators for human capital: number of 
lawyers (negatively correlated with regional growth) and number of engineers 
(positively correlated with regional growth).
In the following sections we investigate whether or not the proxies introduced 
in these studies represent a bad choice when the relationship between human capital 
and growth is investigated. In other words, we follow the different arguments 
introduced above that suggest we use in empirical analysis measures of the stock of 
human capital such as the initial levels of educational attainments. We expect these 
indicators to be more strongly and positively correlated with regional growth than 
secondary school enrolment rates.
34 See Sestito (1991) and Attanasio and Padoa Schioppa (1989) for regional migration patterns and 
Goria and Ichino (1994) for a specific analysis o f the relationships between migration and 
convergence among Italian regions.
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3.5. Description of the data.
We begin with a brief description of the main regional differences in human capital 
endowments. We use data from the Italian census to construct four different 
indicators of the educational attainment of the regional labour force : the illiterate 
proportion of the labour force and the percentages attaining primary school, 
secondary school and higher education as a maximum qualification. Data are 
available for the census years: 1961, 1971, 1981, and 1991. We define the total stock 
of human capital of the labour force as:
Total Stock of Human Capital =£/ YRj* HKj
where j  is the schooling level, YRj is the number of years of schooling represented by 
level j ,  and H K j is the fraction of the labour force for which the jth  level of education 
represents the highest level attained. In the Italian education system, primary school
‘XHlasts eight years , the secondary level is usually attained after five years, and 
university courses take four to six years. The total stock is thus the average years of 
schooling of the labour force. For descriptive purposes, we consider the usual 
partition of the Italian peninsula into three geographical areas, the North, the Centre 
and the less-developed South .
Table 3.4(a) gives average educational attainment by area. In 1961 the North 
had an average of 6.3 years of education versus 5.2 years in the South; by 1991 the 
two regions had increased to 9.8 and 9.4 years respectively, with the Centre now 
having the highest average educational attainment with approximately 10 years. Thus 
the South was still behind, but proportionately much less. The North and the Centre 
have always had quite similar average years of schooling. University attainment has 
been fairly similar across all three regions. Perhaps surprisingly, between 1971 and
35 The exact definition is not labour force but active population.
36 Characteristics of the dataset are described in Appendix I.
37 Compulsory schooling has been recently reformed.
38 The classification given by 1STAT, the National Institute o f Statistics, is: North - Piemonte, Valle 
d1 Aosta, Lombardia, Trentino Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Liguria, Emilia Romagna; 
Centre - Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio; South - Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, 
Calabria, Sicilia, Sardegna.
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1991 the South had a greater stock of laureati (people with post-secondary school 
education) than the North. The Centre, which contains Rome, the seat of government, 
has always had the greatest proportion of highly educated labour force. During the 
60s and into the 70s, a very high proportion of the Southern labour force had no 
formal education. For example, 20% of the Calabrian labour force had no schooling 
in 1961 as against 0.2% in Trentino Alto Adige. However, this gap narrowed quickly. 
By 1981 the proportion of illiterate labour force was almost zero everywhere . This 
explains why differences in average schooling narrowed during the 60s and the 70s. 
The gap still present between the South and the North and Centre is caused primarily 
by the smaller fraction of the Southern labour force with secondary school 
attainment. Only 25.6% of this workforce completed secondary school, against 
29.2% in the North and 30.8% of the centre. Thus a greater proportion of Southern 
workers leave school after the primary level. Table 3.4(b) shows a similar overall 
pattern for women, with rather stronger convergence. By 1991, Southern women had 
approximately the same average years of schooling as women in the North and, from 
1961 to 1991, reversed a 5% disadvantage in years of schooling compared to 
Southern men to a 6% advantage.
In sum, we see large increases in schooling everywhere but some persistent 
differences. In particular, Southern males still lag behind. We analyse below if these 
differences and their patterns over time can help to explain the observed regional 
pattern of growth.
3.6 Regressions
We study the role of human capital by introducing lagged stocks into a standard beta- 
convergence growth regression: the role of the human capital endowment of an 
economy is then explicitly introduced into the catch-up process40. We estimate a 
system of 19 regional equations with an unrestricted variance-covariance matrix, thus 
allowing for cross-sectional correlation of the disturbances (Maximum Likelihood)41.
39 Although the South still shows the highest proportion of labour force with no schooling, 1.1% in 
1991.
40 A first version o f this work may be found in Di Liberto (2001).
41 This is obtained by iterating a Feasible Generalised Least Squares procedure. ML enjoys no 
advantage over FGLS procedure in its asymptotic properties; however, it may be preferable in small
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That is, we use the alternative estimator described in Chapter 2. In Chapter 2 we saw 
that, for samples where T>N, and with likely cross-sectional correlation of the 
disturbances, the described Maximum Likelihood estimator is more efficient than 
both the cross-section and panel estimator previously used. With N=19 and T=32 (we 
use annual data between 1963 and 1994) and likely cross-sectional correlation at 
regional level, our sample meets the criteria. The system of equations is described by:
Ayu = a  + 0y„_, + yh„_t +A,+ su (3.2)
where y it is the logarithm of per capita GDP in period t for region i, hlt is the stock of 
human capital (or a vector of stocks) measured as regional average years of 
education, and At is an index of technology, assumed constant across the Italian 
regions.
Equation 1 is transformed to:
Ay\ = Py'„-\ + A ‘,-i + K: (3.3)
where
y ] , = y „ - y ,  K = K -  h  (3.4)
where y, and hi are the Italian average per capita GDP in period t .
The variable h will represent our four different school attainment indices: 
primary, secondary and tertiary education plus the total stock. All these indicators are 
estimates of the average years of schooling in the given category43. Following 
Krueger and Lindhal (2001) we adopt the macro-Mincerian specification of the
samples. The estimation procedure is fully described in Charter 2 and in Di Liberto and Symons 
(2003).
42 We excluded one region from the sample, Valle d’Aosta, in the estimation to avoid the 
multicollinearity arising from the use o f data in differences from the mean.
43 See the Appendix for more details.
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convergence equation where human capital variables do not enter the equation in 
logs44.
3.7 Results.
We set the scene by first estimating the standard convergence equation: see model (1) 
in Table 3.5. The estimate of ft implies absolute convergence among the Italian 
regions of approximately 2% a year, consistent with the stylised facts45 of regional 
convergence. However, evidence of absolute beta-convergence may hide both the 
presence of a non-homogeneous process of convergence within the period covered by 
our sample or the existence of convergence clubs. In fact, as stated above, a standard 
result in the literature on Italian convergence is that decreasing dispersion in regional 
per capita GDP, while strong during the 60s, all but ceased after about 1975. As a 
provisional measure, we simply allow the /? parameter to change after 1975 (see 
model 2). It will be seen that the convergence parameter falls from 3.3% per annum 
before 1975 to 0.7% after that date. Thus, while beta-convergence was strong in the 
60s and early 70s, it is currently weak and only on the border of significance. In 
models 3 and 4 we include the aggregate human capital term: the parameter is small 
and insignificant in both models. Thus, in these experiments, allowing for different 
rates of convergence across time does not rescue human capital.
As noted above, one possible explanation of the observed shift in the 
convergence process after 1975 is a change in the nature of public intervention, from 
provision of physical capital to increases in local public administration. It has been 
argued that decentralisation gave rise to a new class of local bureaucrats with 
increasing control of local economies46. Mass recruitment of civil servants may have 
caused a distortion in the allocation of the labour force. For example, skilled workers 
may have found it more convenient to dedicate their efforts to rent-seeking rather 
than entrepreneurial activities.
Rent-seeking aside, it is possible that the expansion of public administration
44 Results do not change significantly when human capital variables enter the equation in logs.
45 See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
46 On this point see also Boltho, Carlin and Scaramozzino (1997).
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in Italy has been distortionary. Recruitment of civil servants was one policy adopted 
to reduce the very high unemployment levels in the southern area of the country. This 
is a familiar problem in developing countries47 and overstaffing may have created 
“disguised unemployment”48 in Italy. A related problem is that the true output of the 
public sector is in any case almost certainly badly measured, as noted by Griliches 
(1997).
All of these considerations suggest introducing the relative size of the public 
sector as an explanator in the convergence regression49. This is done in Table 3.5, 
model 5. The size of the public sector is negatively signed and strongly significant. 
More importantly for our purposes, the human capital term becomes now more 
significant.
Finally we consider the level of education of the female labour force. Male and 
female education are often distinguished in both theoretical and empirical work. In 
Becker’s (1976) framework, educated women have smaller families but devote more 
maternal time to each child. Experience in developing countries shows that female 
education is linked to a decrease in infant mortality and better health conditions. 
These may have macro effects. Moreover, empirical analysis of earnings differentials 
suggests that returns to education are higher for women50. Model 6 in Table 3.5 
includes relative female human capital51. The variable is positively signed and 
significant, consistent with the two findings suggested above.
3.8 The analysis of Convergence Clubs
The shift in the beta parameter after 1975 is almost certainly due to the failure of the 
South to continue its former rapid growth. An attractive alternative to an ad hoc
47 Pritchett (1996) cites as an example the guarantee by the Egyptian government o f a job to all 
educated people. The continual expansion o f its Public Sector resulted in heavily overmanned 
bureaucracies and state enterprises. See also Griliches and Regev (1995) for evidence on the Israeli 
case and Funkhouser (1998) for Costa Rica.
48 In which workers work normal hours but their capacities are not fully utilised: see Blaug, Layard 
and Woodhall (1969).
49 The variable is defined as the ratio between the number o f workers employed in the Public Sector 
over total employment.
50 See Psacharopoulos (1985) and Krueger and Lindhal (2001).
51 The difference between female and male average years o f schooling.
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parameter-shift is to allow the North-Centre and South to converge separately. Other 
considerations suggest a separate analysis of these two non-homogenous areas. For 
example, Krueger and Lindahl (2001) argue that a positive and significant coefficient 
on the level of human capital may result from incorrectly imposing a single 
coefficient and thus equal returns on schooling among different countries. Kyriacou 
(1991) explains the anomalous evidence on human capital and growth by arguing that 
human capital is more effective when its average (educational) level is higher 52. 
These hypotheses can be tested by considering the North-Centre and the South 
separately, the latter having a lower average level of human capital with respect to 
the former over the sample period .
In Table 3.6 variables are expressed as deviations from the two regional 
averages (North-Centre, South). In preliminary experiments we found that the beta- 
shift variable was always insignificant and trivial in magnitude. Thus, allowing the 
two areas to converge to different levels removes the need for a shift in the 
convergence parameter. Models 1 and 2 in Table 3.6 differ from models 5 and 6 in 
Table 3.5 only in that the South and the North-Centre are allowed to converge to then- 
own levels. Human capital is somewhat strengthened in these experiments. In models 
3 and 4 in Table 3.6 we allow the parameters on the forcing variables to differ 
between the South and the North-Centre. One can see that the convergence 
parameters are of a similar order of magnitude in the two regions. Most striking 
however is that human capital is insignificant in the North-Centre while strongly 
significant in the South. Similar results hold for relative female human capital. In 
general, the implication appears to be that increased education in the South, but only 
in the South, has a positive effect on growth. As we have seen, increased education in 
the South took place from very low levels, particularly in the ‘60s.
In Table 3.7 (model 1), we decompose the total stock of human capital into 
components corresponding to the average years of schooling in primary, secondary
52 Remember also from Charter 1 the Azariadis and Drazen (1990) model in which the presence of  
threshold externalities to education implies that investments in human capital have significant effects 
on growth only when certain threshold levels o f human capital are passed.
53 Thus the two areas can converge to different equilibria. The SURE estimation procedure does allow 
the shocks to be correlated among the two different clubs.
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and tertiary education attained by the Italian regional labour force54. A number of 
growth models suggest that higher levels of educational attainments should act more 
powerfully on growth than primary levels55 (despite the weight of microeconometric 
evidence that returns to primary education are usually estimated as higher than other 
levels56). Moreover, the analysis of the effects of the different levels of education 
may represent an indirect test of the hypothesis of the Nelson and Phelps approach. 
Models where human capital has a fundamental but indirect role in the growth and 
catch-up process of an economy, by increasing the capacity to adopt and implement 
innovations or new technologies implicitly suggest that higher levels of education 
should be more relevant for growth than lower levels.
We see that secondary education is good for growth but that tertiary education 
has a marginal negative effect. Failing to find an important positive effect of higher 
education on productivity is not new in this literature as similar results have been
cn
found with alternative international data sets . There are a number of possible 
explanations for this negative sign. First, while the experience of university may be 
beneficial to some individuals in many respects, it need not, with the exception of 
some vocational studies, increase productivity in the market place . Further, it also 
possible that, unlike lower levels of education, higher education performs mainly a 
signalling function in the job market. That is, it seems likely that, if the signalling 
model has anything to it at all, it should apply to higher education where children 
arrive with most of the numeracy and literacy needed as workers59. An alternative 
hypothesis is that university education, rather than encouraging productive activities,
54 For more details see Appendix.
55 In particular, models where human capital has a fundamental but indirect role in the growth and 
catch-up process o f an economy, by increasing the capacity to adopt and implement innovations or 
new technologies.. In these models the better educated are more involved in innovative activities. See 
Nelson and Phelps (1966), Romer (1990b) and Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) among others.
56 See Pritchett (1996) and Krueger and Lindhal (2001).
57 For example, Wolff and Gittelman find ambiguous evidence on the role o f university education as a 
source o f growth. See also Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2003). An exception may be found in 
Ayiar and Feiyer (2002).
58 And note that Italy (but also Spain) has low percentages o f university students with a scientific-
technical background compared to other OECD nations. See De la Fuente and Da Rocha (1996).
59 As shown by Psacharopoulos (1985), private returns are in excess of social returns, especially at 
university level.
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simply stimulates rent-seeking activities, which inhibit growth60. Further, it is well 
documented that the Italian labour market is characterised by a “bureaucratic bias” 
among the highly educated. Sestito (1992) finds a bias towards bureaucratic skills, 
mainly in the southern area of the country61. Therefore, one explanation of the 
paradoxical result is that university educated workers have a greater tendency to be 
employed in the Public Sector, itself characterised by non-innovative and highly 
routine activities and/or, as we have previously said, whose contribution in terms of 
GDP is underestimated in national account statistics. However, this hypothesis is not 
confirmed by our data since we test for the Public Sector, and we do not observe any 
significant change in the tertiary education coefficient.
Finally, we have investigated another plausible explanation. Our negative sign 
on higher education could be a spurious result. Human capital models assume that 
the decision to invest in higher education is affected by the rate of return, the cost of 
this investment and by family background factors. In general, the opportunity cost of
•  f i )  •education may act countercyclically . Moreover, there is evidence that in developing 
countries higher education is associated with a greater incidence of unemployment63. 
Our data on higher education for example show that, in some cases, northern regions 
invest less in higher education than southern regions. All this seems to suggest 
another solution for explaining our results: endogeneity. Regions are not performing 
badly because of their (high) stock of highly educated workers. The reverse could be 
true: people invest more in education since the economy and job opportunities are
60 Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) describe a model in which rent seeking is highly remunerative, 
prompting talented people to leave productive activities. Lodde (1995) tests this hypothesis for Italian 
regions and finds a positive relationship between engineers and growth but a negative one between 
lawyers and growth among Italian regions. See also W olff and Gittleman (1993) and Pugno (1998).
61 We only have data on the percentage of the labour force employed in the public sector. See Table 
3.3 in Appendix III-C.
62 For example, Sakellaris and Spilimbergo (1999) find that in the US, during recessions, when labour 
market opportunities are few, the university enrolment rate increases.
63 See Blaug, Leyard and Woodhall (1969). On this see also Padula and Pistaferri (2001). Blaug, 
Layard and Woodhall (1969) propose another explanation for this negative sign. “In most countries 
private rates o f returns exceed social rates simply because (higher) education is subsidised by the State 
and subsidies are never recouped by subsequent income taxation o f the earnings o f educated people”. 
In Italy, during the period covered by our sample, fees for higher education were almost completely 
subsidised.
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low. This is a well known problem in this literature64. The use of the initial stocks 
instead of enrolment rates of education should help to mitigate this problem. But 
endogeneity may also be investigated by introducing an Instrumental Variable 
estimator. We have replicated our regressions by introducing lagged values of the 
level of regional GDP as instruments. However, using a different estimator did not 
change our results. Not surprisingly, all our coefficients lose significance (as IV 
studies tend to have relatively imprecise estimates) and our higher education 
indicator remains negative. Therefore, our hypothesis of endogeneity has not been 
confirmed by our analysis. Because of these disappointing results we do not 
explicitly include these regressions in our Tables.
In Table 3.7 (model 2), we allow the parameters to differ between the North- 
Centre and the South. In other words, we develop a specification that allows for some 
limited heterogeneity in slope coefficients65. Note that educational levels are 
positively significant at the 95% level only once: for primary education in the South, 
with a long-run GDP/capita return of nearly 100% for each extra year of primary 
education. Of course, all Italian children now attend school to age 14 and close to 
95% of the workforce have completed primary school in the South. Between 1961 
and 1991, the proportion of the workforce in the South with no schooling fell from 
almost 15% to 1%. Our point estimates thus indicate very high returns to this 
increase in basic education. It should be emphasised that these are long-run effects 
and thus include in principle the effects of more educated parents on the earnings of 
children. There is little evidence in these data that increases in secondary and tertiary 
education in the South have had any effect on GDP/capita. These increases have been 
substantial: between 1961 and 1991: the proportion of the workforce with a degree 
rose from 2.1% to 7.5%, while the proportion with a secondary school certificate rose 
from 5.0% to 25.6%.
The parameters on secondary education in model 2 both have positive point- 
estimates. However, secondary and tertiary education are positively correlated so 
these estimates may be an artefact of the negative parameter estimates on tertiary 
education. In fact, the likelihood-ratio test for the exclusion of all education
64 See Bils and Klenow (1995) and Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996).
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parameters in the North-Centre gives = 4.17, insignificant at the 20% level66, so 
the data are quite consistent with small values for all education parameters in the 
North-Centre. Similarly the likelihood-ratio test for the exclusion of all education 
variables except for primary in the South is insignificant at the 20% level. Thus, 
again, we fail to find an important positive effect of higher education on productivity.
On balance, how strong is the evidence that the returns to non-primary 
education are small? In Table (3.6), model 4, we find a 95% confidence interval of (- 
.07, .10) for the long-run return of human capital in the North-Centre. Thus, though 
small at the middle, the long-run return is quite reasonable towards the top of the 
confidence interval. It is fair to say that these results are suggestive rather than 
conclusive. They suggest that the principal gains from education, in terms of growth 
at least, flow from the elimination of illiteracy. This is a common result in micro 
analysis where estimated returns to schooling are higher for lower levels of 
educational attainments.
On the other hand, these results suggest another possible interpretation. As 
stressed in Chapter 1, catching up models imply that technological progress is the 
result of both the adoption of existing technologies from abroad (for backward 
countries) and also of pure innovation (for leader countries). These different tasks 
(imitation and innovation) may require different types of skills. In particular, 
innovation activities are certainly influenced by higher education while imitation may 
be performed by labour forces with lower levels of education. As stressed by 
Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2003), this implies that the growth enhancing 
impact of a highly educated labour force may increase with the proximity to the 
(technological) frontier, since only countries at the frontier are likely to innovate 
rather than to simply imitate. Using a panel of 19 countries they find evidence in 
favour of this hypothesis, showing that a highly educated labour force had a stronger 
growth enhancing effect in economies closer to the technological frontier. Moreover, 
for backward countries, they find that higher education may have a negative impact 
on growth. Italy has been estimated as being one of the countries more distant from
65 As suggested by Bond, Hoeffler and Temple (2001) among others.
66 The corresponding statistic for the South is 11.93, a P-level o f about .007%.
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A 7 •the frontier . Note that our finding on the absence of positive returns to tertiary 
education is thus consistent with these results.
3.9 Summary
The relationship between human capital and development has always been 
considered as a close one. Theoretical studies on growth claim that the level of 
education of the labour force should be positively correlated with growth. Likewise, 
development economists share the idea that, among different possible policy 
interventions in LDC’s, investments in education may represent a “magic bullet”
/ o  •  •
against poverty . Despite the importance placed by both theoretical growth literature 
and development strategists, empirical evidence on aggregate returns to schooling is 
weak since econometric analysis that introduce international data sets usually find 
that human capital is insignificantly or even negatively correlated with the process of 
development.
This study investigates the regional Italian case introducing a new data set on 
human capital. We use a measure of the stock of regional human capital instead of its 
rate of accumulation as has been done so far and estimate a standard convergence 
equation using a new and, possibly, more efficient panel estimator. We have 
attempted to estimate the social returns to schooling by including measures of 
average primary, secondary and tertiary education. It is well known that convergence 
in the South slowed after about 1975. We deal with this problem using two different 
methods: first by allowing the convergence rate to slow after 1975; second by 
allowing the South to converge to its own, potentially different level. We find 
marginally significant returns to total education with both methods. When we allow 
the parameters to differ between regions, however, we find that increased education 
seems to contribute to growth only in the South. Decomposing total schooling into its 
three constituent parts, we find that primary education in the South seems to be 
important. The results thus suggest that Italian growth mainly benefited from the
67 Proximity to the technological frontier is calculated as the ratio o f a country’s TFP level to that of 




elimination of illiteracy in the South, during the ‘60s, but not from the substantial 
increases in education at the other levels.
Thus, this study seems to confirm standard results on the effects of education 
on earnings in the microeconometric literature which, however, have hitherto been 
difficult to confirm in macroeconomic data. But these results may also indicate that 
growth rates in Italy have been mainly determined by low tech activities (imitation 
rather than innovation) where a high skilled labour force did not play a significant 




Interpolation of inter-censal observations.
We have data on the educational qualifications of the workforce (degree, secondary, 
primary, some primary, no school) for the census years, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991. We 
have as well enrolments in school by type in each year. We assume certain of these 
enrolment rates are appropriate ot interpolate the qualification proportion in a given 
category. Specifically, let p denote the numbers of workers with a given qualification 
and let c be the enrolment rate to be used for interpolation. Then we assume:
d p /d t = - r p  + ac
where r is the retirement rate (assumed constant) and a  is an unknown constant. If n 
-  p/n where n is the labour force then
dn/ d t = - ( r  + g ) n  + ak
where k = c/n and g is the growth rate of n, assumed constant between the census 
years. The constant a  can be obtained if the inter-censal average values of the 
variables in this equation are known. One then has:
d * / = ( r + g ) ( P k / K - i t )  + k D / K
where P, K and D are the inter-censal averages of n, k, and d7i/dt, respectively. Thus 
we estimate
Aft = (r + g)(Pk I K - f t ) +  kD/  K  
taking r = .02, and g, P, K and D as observed69. For the interpolations we take c as 
one minus the secondary school enrolment rate for the proportion of workers with 
primary school qualifications, while use the secondary school enrolment rate lagged 
three years for secondary qualifications, and the secondary school enrolment rate 
lagged ten years for degree qualifications. No school and some school are linearly 
interpolated.
Our primary, secondary and tertiary school variable are measured as average years of
69 P is not observed but can be approximated by the average o f the two closest census years.
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each level of education. That is:
primary = S ( p , +p 2+p 3)
Secondary = 5 ( p2 + p 3)
Tertiary = 4 p 3
Where pi, P2 and p 3 measure the fraction of total population that has attained, 
respectively, a primary, secondary and tertiary schooling level. These fractions are 
multiplied for the number of years necessary to complete each level of education: 8 
years of primary schooling, 5 years of secondary and 4 years of tertiary education. 
The definition of primary schooling sums up the two levels of Italian compulsory 
education: scuola elementare (5 years) and scuola media (3 years).
Given that the expected duration of a college degree is much higher than the statutory 
duration, average years of tertiary education have also been computed using 5 and 6 




Gross Domestic Product (1963-1994): Dataset Contabilita regionale Prometeia, 
Bologna, Italy.
Population: CRENOS, Centro Ricerche Nord-Sud, Universita di Cagliari.
Population 15-19 years: Ricostruzione della popolazione residente per sesso, eta e 
regione, in A. Golini, L. Clucci, G. Caselli and ISTAT (eds.), (years 1952-72), 
CRENOS, Centro Ricerche Nord-Sud, Universita di Cagliari (following years), and 
ISTAT, Popolazione residente per sesso, eta' e regione, Supplemento al Bollettino 
mensile di statistica anno 1978, n.l 1.
Secondary school enrolment rates: ISTAT, Annuario Statistico dell'Istruzione 
Italiana 1959 (years 1950-58), and ISTAT, Annuario Statistico dell'Istruzione 
Italiana, anni vari (years 1958-94).
Labour force with different educational attainments (1961, 1971, 1981, 1991): 
ISTAT, (XII-XV) Censimento della popolazione, fascicoli regionali, vol.II.
Workers employed in the Public Sector: Dataset Contabilita regionale Prometeia, 
Bologna, Italy.
Total employment: Dataset Contabilita regionale Prometeia, Bologna, Italy.
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A P P E N D IX  III-C
T ab le  3.1: R eg io n a l p e r  c a p ita  G D P
Italy Piemonte V.d'Aosta Lombardia Trentino A.A. Veneto Friuli V.G.
1963 100 126 154 139 114 107 109
average 60s 100 121 142 134 113 110 112
average 70s 100 116 147 128 121 111 115
average 80s 100 118 135 132 125 117 118
Liguria Emilia R. Toscana Umbria Marche Lazio Abruzzi
1963 138 119 117 89 99 127 74
average 60s 134 121 116 90 104 122 81
average 70s 121 130 112 97 108 113 89
average 80s 117 129 111 98 106 115 90
Molise Campania Puglia Basilicata Calabria Sicilia Sardegna
1963 65 80 74 58 60 69 81
average 60s 68 77 75 62 62 72 84
average 70s 73 72 73 66 62 70 80
average 80s 77 70 73 64 60 69 77
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T ab le  3.2: T h e  ro le  o f h u m an  ca p ita l in th e  l i te ra tu re  on I ta lia n  
convergence
ExDlanatorv variables Reference Results
secondary school 
enrollment rate





positive but ns. (* only 1970-80) 
inconclusive results 
negative and ns. 
positive but ns. 
never significant
Proportion of the population 
with a degree or a diploma
Paci-Pigliaru (1995) not directly included
students enrolled in secondary 
school over total population
Bianchi-Menegatti (1997) negative and ns.
Proportion of the working 
population with a degree
Lodde (1995) positive but ns.
Proportion of the working 
population with a diploma
Lodde(1995) positive but ns.
ratio of the stock of lawyers 
to working population
Lodde (1995) negative and significant
ratio of the stock of engineers 
to working population
Lodde (1995) positive and significant
Notes
The third column introduce the results obtained on human capital variables by the empirical analysis 
(ns. = non significant).
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T ab le  3.3: P e rcen tag e  o f th e  la b o u r  force em ployed  in the  P ublic  
S ec to r
Piemonte V.d'Aosta Lombardia Trend no A.A. Veneto Friuli V.G. Liguria
average 60s 8% 13% 8% 18% 10% 20% 14%
average 70s 12% 16% 11% 20% 14% 24% 19%
average 80s 15% 16% 13% 21% 15% 24% 20%
Emilia R. Toscana Umbria Marche Lazio Abruzzi Molise
average 60s 10% 11% 11% 10% 25% 12% 12%
average 70s 14% 15% 17% 14% 26% 16% 17%
average 80s 15% 17% 22% 16% 26% 18% 20%
Campania Puglia Basilicata Calabria Sicilia Sardegna
average 60s 14% 15% 11% 11% 15% 18%
average 70s 17% 18% 17% 18% 18% 22%
average 80s 20% 21% 21% 21% 22% 24%
Table 3.4a: Percentage of the total labour force
with different educational attainments
Total Stock of Human Capital
north centre south*
61 6.1 6.0 5.1
71 6.8 6.9 6.2
81 8.1 8.3 7.8
91 9.5 9.7 9.1
Higher Education (degree) Primary School
north centre south north centre south
61 2.2% 2.8% 2.1% 61 90.3% 86.2% 78.3%
71 3.2% 4.3% 3.5% 71 86.4% 83.2% 79.4%
81 4.8% 6.3% 5.6% 81 76.8% 73.1% 74.8%
91 7.3% 8.9% 7.5% 91 63.4% 60.1% 65.8%
Secondary School No school
north centre south north centre south
61 6.3% 6.5% 5.0% 61 1.2% 4.4% 14.7%
71 9.9% 11.0% 9.5% 71 0.5% 1.5% 7.6%
81 18.2% 20.2% 17.4% 81 0.2% 0.4% 2.2%
91 29.2% 30.8% 25.6% 91 0.2% 0.2% 1.1%
Notes:
i) According to the ISTAT (1961) classification of regions
ii) Total stock o f human capital is the average years of education in the labour force
iii) The percentages in the table represent the percentage of people within the 
labour force with the corresponding maximum qualification
Table 3.4b: Percentage of the female labour force
with different educational attainments
Total Stock of Human Capital
north centre south
61 6.3 6.2 5.0
71 7.1 7.4 6.5
81 8.5 8.8 8.5
91 10.0 10.2 9.9
Higher Education (degree) Primary school
north centre south north centre south
61 1.6% 2.5% 2.0% 61 89.1% 81.8% 67.9%
71 3.0% 4.8% 4.3% 71 84.4% 78.0% 70.8%
81 4.8% 7.0% 7.2% 81 73.2% 67.5% 65.6%
91 8.5% 11.1% 10.6% 91 57.4% 53.2% 56.2%
Secondary School No school
north centre south north centre south
61 8.3% 10.3% 9.1% 61 0.9% 5.4% 20.9%
71 12.1% 15.5% 14.5% 71 0.4% - 1.7% 10.4% -
81 21.8% 25.2% 24.5% 81 0.2% 0.4% 2.8%
91 34.0% 35.5% 32.2% 91 0.1% 0.2% 1.0%
Notes:
i) According to the ISTAT (1961) classification of regions
ii) Total stock of human capital is the average years of education in the labour force
iii) The percentages in the table represent the percentage of people within the 
labour force with the corresponding maximum qualification
Table 3.5: Human Capital in Convergence Regressions
Sample: 1963-1994 (Italy, 19 regions)
Dependent variable: regional growth rates 
yit - yit-1

































Relative total stock of female human capital 0.005
(0.001)














Average Durbin's h -.43 -.56 -.41 - -.56 -.67 -.70 -
Notes:
0)
i) standard errors in brackets
ii) yit is the logarithm of per capita GDP in region i in period t
iii) Beta-convergence is the beta parameter in equation 2.
iv) Proportion of the Public Sector means public sector employment as a proportion of the total employment.
v) relative stock of female human capital means the average years of education of females calculated 
as the difference from the corresponding male value
(2)
i) Variables are expressed as deviations from the Italian average
ii) Total stock of human capital means the average years of schooling in the labour force
(eight years for primary schooling, five years for secondary and five years for tertiary education)
Table 3.6: North-Centre and South as Convergence Clubs
Sample: 1963-94 (North-Centre and South as Convergence Clubs)
D ependent variable: regional growth rates 































































Log o f  Likelihood Function 1709.1 1710.5 1715.4 1717.4
A verage Durbin's h .22 .18 .13 .11
Notes:
*In model 1 and 2 the parameters are restricted to be the same in the two areas
i) See notes section (1) Table 2
ii) Variables are expressed as deviations from the regional (North-Centre or South) average
iii) The beta-shift has never been introduced in the included results
iv) Total stock o f  human capital means the average years o f  schooling in the labour force
(eight years for primary schooling, five years for secondary and five years for tertiary education)
Table 3.7: Different levels of schooling
Sample: 1963-94 (North-Centre and South as Convergence Clubs)
Dependent variable: regional growth rates
yit - yit-1 Constrained* Unrestricted
Estim ates Estimates
I 2
Beta-Convergence: yit-1 -0.034 -0.036
(North-Centre) (0.005) (0.008)
Average years o f  tertiary studies -0.097 -0.07
(North-Centre) (0.022) (0.032)
A verage years o f  secondary studies 0.031 0.019
(North-Centre) (0.008) (0.011)
Average years o f primary studies 0.0008 -0.0008
(North-Centre) (0.001) (0.001)
Proportion o f  the Public Sector -0.011 -0.006
(North-Centre) (0.002) (0.002)




Average years o f tertiary studies -0.104
(South) (0.050)
Average years o f  secondary studies 0.035
(South) (0.022)
Average years o f primary studies 0.046
(South) (0.02)
Proportion o f  the Public Sector -0.041
(South) (0.012)
Relative total stock o f female hum an capital 0.004
(South) (0.002)
Log o f  Likelihood Function 1713.8 1723.7
Average Durbin’s h -0.01 -0.001
Notes:
*In model 1 and 2 the parameters are restricted to be the same in the two areas
i) See notes section (1) Table 2
ii) Variables are expressed as deviations from the regional (North-Centre or South) average
iii) The beta-shift has never been introduced in the included results
iv) Total stock o f  human capital means the average years o f  schooling in the labour force
v) Average years means the average years o f  each level o f  schooling in the labour force
CHAPTER 4
THE ROLE OF HUMAN CAPITAL IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF SPANISH REGIONS
“...w e think the insights gleaned from cross­
country regressions have run into sharply 
diminishing returns. We would like to see more 
detailed country analysis a la Young (1995)....” 
Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997b)
4.1 Human capital and Spanish regional convergence: an introduction1
In the previous Chapter we investigated the returns to education among Italian 
regions using a measure of the stock of regional human capital. Results have shown 
that elementary levels of education had the strongest positive impact on growth, thus 
confirming standard results on the effects of education on earnings in 
microeconometric literature. Moreover, we found some evidence stressing the 
importance of the allocation of human capital when returns to schooling are 
estimated.
In this Chapter we perform the same analysis using Spanish regional data as 
in the one carried out on Italian regions. In terms of regional GDP patterns and 
educational institutions, Spain and Italy share some characteristics. For example, 
both countries traditionally have high levels of regional economic disparities and 
have seen these disparities decrease, mainly during the 1960s and 1970s. Moreover, 
in comparison with the other OECD economies, both countries show low levels of 
educational attainment together with significant regional disparities. Finally, as for
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the Italian case, previous empirical evidence on returns to education in Spain reveal 
puzzling, non-homogeneous results.
However, even though there are a number of similarities, the comparison 
between the two countries also highlights numerous differences. This implies that the 
results we obtain with the Spanish sample cannot be exactly compared with those 
found for Italian regions. In particular, we have identified two different types of 
problems. First of all, since the Spanish educational system is different and more 
complex than the Italian one, the organisation of the Spanish educational datasets 
reflects this complexity. For example, Spanish data on primary schooling represents 
a very basic level of schooling and does not encompass compulsory education as is 
the case in Italy. Further, Spanish data on secondary schooling includes dissimilar 
possibilities in terms of educational attainments, with time periods considered 
ranging from 3 to 8 years of schooling, including compulsory schooling, while in 
Italy the term secondary schooling embraces only upper secondary education. In 
terms of our empirical investigation, these data sets characteristics imply that our 
analysis of Spanish returns to schooling on different levels of educational attainment 
produces results that differ somewhat to those found in the Italian study. Secondly, 
data on regional GDP in Spain are only computed every two years. As we will see in 
the following sections, this factor will limit our econometric analysis, since the 
estimator used for Italian regions does not perform well for samples with T close to 
N.
Apart from problems of comparability, as stressed by De la Fuente (2002), 
the Spanish regional data set is highly informative, and it enables us to investigate 
the effects of education on growth and convergence in considerable detail. In 
particular, unlike the Italian data set, Spanish human capital datasets include data at 
sectoral level. In Chapter 3 we noted how in many countries the public sector is the 
chief employer of most of the skilled labour force, and that this may be a factor that 
produces distorted results when we estimate returns to schooling. Examining the 
different levels of educational attainment in the labour force, disaggregated by sector, 
enables us to test directly the hypothesis of what possible effects the public sector
1 I am in debt with Ester Vaya and Rosina Moreno who have been a valuable source o f information on 
the Spanish educational system and with Angel De la Fuente for providing me with the data on GDP, 
employment and population at Spanish regional level.
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will have on the analysis of returns to schooling. In other words, we may estimate 
whether or not excluding the public sector from the analysis significantly changes 
our results on returns to schooling.
The Chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents a descriptive 
analysis of the Spanish regional convergence process and briefly describes 
differences and similarities with the Italian case. Section three compares the Italian 
and the Spanish educational systems, and describes the main characteristics of the 
Spanish educational regional data set. Section four presents the previous empirical 
evidence on returns to education in Spain, while section five presents the 
econometric methodology and illustrates the results obtained with the whole sample 
of Spanish regions. Section six discusses the results obtained introducing the 
possibility of Spanish convergence clubs. The last section contains some concluding 
observations.
4.2 The distribution of Spanish regional per capita GDP: stylised facts
Stylised facts on Spanish regional convergence are similar to those observed in Italy. 
As in Chapter 3, we use the a  -convergence analysis to describe the pattern of the 
standard deviation of regional per capita GDP during the period 1963-1997. In Spain 
we identify seventeen regions defined at NUTS2 level . Figure 4.1 shows the results. 
The process of a  -convergence in Spain has been very similar to that observed in 
Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3. We identify a significant decrease in the dispersion of 
regional per capita GDP during the sixties and mid-seventies, but this process ended 
after that period. Thus, as in Italy, this process was not homogeneous throughout the 
period analysed.
As we observed in Chapter 3, the oil shock may have influenced regional 
economic development and thus the pattern of regional inequalities. However, note 
that regional GDP had a different immediate reaction to the ’74 oil shock in the two 
countries. While in Italy there was a sudden decrease in inequalities, the opposite 
seems to have happened in Spain. This fact may be due to the different regional 
economic structure in the two countries, with rich Spanish regions less industrialized 
in 1974 (and therefore less immediately affected by the oil shock) than Italian
2 We are excluding Ceuta y Melilla for which data were not available.
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Fig. 4.1- Time path o f  the standard deviation o f  the logarithm o f  GDP across Spanish regions 
1963-97.
regions. Nevertheless, this effect of the oil shock was fairly easily absorbed in both 
countries. Together with the oil shock, there are other reasons for the decline of the 
Spanish regional convergence process, which are very similar to the Italian case. In 
particular, to explain this phenomenon, De la Fuente (2001) emphasizes the influence 
of a decrease in internal, regional migration rates, together with a specific structural 
change pattern. Indeed, like many other countries in the same period, Spain went 
through a process of job destruction in the agricultural sector with the subsequent 
expansion of other sectors, in particular the service sector.
Serrano (1999) investigates this process of structural change focusing on the 
proportion of workers as a percentage of total labour force and finds significant 
changes in all sectors. Between 1964 and 1995 the proportion of workers fell both in 
Agriculture and Industrial (Manufacturing) sectors3, decreasing respectively from 
37% in 1964 to 9.2% in 1995 in the former, and from 23.3% in 1964 to 19.5% in 
1995 in the latter sector. Conversely, he notes a sharp increase mainly in public 
administration and services. The proportion of workers in the public sector increased
3 Minor changes are observed in constructions (from 7.7% to 9.4) and Energy (ffoml.6% to 1.2%).
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from 6.4% to 14.3%, while that in other services from 24.7% to 46.4%.4 As stressed 
by De la Fuente (2001), until the mid seventies the surplus of agricultural labour had 
migrated from poor to richer regions characterised by a more dynamic labour market, 
and where the expansion of the service sector has been more significant. After that 
period, Spain went through a relatively long period of economic crises with a 
simultaneous halt in internal migration due to a sharp decrease in employment 
opportunities even in the richer areas. Thus, “...job destruction in agriculture 
translated directly into rising unemployment rates in the poorer regions and falling 
convergence rates. Somewhat surprisingly, the situation has not changed much in 
spite of the recovery of the last decade5”.
Table 4.1 shows the logarithm of per capita GDP for each region (or 
Comunidades Autonomas). Years included are 1964, 1974, 1984, 1994 and 1997. 
We do not analyse this data in terms of groups of regions as in Chapter 3. In fact, 
unlike in the Italian case, the existence of regional clubs is less obvious in Spain as 
are even geographical clusters of poor and rich regions6. To facilitate the reading, 
regions are ordered starting from the poorest region in 1963 (Extremadura). This 
Table shows seven regions in 1964 with (the logarithm of) per capita GDP lower 
than the national average: Extremadura, Castilla y la Mancha, Galicia, Andalucia, 
Castilla y Leon, Murcia and Canarias. Among these regions there is only one group 
that may well form a geographical cluster of southern regions: Extremadura, 
Andalucia, Murcia and Castilla-y-la Mancha. In other words, in terms of per capita 
GDP, the group of relatively poor regions is partly formed by southern regions 
together with the inclusion of Galicia and Castilla y Leon (both North-West), and the 
Canaries. Moreover, Table 4.1 shows that, even if Spain has experienced a decrease 
in regional inequalities as emphasised by the cr -convergence analysis, the regional 
per capita GDP distribution is characterised by persistency or low regional mobility.
4 A similar sectoral dynamic may be observed in Italy. See XI Rapporto Crenos(2004), University di 
Cagliari e Sassari.
5 De la Fuente (2001), page 11.
6 One o f the first attempts to distinguish different groups of regions or clubs is found in Dolado et al. 
(1994). They use data at provincial level (not regions) and identify three clubs (poor, average, rich) 
using thresholds defined by the estimated (by LSDV) values o f the regional constants. At regional 
level they identify three groups o f regions: rich (Aragon, Baleares, Cataluna, Madrid, Navarra, Rioja 
and Valencia), average (Asturias, Canarias, Cantabria, Castilla-yla-Mancha, Castilla-y-Leon, Murcia y 
Pais Vasco), and poor (Andalucia, Extremadura).
146
Indeed, if we focus on the first and last year of our sample, we see that the poor 
regions in 1964 are still the lagging ones in 1997.
4.3 Human capital stocks: a comparison of the Spanish and the Italian 
educational systems
As for per capita GDP, when we compare Spanish and Italian educational institutions 
we find many similar features7. For example, in both countries the educational 
system is mostly public, with approximately only 5% of students going to private 
education for primary or secondary education, and both have low percentages of
• • • • ftstudents with a scientific-technical background . Moreover, as in the Italian regional 
case for Lazio, the most educated region in Spain is the Madrid region, the 
administrative capital. The difference compared to the rest of the country is 
significant: Madrid has approximately 15% more educational capital than the 
Spanish regional average. Finally, among OECD countries, together with Italy, Spain 
has one of the lowest levels of educational capital. Table 4.2 presents recent OECD 
data which highlights that both countries have a very low percentage of people with a 
secondary school qualification.
However, unlike Italy, Spain has a significantly higher percentage of people 
completing tertiary education and, if we focus on recent evidence, we find that 
enrolment rates in Spain, mainly in tertiary education, are among the highest in 
Europe. Thus, Spain is currently investing more than Italy in educational capital.
In our empirical analysis we use the dataset developed by the Ivie (Instituto 
Valenciano de Investigaciones Economicas). The Spanish dataset includes variables 
at regional (NUTS2) level for the different levels of educational attainment of the 
labour force9. These different levels of education include: illiterate, primary school, 
secondary, lower tertiary and tertiary education. At first glance, this dataset seems
7 Apparently, compared to the rest o f  the EU, they even share the characteristic o f having very 
crowded universities. See Palafox, Mora and Perez (1995).
8 On average, 37% of all university students in OECD countries graduate in scientific-technical 
discipline while this percentage decreases to approximately 20% in both Italy and Spain See De la 
Fuente and Da Rocha (1996).
9 More precisely, the exact definition is not labour force but active population (poblacion activa). See 
also footnote 21 in Chapter 3.
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perfectly comparable with that used in Chapter 3 for Italian regions. Yet, in the 
following analysis we will see that this is not exactly the case.
Tables from 4.3 to 4.5 include a brief descriptive analysis of Spanish regional 
human capital endowments. As for per capita GDP, we take five observation years 
(1964, 1974, 1984, 1994, and 1997) and disaggregate them by region, listed in 
alphabetical order. More on the dataset together with a detailed analysis of the 
Spanish education system can be found in the Appendix to this Chapter. Table 4.3 
[section (a)] shows data on illiteracy rates. This Table stresses that, as in Italy, and 
despite there being a law on compulsory schooling dating back to 1945, the 
proportion of illiterate people in Spanish regions has been high until relatively 
recently. Moreover, the computed percentages of illiterates in poor Spanish areas are 
similar to those found in poor Italian regions. With 15% of illiterates in 1964, the 
Canaries used to be the “least educated” region.
On the other hand, in Spain during the 1960s and 1970s regional percentages 
of illiterate labour force were far from zero even in more developed areas, while in 
the same period, in Italy developed regions already had minimal percentages of 
illiterate labour force. This phenomenon has currently disappeared almost 
everywhere10.
Data on primary school attainments are given in Table 4.4 [section (a)]. As in 
the Italian case, Spanish data on primary school attainment includes individuals that 
have not completed primary education. In other words, it is not possible to 
distinguish between the active population that has finished primary school from 
primary education dropouts. This may cause an upward bias for poorer (in terms of 
human capital) regions and so reduce the observed regional inequalities, since it is 
usually the case that the proportion of active population that did not complete 
primary school is higher in “less educated” regions11. Unlike in Italy then, in the
10 We observe that in 1993 (in absolute terms) more than 6 million people had no school qualifications 
(no completed studies), but, as expected, more than half o f these were people over 64 years o f age, 
and 25.7% were in the 55-64 age group.
11 And sometimes the difference is significant. For a specific year, 1993, we have highly 
disaggregated data and observe this characteristic. For example, the percentage o f the population that 
completed primary studies in Andalucia in 1993 is only 29%. In our dataset on primary studies (which 
includes both the percentage o f people that completed primary studies plus people that only have 
some schooling) shows a percentage o f 50.6% in the same region, same year. That is, 20% of 
individuals only have some schooling.
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Spanish data set the definition of primary school covers only five years of education
and does not correspond to the definition of compulsory schooling. As a matter of
fact, Spanish compulsory schooling embraced 5 years only from the years 1945 to 
1 ^
1964 . Thus, only during this period (not included in our sample) did the definition 
‘primary schooling’ coincide with compulsory schooling. After 1964, compulsory 
schooling was increased by 2 years and, again, by a further two years in 1990 13. 
Thus, it is no surprise to observe that the proportion of people completing primary 
education decreased from an average of 86% in 1964 to approximately 33% in 1997.
Conversely, there was a significant expansion in numbers completing 
secondary school [Table 4.4, section (b)], where the proportion of people with this 
level of education dramatically increased from 4% to 51%. Again, this is not 
surprising, since this variable includes compulsory schooling and, as seen before, the 
length of compulsory studies in Spain increased during the period analysed.
Finally, Table 4.5 shows data on tertiary education. Note that in Spain the 
highest level of education is divided into two different levels: universidad de ciclo 
corto, which involves a total of at least 15 years of attendance, and universidad de 
ciclo largo, which on average must cover 17 years of studies. In general, we observe 
that while in the 1960s and 1970s tertiary education was attained by a very low 
percentage of persons in all regions, by 1997 the proportion of people with a 
university degree had increased significantly. However, at the same time there was 
also an increase in regional dispersion. For example, if we sum up the above two 
university education variables (ciclo corto and ciclo largo) we observe that the 
proportion of people with tertiary education varied in 1997, from 12% in Castilla y la 
Mancha to 24% in Madrid. A significant difference indeed.
In general, our analysis on regional educational levels seems to indicate that, 
Spain differs from Italy in that the process of increase in regional educational levels 
did not bring about a commensurate decrease in regional inequalities. To investigate 
this possibility we examine the pattern of regional inequalities in educational levels 
in Italy and Spain computing the cr-convergence process of the average years of 
schooling over time.
12 Pupils from 6 to eleven years of age.
13 See Serrano (1997).
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Fig. 4.2- Time path o f  the standard deviation o f  average years o f  sch o o lin g  across Italian 
regions (1961-1993) and Spanish regions (1964-97)
This variable is estimated using the standard procedure (see Chapter 3, 
section 3.5). As in Serrano14 (1996), to compute the average years of education we 
assume (for each level of schooling) the following average years of attendance:
1. Illiterate (analfabeta): zero years
2. primary school and some school (sin estudios y primarios): 3,5 years
3. average schooling (medios): 11 years
4. lower tertiary (anterior al superior): 16 years
5. tertiary and more (superior): 17 years
Table 4.3 [section (b)] presents data on this synthetic measure of educational 
capital. In general, data on the attainment of different levels of education show that
14 This author has directly contributed to the construction of the dataset. On this see also Serrano 
(1996) and Lopez-Baso and Moreno (2003).
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human capital in Spain has rapidly increased in the last 30 years, in particular during 
the eighties.
Moreover, Figure 4.2 shows the <r -convergence analysis for both Spain and 
Italy. While regional inequalities in Italy have decreased steadily over time, in Spain 
differences among regions increased for almost 30 years and seem to decrease 
significantly only very recently15. This result is surprising, since policies directed at 
promoting education will usually also promote equality in educational standards. 
Apparently, this has not been the case in Spain for very long.
Overall, this comparison of the Spanish and Italian education systems has 
brought to light several problems that may affect the interpretation of our empirical 
results. First of all, note that when computing the standard three levels of schooling 
(primary, secondary and tertiary education) usually analysed in this literature, we 
obtain significantly different levels of education in the two countries. In particular, 
Spanish primary school education represents a very basic level of schooling, since it 
consists of only five years of attendance and also incorporates people that did not 
even complete this level of education. Thus, Spanish primary education is not 
equated with compulsory schooling and is not in accordance with the definition of 
primary schooling as defined for Italy16. Our data on Italian primary education refers 
to eight years of compulsory education and is in line with the OECD definition of 
primary school.
Moreover, as stated above, Spanish data on secondary schooling covers a 
variety of school curricula, embracing the range from compulsory schooling to upper 
secondary education. In reality, the length of these curricula may vary significantly. 
As indicated in Table 4.11 (see the Appendix), secondary studies curricula end after 
just 3 years of further studies (bachiller elemental, EGB...) while others last 8 
years17. In general, this non-homogeneity of curricula certainly implies that the 
Spanish secondary school indicator attracts the same criticism as the average years of
15 De la Fuente and Vives (1995) find the opposite result. However, they use a different dataset and 
concentrate their analysis on the 80s only.
16 For more details see the Appendix.
17 A detailed analysis o f these curricula can be found in the Appendix.
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1 Xschooling indicator . That is, this indicator implicitly assumes that workers with 
very diverse levels of education (such as compulsory schooling only and upper 
secondary education) are perfectly substitutable and does not enable us to distinguish 
returns to secondary schooling (as defined by OECD) from returns to lower levels of 
education. Further, even if Spanish data distinguish two different levels of tertiary 
education, the sum of these two indicators approximately corresponds to the Italian 
tertiary education level. Thus, for this level of education Spanish and Italian data are 
comparable. To sum up, we cannot assume that the three levels of education 
(primary, secondary and tertiary education) identified in Chapter 3 for Italy equate 
with the corresponding Spanish levels. These problems may certainly cause 
difficulties when we try to compare the regression results obtained for Spain and 
Italy.
4.4 Human capital and the development of Spanish regions: previous 
empirical evidence
As for Italy, the previous literature on regional Spanish convergence highlights 
different and puzzling empirical results concerning the effect of human capital on 
growth. A number of studies have found that education has not positively influenced 
Spanish regional development processes. Among them we include one of the first 
papers on this subject, the Dolado, Gonzalez and Roldan (1994) study. This work 
represents one of the few attempts to form groups of regions and identify clubs. They 
use the values of the constants obtained by a LSDV estimator and identify three 
“supra-regiones” but they did not perform any formal analysis on separate 
convergence clubs19. They use data for 1955 to 1989 at provincial level, a finer level 
of geographical disaggregation than regions, and perform the standard unconditional 
and conditional ft  -convergence analysis. In their conditional convergence analysis 
they introduce two different human capital indicators: the first is a measure of the 
stock of human capital in 1981 computed as the proportion of population that
18 Mulligan and Sala-I-Martin criticise the use o f the average years o f schooling indicator since it 
implicitly assumes that workers with different educational levels are perfectly substitutable and that 
the human capital endowment is proportional to years o f schooling. On this see also Serrano (1997) 
and Lopez-Bazo and Moreno (2003).
19 See also footnote 6.
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00attained tertiary education in 1981 , while the second is a flow indicator, the level of
public expenditure in education in 1964. Neither of these human capital indicators
seems to positively affect Spanish provincial growth.
The standard convergence equation approach may also be found in
Gorostiaga (1999). She firstly introduces the Mankiw Romer and Weil approach and
performs a convergence analysis at Spanish regional level, 1969-1991. In this
specification, human capital enters the equation in terms of investment rates. More
precisely, she introduces a measure of the investments in education financed by the
public administrations as a percentage of GDP. She uses a panel IV estimator, with 
0 1fixed effects and finds paradoxical results on human capital variables, where the 
coefficients on this indicator are almost invariably negative. Secondly, she 
investigates whether following the Nelson and Phelps approach and using a measure 
of the stock of human capital changes the results. In other words, using a 
specification a la Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), she introduces as a proxy the stock 
of human capital in the labour force with at least lower tertiary education. However, 
the use of this alternative specification does not significantly change the results.
Serrano (1997) and (1999) represent one of the few examples of studies that 
investigates whether or not returns to education will be different when the educated 
labour force is employed in different sectors and stresses the role of the public sector 
as an “absorber” of educated labour force. In his first study Serrano examines 
aggregate returns to education in Spain during 1964-1991. His focus is not primarily 
on regions. In fact, he performs an econometric analysis using series at national 
level, while introducing a regional panel only to control for the robustness of results. 
In his analysis at national level he removes data on the public sector. In other words, 
he investigates if the human capital endowments of the workforce employed in the 
private sector had any growth effect on private sector output. This distinction is not 
present when regional data are introduced, since in this case data includes both the 
private and the public sector. Moreover, he was the first to compute average years of 
schooling by different levels of education, and in his empirical analysis he introduces 
measures of the average years of tertiary, lower tertiary and secondary education,
20 The definition o f this variable is not clear as it is defined as the proportion o f population with 
primary, secondary and tertiary studies.
21 As found in Arellano (1998).
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together with the standard measure of average years of schooling. Thus, he purposely 
excludes primary school as a possible explanatory variable22. He finds that only 
secondary school seems robustly positively correlated with growth, while the 
coefficients on tertiary and lower tertiary education are negative and non significant 
in all specifications. Finally, the results on average years of schooling are not robust 
given that this variable is positive and significant only in the regional panel 
specification.
In a second paper Serrano (1999) examines Spanish regional growth 
dynamics focusing on the role of human capital at sectoral levels. He remarks that, as 
we have seen in the previous section, Spain has experienced a significant sectoral 
transformation during the last 30 years (1964-95) and that this process may influence 
the analysis of returns to schooling since in terms of human capital endowments 
there are consistent sectoral differences. In particular, he emphasises how there are 
very high levels of human capital in the Spanish public sector where the percentage 
of employees with at least lower tertiary education has increased from 30% in 1964 
to 47% in 1995. Conversely, data on the remaining sectors show a different picture, 
with only 1.6% of employees with a degree in 1964 and 10% in 1995. Thus, even if 
during the period analysed we observe a sixfold increase in the proportion of highly 
qualified workers in the private sector, the gap existing with the public sector is still 
significant. His results show that human capital affects different sectors of the 
economy in different ways. In particular he does not find any positive influence of 
human capital in Primary Sectors such as (Agriculture and Energy) and he interprets 
this result as evidence of an overqualified labour force. Conversely, in secondary and 
tertiary sectors such as industry, constructions and services (excluding the public 
sector) he finds a positive effect of human capital on (sectoral) growth. However, as 
found in other studies included in this survey, he does not find any evidence of a 
positive role of tertiary (lower and upper) education on growth.
Finally, unlike in previous works, we identify one study where the role of 
human capital on growth is unambiguously positive. Using a different approach with 
respect to the standard convergence literature, de la Fuente and Vives (1995)
22 Human capital indicators are included separately in each regression. The estimated equation is 
specified in first differences to control for stationarity. He also uses IV to control for the possibility o f  
endogeneity o f educational variables.
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investigate whether traditional policy instruments such as infrastructures and training 
schemes had an impact in decreasing regional Spanish inequalities. They use a 
smaller sample, from 1981 to 1990, and find that the coefficient of their human 
capital proxy, estimated as average years of schooling of the employed labour force, 
is positive and strongly significant, appearing thus as an important determinant of 
regional productivity. Interestingly, they also estimate how much regional income 
inequalities would be reduced if  differences in human capital were equalized. They 
firstly compute the coefficient of variation of the log of regional income per capita 
and then estimate the same index under the assumption of complete equality in 
regional human capital endowments: this index drops from 19.5 to 14.5. They stress 
how this exercise seems to suggest the importance of education as a potential 
effective instrument for regional cohesion policies .
4.5 Regression analysis: returns to education at Spanish regional level
Using the I VIE dataset we replicate the regression analysis carried out for Italy in 
Chapter 3 with our sample of seventeen Spanish regions. However, we are not able 
to exactly replicate the previous analysis since the characteristics of the Spanish data 
set do not allow us to do so. Remember that in Chapter 2 we saw that for samples 
where T>N, and with likely cross-sectional correlation of the disturbances, the 
described Maximum Likelihood estimator is more efficient than both the cross- 
section and panel estimator previously used. With N=19 and T=32 and likely cross- 
sectional correlation at regional level, our Italian sample perfectly met the criteria. 
Conversely, regional Spanish data on GDP cover the period 1963-1997 but are only 
biannual. This implies that, with annual data on education starting from 1964 and 
excluding one region from the sample (as for Italy) we cannot use our estimator since 
T=N=16. Ultimately, this problem may be overcome by identifying clubs and 
estimating each of them individually. In this case we are able to estimate the usual 
system of regional equations, defined by:
*y>flyL+rK-'+*l (4-D
23 However, the estimated effect o f  the contribution o f actual public investments on income 
convergence is estimated as being very small (approximately 1% o f the observed reduction in income 
inequalities during the 80s).
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allowing for cross-sectional correlation of the disturbances as previously done for the 
Italian sample. As before, y it is the logarithm of per capita GDP and hit is the stock 
of human capital in period t for region i, and:
y > y u - ~ y < t h ^ h ^ - h , (4 .r )
where y t and Hi  are the Spanish average in period t. Again, the variable H
represents our four different educational attainment indices: primary, secondary and 
tertiary education plus the total stock, where these indicators are estimates of the 
average years of schooling in the given category. The only difference with the Italian 
case is that here data are biannual, that is, r  = 2 . We will investigate the returns to 
education on clubs in the following section.
However, there are two possible options to choose from to perform this type 
of analysis for the whole sample. The first is to transform our biannual sample into 
an annual sample. This may be done by interpolating our GDP series in order to 
obtain an annual sample, starting from 1964 to 199724, that is, with T=33. However, 
not surprisingly, when using this approach our results show the presence of serial 
correlation. The second option is to reduce N, that is, to reduce the number of regions 
in the sample. To this end, it is possible to identify seven Spanish macro-regions at 
NUTS1 level. These are: Noroeste (Galicia, Asturias, Cantabria), Noreste (Pais 
Vasco, Navarra, La Rioja, Aragon), Madrid, Centro (Castilla y Leon, Castilla y la 
Mancha, Extremadura), Este (Cataluna, Comunidad Valenciana, Baleares), Sur 
(Andalucia, Murcia), Canarias. Note that, these macro-regions are determined only 
by their geographical proximity, but in most cases each group is formed by 
heterogeneous regions. Thus, it is not possible to simply perform the econometric 
analysis using the NUTS 1 definition of macro-regions since in order to reduce the 
sample we have to group regions that are similar. A possible choice is to identify 
within each macro-region groups of regions that had similar human capital 
endowments at the start of the period. In order to do this, we have identified three 
candidates: Navarra and Rioja (Noreste), Castilla y la Mancha and Extermadura
24 GDP data start from 1963 but we have to reduce the sample since human capital data are available 
from 1964.
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(Centro), Andalucia and Murcia (Sur). Secondly, we eliminate the Canaries and 
Balearic islands from the sample since they clearly represent outliers25. In this case, 
we are left with a sample where T=16 and N=12 and we are able to perform our 
analysis.
Table 4.6 sets out the results obtained for the Spanish sample. In this case, 
when we check for the possible presence of (second order) autocorrelation, our 
standard Durbin tests largely accept the null hypothesis of absence of serial 
correlation . In Model 1 we estimate the standard (absolute) p  -convergence 
equation. The coefficient is negative and significant but, as observed in Chapter 3, 
this result may hide the presence of a non-homogenous process of convergence or the 
existence of convergence clubs. As expected, when we introduce the p  -shift in 
Model 2, thus allowing the convergence parameter to change after 1977, we observe 
that this process of convergence disappeared after the mid seventies28.
Models from 3 to 8 introduce our human capital indicators and estimate the 
returns to schooling at Spanish aggregate level. Remember that in Chapter 3 we 
presented various considerations suggesting a possible role of the public sector when 
we investigate returns to schooling. Among them, we stressed that this sector may be 
linked to rent-seeking activities, and that it may not always be governed by 
efficiency criteria since the recruitment of civil servants is one of the policies 
adopted to reduce high unemployment levels in the poorest areas of a country. This 
policy may have also slowed down regional migration for tertiary educated thus 
affecting the convergence process, since it is usually the case that there is a national 
scale for civil servants. Moreover, since we do not have good measures of the real 
output of the public sector, if the proportion of educated labour force employed in the
25 In particular, differently from other regions their economies are highly dependent on the tourism 
sector.
26 Note that as stressed by Evans and Karras (1996) it is likely that the performance of this estimator 
improves the larger the difference between T and N. Beck and Katz (1995) show that this is the case 
for the Parks FGLS estimator. However, to answer this question it would be necessary to perform a 
specific Monte Carlo analysis.
27 We do not use Durbin’s h test here, since we have to test for second order serial correlation but 
apply Durbin’s (1970) standard alternative test. See Wooldridge (2003).
28 We follow the result obtained by our <J -convergence analysis in section 4.2 and allow the P  
parameter to shift after 1977. Note that results do not change if we allow the P  parameter to shift 
after 1975, as for the Italian case.
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public sector is significant, this may result in serious problems when we try to 
estimate aggregate returns to education.
In comparison with the Italian case, the Spanish sample has a distinct 
advantage when we test for the effects of the allocation of human capital in the 
public sector. The Spanish regional human capital data set is in fact very detailed and 
includes sectoral disaggregation. This means we may identify the number of 
workers employed in the public sector and their levels of education. Table 4.7 
shows how the proportion of highly educated labour employed in the public sector in 
Spain is significant in all regions. On average, in Spain 53% of people with tertiary 
education are employed in the public sector. In the poorest regions this percentage is 
very high, and reaches 70% in Extremadura, while we observe significantly lower 
percentages in the more developed areas, especially Pais Vasco (35%) and Cataluna 
(38%). The Madrid area which, as indicated in Table 4.3 section (b), represents the 
region with the highest proportion of highly educated labour force, absorbs 46% of 
its graduates in the public sector. With regard to other levels of education, we 
observe that the public sector absorbs relatively low percentage of people with 
secondary schooling (the Spanish average is 15%), and marginal percentages of 
people with very basic levels of education (only 5%). These observations confirm 
our idea that when we investigate returns to schooling we have to probe the public 
sector, especially with regard to tertiary education.
Thus, in order to test if returns to education are affected by the sectoral 
allocation of the labour force, we adopt two strategies. Firstly, we use the 
methodology implemented in Chapter 3 and introduce a measure of the proportion of 
the public sector in our regression and replicate the analysis performed for Italian 
regions. Secondly, we compute a new set of human capital indicators (total stock of 
human capital plus primary, secondary and tertiary schooling) excluding the 
individuals employed in the public sector: that is, we effectively compute measures 
of average years of schooling for the private sector.
In Model 3a, we include our standard measure of average years of schooling, 
or total stock of human capital, while in Model 3b we use the same variable
29 In this case the definition is not poblacion activa but poblacion ocupada in the various sectors.
30 As in Chapter 3, this variable is defined as the ratio between the number o f  workers employed in the 
public sector over total employment.
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computed for the private sector. In the first case, our human capital variable has a 
positive but non significant parameter, while in the second case the coefficient is 
significant at the 10% level and the value of the parameter is larger. Thus, results 
stress a possible influence of the public sector in the analysis of returns to schooling. 
Model 4 confirms this result. In this case, we replicate the analysis of Chapter 3, that 
is, we use the standard measure of human capital as in Model 3a, also including a 
measure of the proportion of the public sector. In this case, the coefficient on human 
capital becomes positive and significant at 1% level.
In Model 5a, 5b and 6 we decompose our human capital indicator into 
components corresponding to the three different levels of education. In both models 
5a and 6, these variables represent the economy-wide average years of schooling in 
primary, secondary and tertiary education, while in Model 5b we have computed the 
same variables excluding the public sector. Among the three levels of schooling, 
only primary education seems to have an unambiguous positive role for growth. 
Secondary schooling is never significant, while the tertiary education coefficient is 
positive and significant at 9% level only in Model 5b, where we include our private 
sector’s human capital indicators. Thus, not surprisingly, the exclusion of the public 
sector from our human capital indicators mainly affects the results on tertiary 
education, since, as stressed in Table 4.7, the vast majority of Spanish regions show 
high proportions of individuals with this level of education employed in this sector. 
Again, these results seem to stress the importance of the allocation of human capital 
in the public sector in the analysis of returns to education.
4.6 Identifying convergence clubs
In this section, we investigate how far returns to education in Spain have differed in 
the various regions. In other words, we define the Spanish convergence clubs and 
allow for some heterogeneity in the slope coefficients. As seen in Chapter 3, a 
variety of considerations suggest a separate analysis of returns to schooling in non- 
homogenous areas. First, Krueger and Lindahl (2000) argue that a positive and 
significant coefficient on the initial level of human capital may result by incorrectly 
imposing a single coefficient and thus equal returns to schooling among different 
economies. Secondly, we saw in chapter 1 that Azariadis and Drazen (1990) and 
Benhabib and Spiegel (2004) describe models in which the presence of threshold
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externalities to education cause the investments in human capital to have different
<5 i
returns depending on the existing level of human capital . In particular, their model 
introduces the presence of threshold effects on returns to education that depend on 
human capital endowments. Further, quantity and quality of education may be 
positively correlated, and we may expect to control for measurement error problems 
and find lower returns to education in the South and higher returns in the North- 
Centre. Finally, as stressed by Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2003) we may 
expect that the different levels of education will have varying impacts on growth 
depending on the level of development of an economy. All these hypothesis may be 
tested by allowing the different Spanish clubs to converge separately.
Our previous descriptive analysis shows that, unlike in Italy, for Spain it is 
more difficult to formulate an a priori hypothesis on convergence clubs and, in 
general, there is less consensus on how to identify groups of homogeneous regions. 
This may be due to the fact that, as previously emphasised, groups of regions sharing 
the same characteristics in terms of either per capita GDP or human capital levels do 
not form a geographical cluster as observed for the Italian case. Note that, to 
investigate the hypothesis on returns to education listed above, human capital levels 
are fundamental elements in identifying clubs. This is important, since in Spain there 
is no similar correspondence (as there is in Italy) between poor (in terms of per capita 
GDP) regions and uneducated regions. The main exception to the rule poor region- 
uneducated region is the Balearic Islands that show a very high level of per capita 
GDP but a relatively low level (less than the Spanish average) of human capital 
throughout the period analysed. Although not as extreme as the Balearic islands 
Cataluna is a comparable case. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify two clubs of 
poor and rich (in terms of both per capita GDP and human capital endowment) 
Spanish regions. In Table 4.1 we have seen that seven regions show a level of per 
capita GDP below the national average both in 1963 and 1997. Moreover, these 
regions also share another characteristic, since they all have low human capital 
levels, lower than the national average (See Table 4.3). Thus, in our empirical 
analysis we will consider two different clubs. The first group is the poor regions 
group and includes Extremadura, Castilla y la Mancha, Andalucia, Galicia, Canarias,
31 Empirical evidence on this may also be found in Kyriacou (1991). Using an international data set, 
he finds that the growth o f human capital is more effective the higher its average level is.
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Murcia and Castilla y Leon. Accordingly, Comunidad Valenciana, Asturias, Argon, 
Baleares, Rioja, Cantabria, Navarra, Cataluna, Pais Vasco and Madrid form the 
second group of rich regions. Even though this definition may certainly be disputed, 
from now on we will define these groups in terms of their geographical location: that 
is, we shall call the group of relatively poor regions Southeast, while the remaining 
regions will form the rich club called Northwest.
In the previous section, we stressed that, given the characteristics of our 
Spanish sample we were not able to use the alternative estimator described in 
Chapter 2 with the whole regional sample, since this may only be applied to samples 
with more time periods than countries (T>N). However, this estimator may be 
confidently applied when we investigate if returns to education are different in our 
two convergence clubs although we are not able to control for the possibility that 
shocks may be correlated across regions belonging to different groups. That is, in the 
following analysis we estimate two systems of equations separately, as shown in eq. 
(4.1), one formed by the Southeast group and the other by Northwest regions.
Table 4.8 shows the results for the Southeast club. As for Italian clubs, the 
P -convergence parameter is negative and significant in all specifications, while the 
p  -shift has never been found significantly different from zero, thus implying that 
within this subgroup of regions P  -convergence has been a homogeneous process. In 
Model 2 we introduce the total stock of human capital as a regressor and find a 
negative but non significant coefficient. Introducing the proportion of the public 
sector in Model 3 does change the sign of our human capital indicator but does not 
enable the coefficient to become significant. The public sector indicator is itself 
negative and significant.
Model 4 and 5 includes the different levels of education estimated as average 
years of primary, secondary and tertiary education. In this case, only primary 
schooling seems to have been beneficial for growth. Both the coefficients on 
secondary and tertiary education are never significant, with the latter even showing a 
negative sign although considerably smaller and less significant once we control for 
the share of the public sector. Thus, as for the Italian case, our estimates indicate 
high returns to basic education in the poorest areas of the country.
In Table 4.9 we have replicated the same analysis using the Northwest club. In this 
case, the p  -shift parameter, even if not robust, was sometimes negative and
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significant in some specifications. We do not include these results here. We interpret 
this evidence as stressing that this group of regions is less homogeneous than the 
previous one. In other words, they do not necessarily form a convergence club. 
Nevertheless, in terms of our human capital analysis, we are still able to test if 
returns to education are different and possibly higher in highly endowed areas. In 
Model 1 the ft -convergence coefficient is significant at 9% level, but its value and 
significance increases when we introduce our human capital indicators. In particular, 
Models 2 and 3 show that, unlike in the poor regions club, the average years of 
education coefficient is now positive and significant32. The public sector coefficient 
is never significant and the introduction of this indicator never affects other results. 
Comparing this result with that obtained for the Southeast club, we are thus induced 
to interpret our negative coefficient in poor areas as a spurious result. In other words, 
the estimate of this coefficient may be plagued by reverse causality, since it is 
possible that the expansion of public administration has been one of the policies 
adopted to reduce the very high unemployment levels in the poorest areas of the 
country.
When we distinguish among the different levels of education (Model 4 and 5) 
only secondary school seems to positively affect growth, while we may explain the 
non significant result on primary education observing that, among developed regions, 
there is a very low variance in terms of primary school endowments, and this may 
imply that this coefficient is more difficult to estimate precisely. Moreover, as found 
by both the previous literature on Spanish regions and in the Italian case, the 
coefficient on tertiary education is negative in both clubs. Remember that this result 
of the negative sign on tertiary education is not new in this literature and, as shown in 
section 4.4, it seems to represent a standard outcome even in the specific literature on 
Spanish regions. Possible explanations of this result have been already discussed in 
Chapter 3. Here, we will briefly summarise them. First, we have already seen as 
university educated workers have a greater tendency to be employed in the Public 
Sector and as this fact may influence our empirical analysis on returns to education. 
Secondly, we have argued that if the screening model has anything to it at all, it
32 To report all details, the results o f models 2 and 3 in Table 4.9 on human capital are not robust to 
the inclusion of the beta-shift, while that obtained in models 4 and 5 on primary, secondary and 
tertiary education are robust to the use o f different possible specifications.
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should apply to higher education. Further, note that Spain and Italy have low 
percentages of students with scientific and technical background and it may be 
claimed that with the exception of these technical, vocational studies, the experience 
of university not necessarily increase productivity in the market place. Finally, even 
if the use of the initial stocks instead of enrolment rates of education should help to 
mitigate problems of endogeneity, remember that the opportunity cost of education, 
especially for tertiary education may act countercyclically.
Finally, as in the previous section, we introduce our alternative human capital 
indicators and exclude the labour force employed in the public sector. Table 4.10 
shows the results. In contrast to previous results at national level, when we analyse 
the clubs, results do not change significantly. The average years of schooling 
coefficient remain positive and significant only in the Northwest area and primary 
school is positive and significant only in the Southeast club. The only minor 
exception is represented by secondary school, whose coefficient is positive and 
significant at 6% level even in poorer regions. Therefore, our results do not indicate 
that the public sector plays a significant role in the analysis of returns to schooling.
Overall, these results seem to suggest that the level of development of an 
economy influences the estimation of returns of schooling in growth regressions. In 
fact, our evidence is consistent with the idea that there exist complementarities 
between skills and proximity to the frontier. Remember from Chapter 1 that in the 
Nelson and Phelps approach technological progress represents the engine of growth 
but that technology is a dual phenomenon including both innovation and imitation 
activities, and that the latter activities do not necessarily involve the use of the highly 
educated. In particular, as stressed by Vandenbussche et al. (2003) when a country is 
far from the frontier, growth may be mainly caused by imitation activities that do not 
require a highly skilled labour force. Conversely, growth in economies that are close 
to the frontier is mainly driven by innovation activities that rely more on the most 
educated. On the whole, our results seem to be consistent with this hypothesis since 
they suggest that skilled human capital has a stronger growth-enhancing effect in 
more developed economies .
33 In Vandenbussche et al. (2003) Italy has been estimated as being significantly distant from the 
frontier, while Spain has been estimated to be closer. Thus, we may explain the absence of 
significance in our higher levels o f education in the most developed Italian regions by arguing that 
they are still too far from the frontier.
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4.7 Summary
This Chapter estimates the social returns to education at Spanish regional level and 
compares these results with those obtained for the sample of Italian regions in 
Chapter 3. Although differences in the characteristics of the two data sets do not 
enable us to exactly replicate for Spain the analysis conducted in Chapter 3, we are 
nonetheless still able to find comparable results.
Overall, Spanish regional evidence is similar to that found for Italian regions. 
In particular, as for Italy, when we introduce the human capital term in our 
convergence regressions, its coefficient becomes significant only when we introduce 
the relative size of the public sector as an explanator. Moreover, when we introduce 
in our analysis a measures of average years of schooling of the private sector, 
excluding therefore, the human capital allocated in the public sector, we again obtain 
a positive and significant coefficient. When we separate the total stock of human 
capital into components corresponding to primary secondary and tertiary education, 
we find that only primary school seems to have an unambiguous positive role for 
growth. The tertiary education coefficient becomes positive and marginally 
significant only when we exclude the public sector from our human capital variables. 
Therefore, these results seem to stress the importance of the allocation of human 
capital in the public sector in the analysis of returns to education.
However, this result is not confirmed by our analysis on clubs. When we 
allow for some parameter heterogeneity and analyse separately the effect of 
education in the two clubs of poor and rich Spanish regions, we find that the 
coefficients on human capital variables do not change significantly when we take the 
public sector into account. Thus, this relationship needs to be further investigated. 
Moreover, we find that returns to education are different in the two areas. In 
particular, human capital computed as average years of education is positive and 
significant only in the more developed regions club. Further, when we divide human 
capital into the three different levels of education we find significant differences in 
the two clubs. Among poor regions, only primary schooling seems to positively 
affect growth rates: as for the Italian case, our estimates indicate high returns to basic 
education in the poorest areas of the country. Conversely, for rich regions we find a
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positive result only for secondary schooling. Again, these results are similar to those 
obtained in Chapter 3 even if the positive coefficient on secondary schooling in Italy 
is only marginally significant. Thus, overall our results on Spanish regions together 
with those found in Chapter three stress the importance of the relationship existing 
between the level of development of an economy and returns to different levels of 
education. In particular, the Spanish evidence suggests that, while primary schooling 
seems to contribute to growth in poorly developed areas, more skilled human capital 
has a stronger growth-enhancing effect in more developed economies. In other 
words, our evidence emphasizes that there is likely to be heterogeneity in rates of 
returns to education across economies since the effect of schooling in growth 
regressions is influenced by the level of development of an economy. Failing to take 
this heterogeneity into account in empirical analysis may produce misleading results.
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APPENDIX IV-A 
A close look to the Spanish educational system.
The Spanish educational system is quite complex and there exist a variety of options 
beyond primary level. The Table below can be found in Palafox, Mora and Perez 
(1995), and shows the five levels of education identified by our Spanish regional 
dataset with the corresponding curricula. Moreover, for each possible curriculum we 
identify the years necessary to complete these educational phases.
Dataset
Classification










3) ESTUDIOS MEDIOS Bachiller elemental, EGB ciclo superior 
o segunda etapa y ESO 
Certificado de escolaridad
8
Formacion profesional (FP) de ler grado o equivalente 
Otras ensenanza tecnico-profesionales de ler grado 
Modulo 2 de formacion profesional
10
Bach. Superior, BUP i bachillerato 
Ensenanzas regladas equivalentes laboralmente 






Universitad de ciclo corto 15
5) ESTUDIOS 
SUPERIORES
Universitad de ciclo largo y doctorados 17
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This Table stresses that the Spanish primary level education is lower than the 
equivalent Italian level. In fact, in Italy primary school involves a period of eight 
years of education, but only five in Spain. Also, secondary school in Italy involves 
from between 11 to 13 years of formal education, while the rather complex Spanish 
system ranges from compulsory schooling (hasta bachiller elemental) to upper 
secondary education (bachiller superior, FP2), thus covering from 8 to 13 years of 
studies. The abundance of post primary school choices (with their corresponding 
different time periods according to level of attainment) certainly poses a problem 
when we try to measure average years of schooling. Finally, the Spanish dataset 
distinguishes lower tertiary (15 years of education) from tertiary education (17 
years), while Italian data includes only one level of tertiary education (17 years). 
Average years of education are computed as described in the Appendix to Chapter 3.
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APPENDIX IV-B
Table 4.1: Logarithm of per capita GDP
1964 1974 1984 1994 1997
EXTREMADURA 5.57 6.07 6.26 6.63 6.77
CASTILLA YLA MANCHA 5.72 6.34 6.46 6.78 6.87
GALICIA 5.84 6.36 6.53 6.82 6.91
ANDALUCIA 5.86 6.34 6.41 6.67 6.78
CASTILLA YLEON 5.96 6.44 6.57 6.91 7.01
MURCIA 5.99 6.49 6.56 6.85 6.93
CANARIAS 6.02 6.54 6.70 6.94 7.03
ASTURIAS 6.24 6.65 6.72 6.88 6.95
ARAGON 6.24 6.64 6.79 7.09 7.20
RIOJA 6.28 6.66 6.83 7.19 7.29
COM. VALENCIANA 6.28 6.66 6.77 7.03 7.11
CANTABRIA 6.29 6.65 6.74 6.96 7.05
NAVARRA 6.32 6.73 6.86 7.19 7.30
BALEARES 6.56 7.02 7.17 7.37 7.46
CATALUNA 6.58 6.89 6.95 7.24 7.34
PAIS VASCO 6.62 6.90 6.85 7.15 7.26
MADRID 6.75 6.98 6.98 7.24 7.32
ESPANA 6.18 6.61 6.72 7.00 7.09
Table 4.2: Levels of education in industrialised countries
Secondary education attainment rates



















Tertiary education attainment rates



















Data OECD "Education at a Glance” (2003)
Table 4.3: Illiterates and Average years of schooling
a) P ercen tage  o f  total labou r force w ith  no education b) A verage years o f  schooling
1964 1974 1984 1994 1997 1964 1974 1984 1994 1997
ANDALUCIA 14.7 10.1 5.4 2.1 1.5 ANDALUCIA 3.52 4.26 5.89 8.03 8.77
ARAGON 3.4 2.1 0.9 0.5 0.3 ARAGON 4.12 4.93 6.80 8.81 9.56
ASTURIAS 2.1 1.6 0.5 0.2 0.0 ASTURIAS 4.12 4.88 6.47 8.91 9.23
BALEARES 8.2 6.3 1.8 0.9 0.8 BALEARES 3.91 4.76 6.30 8.48 9.32
CANARIAS 15.0 10.0 4.2 1.5 1.3 CANARIAS 3.70 4.66 6.33 8.53 9.01
CANTABRIA 1.7 1.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 CANTABRIA 4.26 5.01 6.71 9.20 9.66
CASTILLA Y LA MANCHA 10.9 8.4 3.9 1.9 1.3 CASTILLA Y LA MANCHA 3.51 4.15 5.68 7.84 8.73
CASTILLA Y LEON 2.5 2.2 1.0 0.4 0.2 CASTILLA Y LEON 4.11 4.77 6.42 8.53 9.32
CATALUNA 4.0 2.8 1.1 0.4 0.4 CATALUNA 4.20 5.17 7.19 9.02 9.62
COM. VALENCIANA 6.3 4.0 2.0 0.6 0.6 COM. VALENCIANA 3.95 4.72 6.42 8.52 9.33
EXTREMADURA 13.9 9.9 5.6 2.4 2.0 EXTREMADURA 3.42 4.06 5.58 7.51 8.68
GALICIA 7.8 6.4 3.0 1.0 0.5 GALICIA 3.68 4.14 5.50 7.52 8.37
MADRID 3.5 2.5 1.2 0.3 0.2 MADRID 4.96 6.15 8.33 10.13 10.49
MURCIA 11.8 8.7 3.3 2.3 1.2 MURCIA 3.79 4.57 6.00 8.05 9.22
NAVARRA 2.5 1.8 0.6 0.3 0.2 NAVARRA 4.23 5.44 7.38 9.78 9.72
PAIS VASCO 1.9 1.4 0.7 0.2 0.2 PAIS VASCO 4.33 5.36 7.47 9.82 10.19
RIOJA 2.1 1.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 RIOJA 4.23 4.78 6.50 9.04 9.16
AVERAGE SPAIN 6.6 4.7 2.1 0.9 0.6 AVERAGE SPAIN 4.00 4.81 6.53 8.69 9.32
Notes:
i) Numbers in the Tables represent the percentage of people in each Comunidad Autonoma 
with the corresponding maximum educational qualification 
Source: Mas, Perez and Uriel (various years).
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Table 4.4: Percentage o f total labour force with different educational attainm ents
a ) P r im a r y  sc h o o l b ) L o w e r  se c o n d a r y  (o r  s e c o n d a r y )
1964 1974 1984 1994 1997 1964 1974 1984 1994 1997
ANDALUC I A 80.1 78.0 65.4 44.5 37.1 ANDALUCIA 2.6 7.8 21.9 42.5 48.2
ARAGON 89.4 81.4 61.9 38.7 30.8 ARAGON 3.7 11.5 27.3 46.7 52.2
ASTURIAS 91.0 82.5 65.3 37.8 34.0 ASTURIAS 3.7 11.4 26.2 48.1 51.6
BALEARES 84.8 77.4 64.8 39.0 29.1 BALEARES 3.8 11.8 26.9 50.9 59.3
CANARIAS 77.7 73.2 61.9 39.9 34.6 CANARIAS 3.9 12.2 25.7 45.9 50.3
CANTABRIA 90.0 81.9 63.6 33.5 28.5 CANTABRIA 4.8 12.1 26.9 52.8 56.8
CASTILLA Y LA MANCHA 85.4 81.8 69.5 46.4 37.5 CASTILLA Y LA MANCHA 1.6 5.9 20.7 42.1 48.7
CASTILLA Y LEON 90.8 83.4 66.2 42.1 34.7 CASTILLA Y LEON 3.3 9.5 23.6 44.1 47.7
CATALUNA 87.3 77.2 55.7 35.1 28.7 CATALUNA 5.2 15.0 34.2 51.7 56.0
EXTREMADURA 82.2 80.7 68.6 50.0 37.9 EXTREMADURA 1.7 5.5 19.6 37.9 46.5
GALICIA 87.7 84.4 72.9 51.6 43.4 GALICIA 2.2 6.0 18.6 38.3 43.8
RIOJA 89.9 84.4 65.7 37.8 37.1 RIOJA 4.2 9.4 25.4 46.1 45.5
MADRID 80.2 67.4 45.2 26.9 24.5 MADRID 9.7 21.5 38.4 51.8 51.2
MURCIA 81.2 76.8 66.8 42.4 33.0 MURCIA 3.9 9.3 22.9 46.6 50.9
NAVARRA 89.4 76.1 55.1 28.7 30.4 NAVARRA 4.2 15.7 33.6 53.6 50.6
PAIS VASCO 89.0 77.1 53.7 28.6 25.5 PAIS VASCO 5.3 16.0 35.1 53.7 53.9
COM. VALENCIANA 86.9 81.2 63.5 40.2 31.3 COM. VALENCIANA 3.8 10.4 27.1 48.1 54.3
AVERAGE SPAIN 86.1 79.1 62.7 39.0 32.8 AVERAGE SPAIN 4.0 11.2 26.7 47.1 51.0
Notes:
i) Numbers in the Tables represent the percentage o f people in each Comunidad Autonoma 
with the corresponding maximum educational qualification 
Source: Mas, Perez and Uriel (various years).
Table 4.5: Percentage of total labour force with different educational attainments
a) U p p er  secon d ary  school (low er tertiary) b) D egree (tertiary)
1964 1974 1984 1994 1997 1964 1974 1984 1994 1997
AN DA LUCIA 1.6 2.7 4.5 6.0 7.4 ANDALUCIA 1.0 1.5 2.8 5.0 5.9
ARAGON 2.0 3.0 4.8 7.6 8.6 ARAGON 1.6 2.0 5.0 6.5 8.0
ASTURIAS 2.0 2.8 4.6 7.1 7.7 ASTURIAS 1.2 1.7 3.3 6.9 6.6
BALEARES 2.0 2.5 3.5 5.0 5.5 BALEARES 1.3 2.1 3.0 4.2 5.2
CANARIAS 2.1 3.0 5.0 6.9 8.0 CANARIAS 1.2 1.6 3.2 5.8 5.8
CANTABRIA 2.4 3.2 5.1 7.4 7.9 CANTABRIA 1.2 1.8 4.1 6.1 6.8
CASTILLA Y LA MANCHA 1.4 2.6 3.6 5.5 6.6 CASTILLA Y LA MANCHA 0.8 1.3 2.3 4.1 5.8
CASTILLA Y LEON 2.0 2.9 5.1 7.0 9.4 CASTILLA Y LEON 1.5 2.0 4.0 6.4 7.9
CATALUNA 2.1 2.7 4.6 6.0 6.9 CATALUNA 1.4 2.2 4.4 6.7 8.0
EXTREMADURA 1.4 2.8 4.1 5.7 8.1 EXTREMADURA 0.8 1.1 2.1 4.0 5.6
GALICIA 1.4 2.1 3.3 5.1 6.1 GALICIA 0.9 1.1 2.2 4.1 6.3
RIOJA 2.1 2.7 4.6 8.0 9.1 RIOJA 1.7 2.0 4.0 8.1 8.3
MADRID 3.0 3.4 5.9 7.6 9.1 MADRID 3.6 5.3 9.2 13.4 15.0
MURCIA 1.9 3.2 3.7 4.4 7.6 MURCIA 1.3 2.0 3.2 4.4 7.4
NAVARRA 2.0 3.7 5.6 9.2 9.6 NAVARRA 1.8 2.7 5.0 8.3 9.1
PAIS VASCO 2.2 3.2 5.6 7.7 8.7 PAIS VASCO 1.6 2.3 5.0 9.9 11.6
COM. VALENCIANA 1.8 2.7 4.4 5.9 7.1 COM. VALENCIANA 1.2 1.8 3.0 5.2 6.7
AVERAGE SPAIN 2.0 2.9 4.6 6.6 7.8 AVERAGE SPAIN 1.4 2.0 3.9 6.4 7.7
Notes:
i) Numbers in the Tables represent the percentage of people in each Comunidad Autonoma 
with the corresponding maximum educational qualification 
Source: Mas, Perez and Uriel (various years).
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Table 4.6: Spanish regional sample
Sam ple: 1963-97 (Spain , 17 regions)
Dependent variable: average regional growth rates 
yit - yit-2














































































i) Standard errors in brackets
ii) yit is the logarithm of per capita GDP in region i in period t
iii) Proportion of the Public Sector means public sector employment as a proportion of the total employment
iv) Variables are expressed as deviations from the Spanish average
v) Total stock of human capital means the average years of schooling in the labour force
vi) Average years means the average years of each level of schooling in the labour force
vii) region excluded: Asturias
I
Table 4.7: Percentage of the labour force with different educational attainments 
employed in the Public Sector
tertiary education secondary education primary education
ANDALUCIA 60% 18% 6%
ARAGON 53% 15% 5%
ASTURIAS 48% 12% 3%
BALEARES 44% 11% 4%
CANARIAS 60% 17% 6%
CANTABRIA 50% 14% 4%
CASTILLA Y LA MANCHA 69% 15% 5%
CASTILLA Y LEON 60% 16% 4%
CATALUNA 38% 9% 3%
COM. VALENCIANA 53% 11% 4%
EXTREMADURA 70% 21% 6%
GALICIA 55% 14% 3%
MADRID 46% 19% 10%
MURCIA 62% 18% 5%
NAVARRA 49% 11% 5%
PAIS VASCO 35% 10% 3%
RIOJA 50% 15% 4%
AVERAGE SPAIN 53% 15% 5%
Notes:
i) Numbers in the Tables represent the percentage of people employed in the Public Sector within each educational category in each region.
That is. 60% of tertiary education in Andalucia, means that the 60% of the Andalusian labour force with a degree is employed in the Public Sector. 
Each percentage is an average 1964-1997.
Source: Mas, Perez and Uriel (various years).
Table 4.8: Southeast as Convergence Club
Sample: 1963-97
Dependent variable: average regional growth rates 
yit - yit-2












































i) Standard errors in brackets
ii) yit is the logarithm o f per capita GDP in region i in period t
iii) Proportion o f the Public Sector means public sector employment as a proportion o f the total employment
iv) Variables are expressed as deviations from the Southwest average
v) Total stock o f human capital means the average years o f  schooling in the labour force
vi) Average years means the average years o f  each level o f schooling in the labour force
vii) region excluded: Canaries
Table 4.9: N orthw est as Convergence Club
Sample: 1963-97
Dependent variable: average regional growth rates 
yit - yit-2












































i) Standard errors in brackets
ii) yit is the logarithm o f per capita GD P in region i in period t
iii) Proportion o f  the Public Sector m eans public sector employment as a proportion o f  the total employment
iv) Variables are expressed as deviations from the Northeast average
v) Total stock o f  human capital m eans the average years o f  schooling in the labour force
vi) Average years means the average years o f  each level o f  schooling in the labour force
vii) region excluded: Baleares
Table 4.10: Exclusion of the Public Sector
Northwest and Southeast as Convergence Clubs
Sample: 1963-97
Dependent variable: average regional growth rates 
yit - yit-2
Northeast Northeast Southwest Southwest




































i) See notes on Table 4.7 (Model la and 2a) and Table 4.8 (Model lb and 2b)
ii) Total stock of human capital means the average years of schooling in the labour force 
excluding the Public Sector
iii) Average years means the average years o f each level o f schooling in the labour force
CHAPTER 5
A PANEL TECHNIQUE FOR THE 
ANALYSIS OF TFP CONVERGENCE
“Why do countries have different levels o f 
technology? How do technology change over 
time? How do we measure technology -  is it 
sufficient to consider a labour-augmenting 
technology factor or are other differences in 
the production function important? How 
much o f the convergence that we observe is 
due to convergence in technology versus 
convergence in capital-labour ratios?” 
Bernard and Jones (1996).
5.1. Introduction
The survey on the theoretical literature on growth and convergence in Chapter 1 
shows how the role of technology has evolved within the growth literature in the last 
decades. We have seen that early contributions to this literature introduce technology 
as a pure public good, freely available to all countries. This explains why early 
empirical analyses of growth and convergence have been mostly based on models 
that rule out technology heterogeneity by assumption1. Nowadays, differences in 
productivity levels are considered as a major component of the observed large cross- 
country differences in per capita income . Most empirical studies on this subject 
analyse large international datasets and find significant differences in productivity 
levels across countries [see Islam (1995) Coe and Helpman (1995), Caselli Esquivel 
and Lefort (1996), Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (1997)], stressing that the great 
part of per capita income differences are explained by these productivity differences
1 See Mankiw Romer and Weil (1992).
2 See Bernard and Jones (1996) p. 1043. See also Parente and Prescott (2000), Easterly and Levine
(2001), Lucas (2000), on problems concerning technology adoption and various diffusion 
mechanisms.
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and not by differences in physical or human capital [see Klenow and Rodriguez- 
Clare (1997a) and Hall and Jones (1999)]. Moreover, remarkable differences in TFP 
levels have even been found in highly integrated areas [as the EU regions in Boldrin 
and Canova (2001)] and across regions of a single country [see De la Fuente (2002) 
for the Spanish regions].
Although few economists would currently dispute the finding that differences 
in productivity reflect -  among other things -  differences in technology levels4, more 
controversial is the question of whether such differences in technology are stationary 
or temporary, that is, whether technology convergence is taking place, at what speed, 
under what conditions. In fact, as stressed in Chapter 1, observed convergence may 
be due to three different mechanisms: convergence due to capital accumulation, 
convergence due to technology transfer (catch up), and convergence due to both. 
Indeed, as Bernard and Jones (1996) put it, we often do not know “how much of the 
convergence that we observe is due to convergence in technology versus 
convergence in capital-labour ratios”. Both theoretically and empirically, the 
problem is therefore to find a methodology able to discriminate among these three 
hypotheses. Recently, things have improved on both the analytical and the empirical 
side.
On the analytical side, simple models in which technology convergence and 
capital deepening can be studied within a common framework are now available. In 
these models the transitional dynamics is simple enough to be useful for empirical 
analysis5. On the empirical side, one of the main obstacles when testing the 
hypothesis of catching up has always been how to measure TFP at different points in 
time. Given the current availability of data in most of the existing cross-country and 
cross-region datasets, this is a difficult task. Previous studies often use per capita (or 
per worker) GDP levels as a proxy for technology and interpret the estimated 
coefficient on this variable as a technological convergence coefficient. This 
methodology has been used by two pioneering works on this subject, Dowrick and
3 For example, Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997a) find that over 60% o f per capita income 
differences are explained by differences in productivity.
4 Among them see Baier, Dwyer and Tamura (2002).Using growth accounting techniques in a sample 
of 145 countries they find that TFP growth is an unimportant part o f average output growth (about 
8%).
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Nguyen (1989) and Benhabib and Spiegel (1994). A second approach computes 
technology levels as a residual once the contribution of factors of production to per 
capita GDP has been taken into account [See Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), 
Hall and Jones (1999) and Aiyar and Feyrer (2002)]. Here technology is measured 
indirectly, as the residual component of GDP growth that cannot be explained by the 
growth of the assumed inputs of production. Finally, a third approach tests for the 
presence of technology heterogeneity in cross-country convergence analysis by using 
an appropriate fixed-effects panel estimator but does not test directly the presence of 
catching-up among countries. [See, Islam (1995) and Caselli et al. (1996) among 
others].
The contribution of the present study is on the empirical side.6 In this study 
we propose a new methodology based on Islam (2000) designed to test whether part 
of the observed economic convergence is due to technology convergence. In his 
study Islam (2000) compares the distribution of the estimated fixed effects over two 
points in time, but the possibility that technology convergence lies behind the 
observed changes in the distribution is neither discussed nor tested. The aim of this 
study is to do just this. We firstly estimate the standard convergence equation on 
regional GDP per worker data with a fixed effects estimator over two sub-periods. 
Second, we use the values of the individual intercepts to compute our regional TFP 
levels. The robustness of our results is assessed comparing the resulting estimates 
obtained using different estimators, in particular, a Least Square with Dummy 
Variable (LSDV) estimator, a corrected LSDV estimator and a difference-GMM (or 
Arellano and Bond) estimator. Third, we analyse the two TFP series to test whether 
the observed pattern over time is consistent either with the catching-up hypothesis or 
with the hypothesis that the current degree of technology heterogeneity is at its 
stationary value.
In this Chapter we follow the Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997b) 
suggestion of using within country data bearing on the process of technology
5 See for instance, De la Fuente [(1997) and (2002)] and Pigliaru (2003).
6 Companion studies o f the present one are Paci and Pigliaru (2002), in which convergence across EU 
regions is analysed, and Pigliaru (2003).
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7 Xdiffusion and use a panel dataset of Italian regions, 1963-93. There are three main 
reasons for this choice. We list them from general to specific. First, we use a regional 
dataset because it deals with areas where various unobservable components are 
supposed to be far more homogeneous than across countries. In our case, this feature 
of regional data (as opposed to international ones) represents a distinctive advantage. 
The reason is that fixed effects in panel regressions reflect all the unobservable 
components (institutions, geography...), and the more homogeneous are those not 
directly linked to technology, the closer the fixed effects get to yield a satisfactory 
measure of technology levels. Second, data comparability is easier. Consider human 
capital, a crucial variable for convergence analysis. One of the main criticisms with 
cross-country datasets is the limited comparability of the different schooling 
institutions. The use of a regional dataset enables us to limit this type of problem. 
Third, we study the Italian case because it is notoriously characterized by a 
remarkable degree of regional heterogeneity in variables such as per capita income 
levels and human capital stocks,9 and because the available time-series are rather 
long, starting from 1963. In fact, the Italian case is one of the best known cases of a 
regional divide and papers close to ours do exist, in that they obtain measures of the 
cross-region distribution of TFP [Aiello and Scoppa (2000), Marrocu, Paci and Pala
(2001)]. However, these papers do not apply the fixed-effect methodology to 
measure TFP and, more importantly, they do not examine how this distribution 
evolves over time. In other words, our study yields the first explicit analysis of 
technology convergence across Italian regions.
5.2 Is convergence due to technology catch-up or capital accumulation? 
Previous empirical literature
As shown in Chapter 1, the theoretical literature has identified two main
7 “...we think the insights gleaned from cross-country regressions have run into sharply diminishing 
returns. We would like to see more detailed country analysis a la Young (1995)....” Klenow and 
Rodriguez-Clare (1997b) pag.614. See also Chapter 3 and Temple (1999b) He argues that the use of 
samples of very heterogeneous countries may cause serious distortions during the empirical analysis, 
researchers should focus on “...the most coherent part o f the data set rather than the whole sample”.
8 The length o f the dataset is constrained by the human capital variable: we use census data and 2001 
observations are not available yet.
9 Paci and Pigliaru (1995), Di Liberto (2000), Boltho, Carlin and Scaramozzino (1999), among several 
others.
181
determinants for convergence in levels across countries: factor accumulation and 
technology transfers. Early empirical evidence on convergence corroborates the 
hypothesis of a process of convergence fuelled by capital accumulation10. In 
particular, the detailed studies on the East Asian miracles11 by Young [(1994) and 
(1995)] have contributed to the debate stressing the importance of neoclassical 
transition dynamics in explaining one of the most significant episodes of 
convergence observed in the recent years. Nevertheless, the reaction in favour of 
catching up has been fast as different studies “...call for returning productivity 
differences to the centre of theorizing about international differences in output per 
worker”12.
As stressed above, this literature has always had to face a major empirical 
problem: that is, how to estimate something like TFP that is not directly observable. 
We identify three methodologies that try to estimate differences in technology and 
catch-up. Firstly, we have seen in Chapter 2 (section 2.3) that, one of the proposed 
approaches to control for possible cross-country differences in technology has simply 
been to assume that TFP is in fact unobservable and, moreover, possibly correlated 
with other explanatory variables in standard growth-convergence regressions13. In 
this case, suitable panel econometric techniques are adopted to control for this 
problem. This approach will be examined in detail in the following sections.
A second approach introduces standard growth accounting techniques to 
measure the contribution of TFP to per capita (or per worker) GDP, where this is 
computed separately from the contribution of capital (usually identified in its 
augmented form) and labour accumulation. In general, growth accounting is an 
empirical methodology that measures productivity indirectly, as the residual 
component of GDP growth that cannot be explained by the growth of the assumed 
inputs of production. In other words, given a standard production function 
Y = F(A, K, L) , if we take logarithms and derivatives with respect to time we obtain:
10 Including all early empirical studies on convergence. For a review see the (new edition) Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (2004).
11 South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong.
12 Klenow and Rodroguez-Clare (1997a), page 99.







+ Fl L (5.1)
where FK and FL are the factors (social) marginal products and g  is equal to growth 
due to technological change. Assuming the absence of externalities and that factors
are paid their private marginal product, thus, {P kZ } and (F lL \
Y  J I  Y J
represent,
respectively, the fraction of GDP used to rent capital (or capital share) and to pay 
wages (or labour share). Thus, with data on growth rates of Y, K  and L and data on 
capital and labour shares, equation (5.1) implies that g, the growth due to 
technological change, can be estimated as a residual14.
A similar procedure has been applied by the level accounting approach that 
computes TFP levels, rather than TFP growth rates, directly from the production 
function. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997a), and Hall and Jones (1999)15 propose 
a model based on a production function of the form Y = K a {AH)l~a , where human
capital is defined by H  = e ^ L , and E denotes average years of schooling attained 
by the workforce. In other words, labour L is assumed to be homogeneous with each 
unit of labour trained for E  years. The derivative fJ.'(E) is the return to education 
estimated in a Mincerian wage regression. They rewrite the production function in 
terms of output per worker and obtain:
y  = A E]-h
Y
(5.2)
Y Hwith y  = — and h = — . Hall and Jones (1999) collect data on GDP per worker, 
L L
human capital per worker, the capital-output ratio for a sample of 127 countries for 
the year 1988. They assume that a  =1/3 as is standard in this literature, while for fj!
14 A recent application o f the growth accounting approach may be found in Baier, Dwyer and Tamura
(2002). For more on growth accounting see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004)
15 See also Coe and Helpman (1995), and Coe, Hoffmaister, and Helpman (1997).
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they use Psacharopoulos (1994) assuming that ju(E) is piecewise linear, with a 
coefficient of 13.4 for the first four years of schooling, 10.1 for the second four years
tViof schooling, and 6.8 for schooling beyond the 8 year for all 86 countries of their 
sample. In this way, they are able to estimate A , the TFP level, from equation (5.2), 
as a residual. Their results show that only a small part of the observed variation in 
output per worker across countries is explained by differences in physical and human 
capital, while a significant part, over 60%, is explained by residual or TFP, 
differences. Both Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997a) and Hall and Jones (1999) 
conclude that as long as technology levels differ across economies, technological 
diffusion is likely to play a significant role in economic convergence.
However, this is only a conjecture, since they do not test for the possibility of 
catch-up directly. In other words, the studies surveyed above do not offer any answer 
to the open question of the convergence literature, that is, how to distinguish between 
convergence due to capital accumulation and convergence due to technology 
transfers. In fact, while these studies stress the importance of TFP rather than 
physical and human capital in determining per capita GDP differences, they do not 
investigate the dynamics of TFP levels across time. In other words, since they limit 
the analysis to a single year, they do not offer any direct empirical evidence of the 
existence of cross border technology transfers.
Aiyar and Feyrer (2002) develop further this level accounting approach and 
devise an empirical methodology able to incorporate simultaneously the main 
determinants of convergence identified by the theoretical literature. While earlier 
studies propose a level accounting exercise for one particular year, Aiyar and Feyrer
(2002) introduce the same methodology to compute TFP levels for different points in 
time and examine their evolution across time. In particular, they estimate TFP levels 
for a sample of 86 countries over the period 1960-1990 using a five-year time span, 
thus obtaining 7 observations of TFP. With these, they may analyse the evolution of 
TFP levels over time and, to this end, they estimate what they call a model of 
“...conditional convergence in TFP, where the long run level of TFP relative to the 
frontier is determined by the level of human capital”16. In particular, they follow the 
standard catching up literature a la Abramovitz assuming that the rate of growth of a
16 Aiyar and Feyrer (2002), page 3
184
country’s TFP is a positive function of the gap between its actual TFP level at a point 
in time and its potential TFP level, where the latter is a function of three things: the 
stock of human capital per worker, the level of TFP at the world technological 
frontier, and country’s specific factors such as institutions or geography. In this way 
they obtain a regression specification of the form:
%  = f,+  pa„-\ + £*/,m + n, + (5.3)
with ai t equal to the logarithm of TFP and x,, equal to the logarithm of human
capital per worker. This is the usual dynamic panel specification of the convergence 
regression17 and they use the Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator and find evidence of 
conditional convergence in TFP levels, with human capital positively affecting the 
steady state growth path of TFP. These results are interpreted as supporting the 
Nelson and Phelps approach. A similar approach, and similar results have been found 
by De la Fuente (2002) for Spanish regions. De la Fuente (2002) deals with 
technology diffusion by means of a fixed effect model, where technology levels are 
computed independently and then used as regressors in a convergence equation. As a 
consequence, the estimated individual intercepts yield a measure of unobservable 
characteristics other than technology, with evidence of conditional (to human capital 
level) TFP convergence.
1 ftThe growth accounting approach has been strongly criticised . Firstly, this 
methodology assumes the absence of spillovers between factor accumulation and 
productivity. As stressed in Chapter 1 and three, given the role played by 
externalities and, mainly, by human capital externalities, in the recent theoretical 
literature on growth, this assumption is certainly debatable. In particular, when social 
returns to capital are higher than private returns, the accounting framework implies 
that too much of the observed income variation is ascribed to differences in 
productivity. Moreover, as shown by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), accounting 
decompositions may easily attribute to capital accumulation something that 
conversely should be attributed to technological progress and vice versa. This is
17 See Chapter 2, section 2.3.
18 See also Islam (2000) for a direct comparison between growth accounting and panel methodologies.
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certainly true if capital is endogenous and responds to technological progress or if 
improvements in educational attainment have indirect effects on output through 
changes in labour force participation or R&D and growth of TFP19. In general, as 
stressed by Temple (2001), the growth accounting methodology “ ...does not capture 
these indirect effects, and so gives only a partial picture of the overall importance to 
growth of (different) variables....”. A second criticism arises from the assumption 
that income shares should be identical across heterogeneous countries, with a (the 
capital share) usually assumed equal to 1/3. Gollin (2002) shows using comparable 
UN data on employee compensation as a proportion of GDP, a variable used to
calculate the labour share in these studies, that there is an enormous across-countries
20variance .
A third approach introduced to control for possible cross-country differences 
in technology and catching-up uses the initial level of per capita/worker GDP, or a 
combination of GDP and other variables, as a proxy for TFP. The use of this 
methodology dates back to one of the first empirical study on growth and catching 
up, the Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) study. Here the whole observed convergence is 
assigned to the catch-up mechanism, while capital deepening is neglected on a priori 
grounds rather than tested21. Moreover, as shown in Chapter 1, the use of per capita 
GDP as a proxy for technology can also be found in Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) 
and (2002).
This approach may be criticised for the use of the lagged level of GDP per 
worker as a proxy for technology gap. As stressed by de la Fuente (1995), the 
coefficient on this variable may also capture the effect of diminishing returns rather 
than technological diffusion. More recently, Dowrick and Rogers (2002) develop 
further this methodology for estimating technological convergence in a panel of 57 
countries22 controlling for possible observational equivalence problems. They firstly 
use two different model specifications for the growth of output per worker
19 See Barro and Sala-I-Martin (2004) pp.457-60, and Temple (2001).
20 But in his paper Gollin (2002) justifies the use of a common a = 1/3 .
21 This is the approach usually introduced by separate, non neoclassical line o f research, where 
technology diffusion is regarded as the crucial source of convergence. See Fagerberg and Verspagen
(1996).
22 They use a panel 1965-1990 o f 57 countries (Penn World Tables) for which data on capital per 
worker were available.
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regression: the standard Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) structural specification 
(henceforth MRW) as described in both Chapter 1 and 2, and an alternative one 
given by:
y_
=  g A i ( l - a )  +  a
k
1 +  £ it (5.4)
y . it k it
This model is obtained differentiating with respect to time a standard Cobb- 
Douglas production function Y = K a(AL)l~a , where y  and k  in equation (5.4) are 
output and capital per worker respectively, and g  is the rate of technological 
progress. They firstly test for TFP heterogeneity as in Islam (1995) and Caselli 
Esquivel and Lefort (1996), that is, using country-specific effects in a growth 
regression, and find that country-specific effects are strongly significant in both 
specifications, thus, rejecting the assumption of homogeneous technology among 
countries.
Secondly, to estimate the presence of convergence due to technology 
transfers, they model the rate of growth of technology in country / as:
S a ,t = to '  A t  '  
-4,7’-r
= SAi + S at +^ln
'  JC 'A  T - t  
A , T - t
(5.5)
where r  is the time-span considered, A* represents the technology level in the 
leader country, gAi is the constant country specific component and gAT is the period 
specific component. They show that, under standard assumptions on the production 
function, and introducing labour productivity as a proxy for the unobservable 
technology, the growth rate of output per worker may be described by:
g ,u  = { S a t  + f to  y-,T-r } + 8A, -  <!> >n y,f-, +




L J i ,T
+ £i,T (5.6)
where the dependent variable gyiT = \nyKT-\D.ylx-t
\
, the first set of brackets
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identifies the period specific term (comprising both common technology 
slowdowns/speed ups and the level of productivity of the leader), ak provides an
estimate of the output-physical capital elasticity, and ah provides an estimate of the
output-human capital elasticity. Given this specification they assume that the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable should now capture convergence due to 
technology transfers while it should not capture the usual solovian convergence 
effect. Conversely, the solovian /? -convergence parameter is recovered as in MRW
by the formula J3 = ( l - a k - a h)(S + g + ri)23, using ak and a h . Equation (5.6) is
estimated with a GMM-Arellano and Bond estimator. Their results show the 
presence of both technology and solovian convergence.
Finally, De la Fuente (1995) examines another possibility of including in a 
single theoretical framework both solovian convergence and catching up, with the 
use of alternative proxies for technology. He develops a model where per capita 
output growth can be written as gy = gA+ ocgz , that is, the sum of the rate of
technical progress g A and the accumulation of productive factors gz , where a
£
measures the degree of returns to scale in capital and Z = — . Moreover:
AL
S z = g K - g A ~ n (5-7)
gA = rO + sQaAm - \a A )  (5.8)
where 0 represents the fraction of GDP invested in R&D, y  measures R&D 
productivity, and, s  measures the speed of diffusion of new technologies across 
countries. Given these assumptions and following the MRW approach24, he develops 
a convergence equation where the growth rate of income per worker is a function of 
the initial level of income per worker (which should capture the standard solovian 
convergence process), investment rates in both physical and human capital, 
investment in R&D, and the initial technological gap, which should capture the
catching up effect. In his empirical analysis, 6 is measured by total R&D
23 S ee  C hapter 1, sec tio n  (1 .1 .1 ) .
24 S e e  C hapter 1.
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expenditure as a fraction of GDP, while to construct a proxy for technological 
backwardness he uses a combination of three variables based on an average of three 
indices, which should be able to capture the initial position of each country relative 
to the US: the fraction of the population holding a university degree in 1960, the 
number of scientists employed in R&D activities as a fraction of the labour force, 
and the average product per worker at the beginning of the sample period. The 
equation is estimated using a dataset of 21 OECD countries during the period 1963- 
1988 and the results point to both convergence mechanisms (solovian and catch-up) 
as characterising the cross-country paths of GDP per worker.
5.3. A Panel Data approach to estimate technology convergence
As noted in the previous section, standard growth accounting techniques have been 
criticised as they require the imposition of too many assumptions on cross-country 
parameter homogeneity and the absence of externalities. Secondly, studies that 
introduce the initial level of per capita GDP as a proxy for technology into the 
empirical analysis have been accused of capturing the effect of diminishing returns 
rather than only technological diffusion. Another approach to control for possible 
cross-country differences in technology is to test for the presence of technology 
heterogeneity in cross-country convergence analysis by using an appropriate fixed-
0 ceffect panel estimator . Islam (1995) has been among the first to suggest this 
econometric solution to the problem of estimating TFP levels. In details, in Islam 
(1995) the standard Mankiw Romer and Weil (1992) structural approach (hereafter 
MRW) is extended by allowing TFP levels to vary across individual economies, 
together with saving rates and population growth rates . The convergence equation 
is given by:
1 - a  1 - a
(5.9)
where Yit is per capita GDP in economy i at time tx (initial period, while t2 is the
25 See Islam (1995) and (2000) and Caselli Esquivel and Lefort (1996) among others.
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final one), and s ,n , 8  and g  are, respectively the saving rate, the population growth 
rate, the depreciation rate, and exogenous technological change, the latter assumed to 
be invariant across individual economies. Moreover, a  is the usual capital share of a 
standard Cobb-Douglas production function. Finally, p  = e~Xr, where 
X = (1 - a )(n  + g + S) represents the convergence parameter and r = t2- t x, is the
time span considered.
Differently from MRW, Islam introduces the possibility that the unobservable
77differences in TFP are correlated with other regressors , and uses suitable panel 
techniques to estimate:
2
yi, = Pyu^ +TlrJXjj,+n,+H+vll, (5.10)
7=1
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of per capita GDP (measured in terms 
of population working age), vit is the transitory term that varies across countries, and 
the remaining terms are:
4  = ln(*„) (5.11)
**= In(n„ + g+ S)  (5.12)
r = ( - (5-13)1 - a
M = (l-/? )ln .4 (0 )f (5.14)
r ,,= g (t2 - f r )  (5.15)
In this specification, technology is summarized by two terms. The first is the 
time trend component that captures the growth rate of the technology frontier 
assumed constant across individuals. The second term, /i/3 a time-invariant
26 For more on this see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.
27 In their study MRW’s assume In Aj0 = lnA 0 + £ i , with In Aq constant across individuals, and £. 
representing a random shock, uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables. Notice that, if
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component that varies across economies, should control for various unobservable 
factors like institutions or climate, and -  crucially for our aim -  technology. Since 
technology is likely to be correlated with other regressors, a fixed effect estimator is
9 ftappropriate. Once we have the estimated individual intercepts, we can easily 




In other words, this methodology can be used to obtain a measure of the 
degree of cross-country technology heterogeneity.
From our point of view, the main problem with this methodology is that, 
while it was designed to control for the presence of cross-country TFP heterogeneity, 
it rules out technology convergence by assumption and completely ignores possible 
problems of observational equivalence between technological catch up and capital 
deepening. More precisely, as shown by equations (5.14) and (5.15), equation (5.10) 
is obtained by log-linearizing the Solow model around the steady-state under the 
assumption of a stationary degree of TFP heterogeneity. In other words, all 
economies are assumed to growth at the same technological rate according to the 
process In Au = In Ai0 + g t , whatever their level of technological knowledge.
This is clearly in sharp contrast with the technological catching-up 
hypothesis. The latter may be described by a process where the growth rate of 
technology is proportional to the current gap between the world technology frontier 
and the technology level currently adopted in an economy. Typically, during the 
transition towards the steady-state in which all economies share the common long- 
run technological growth g, the presence of technological catch-up enables the
instead technology is correlated with the explanatory variables, MRW’s OLS results are not 
consistent.
28 For more on this see Baltagi (2003) and Chapter 2.
29 One o f the main criticisms o f this approach is that the estimated individual intercepts do not simply 
control for technology but include also the effect o f other possible unobservable factors such as 
institutions or geography. As explained in the following section, one way to control for this 
problem is to apply this methodology to samples that are relatively homogeneous with respect to 
other factors such as institutions.
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technology levels in the lagging economies to growth faster than g. As a 
consequence, during the transition, the technology gap between the leader and a 
follower should decrease. On the contrary, if no systematic process of technology 
diffusion is at work, this gap should stay constant over time, since all economies 
grow at a common rate of technology growth. Note that, since productivity is 
certainly correlated with technology, equation (5.10) is plagued by problems of 
observational equivalence, as the J3 coefficient may still capture the effect of both, 
neoclassical (or solovian) convergence and catch-up.
Hence, how can we use equation (5.10) to test for the presence/absence of 
technological convergence? First, notice that, the longer the time dimension of the 
panel, the higher the risk that differences in TFP levels are not stationary within the 
sample period, since technological diffusion is more likely to be at work. As a 
consequence, in the presence of technological convergence equation (5.10) should be 
regarded as an approximation of the real process -  an approximation that worsens as 
the length of the period under analysis increases.
Second, and consequently, the presence of technological convergence should 
be detected by comparing the TFP values obtained by estimating (5.16) over 
different periods. This type of comparison should reveal whether the observed 
pattern of TFP values is consistent either with the catching-up hypothesis or with the 
alternative hypothesis that the current degree of technology heterogeneity is at its 
stationary value. Indeed, in this case we are estimating the initial level of TFP in two 
different points in time. By doing this, we are able to detect if the pattern over time 
of these TFP levels is consistent with the presence/absence of catch up. This enables 
us to control for observational equivalence problems.
The technique we use follows several, simple steps. First, we estimate 
equation (5.10) over different sub-periods, in order to obtain a sequence of estimated 
values of individual intercepts. Second, the latter values are used to compute the 
individual values of ln ^  . Third, we analyse the evolution over time of the
distribution of In Ai in order to test for the presence of technological convergence.
30 A similar approach has been previously introduced by Islam (2000)., where the author compares the 
distribution o f the estimated fixed effects over two points in time. However, in his paper the 
possibility that technology convergence lies behind the observed changes in the distribution is 
neither discussed nor tested.
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Indeed, while technology convergence implies a variance of In At that decreases over 
time while approaching its stationary value, the alternative hypothesis implies that 
the variance of In 4  is at its stationary value, and thus no significant trend in its 
value should be detected.
5.4. Comparing the available estimation procedures
•> 1
We use Italian data on regional GDP per worker to estimate the following equation:
3
y„ = Py,,-r+ T drJXjll-r + a +«„ (5.17)
j- 1
y „ = y „ -y ,,  (5.18)
where y , , and x, are the Italian average in period t: data are taken in difference from 
the Italian mean, in order to control for the presence of a time trend component ift
and of a likely common stochastic trend (the common component of technology) 
across regions32. We use a time span r  = 5 in order to control for business cycle 
fluctuations and serial correlation, which are likely to affect the data in the short run. 
Moreover, xu t is the lagged saving rate proxied by the ratio of regional investment
to GDP, and x3f/ represents a measure of human capital stock, namely average years
of schooling. Both these variables are taken at their t - r  level, while x2i t represents
the sum of n, population growth, 8  the depreciation rate and g  the exogenous 
technology growth rate and is taken as an average over the five years preceding f.33 
As standard in this literature, (g+S) is assumed equal to 0.05. Note that equation 
(5.17) simply augments equation (5.10) to include a measure of the stock of human 
capital: indeed, in order to identify TFP differences it is essential to control for one
31 Our aim  is to  obtain  T F P  estim ates from  a standard C o b b -D o u g la s  tech n o lo g y . G iven  that 
un em p loym ent rates d iffer  greatly  across Italian reg ions, G D P  per w orker  is a  m ore adequate  
variab le than per cap ita  in co m e for our purposes.
32 On this se e  a lso  C hapter 2 .
n 2
In fact, reg ion a l ser ies m a y  be characterised  by  h igh  v o la tility  and th is w a s  th e  ca se  for X( t .
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of its most likely determinants.34 Finally, as shown in the previous section, the 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable yields a measure of the speed of the 
solovian conditional convergence (or within convergence), while individual effects 
reflect the degree of TFP heterogeneity.
The first problem we face when we estimate a dynamic panel data model such 
as the one represented by equation (5.17) is which estimator suits our case better. 
The answer is not simple. It is still true today what Kiviet wrote a few years ago: “As 
yet, no technique is available that has shown uniform superiority in finite samples 
over a wide range of relevant situations as far as the true parameter values and the 
further properties of the DGP are concerned.” Indeed, the LSDV estimator, while 
consistent for large T, is characterised by small sample problems and, in particular, 
it is well known to produce downward biased estimates in small samples. 
Conversely, the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator (GMM-AB from now on) is 
becoming increasingly popular since it has both the advantage of producing 
consistent estimates in a dynamic panel regression with both (i) endogenous right 
hand side variables, and (ii) presence of measurement error. Moreover, it is more 
efficient than other standard IV estimators such as the Anderson-Hsiao estimator.
3 7However, it has been recently shown that, when T is small, and either the 
autoregressive parameter is close to one (highly persistent series), or the variance of 
the individual effect is high relative to the variance of the transient shock, then even 
the GMM-AB estimator is biased and, in particular, downward biased. Note that 
the presence of a relatively small number of time periods and persistent time series 
are typical features of macro-growth datasets like ours.
To control for this problem, Kiviet (1995) put forward a more direct approach 
to the problem of the LSDV finite sample bias by estimating a small sample
34 For details on how this variable is computed see Chapter 3.
35 See Kiviet (1995) page 72.
36 See Amemyia (1967) and Chapter 2.
37 See Blundell and Bond (1998) and Bond-Hoeffler-Temple (2001).
38 It may be that the inclusion o f additional explanatory variables among regressors and the inclusion 
of additional lags o f these regressors among instruments will improve the performance o f this 
estimator. See Bond-Hoeffler-Temple (2001).
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correction to the LSDV estimator. Monte Carlo analysis39 finds that for small T (such 
as the one we find in the convergence literature) LSDV estimates corrected for the 
bias (KIVIET from now on) seem more attractive than GMM. In particular, these 
Monte Carlo studies explicitly analyse typical macro dynamic panels and find that 
for T < 20 and N  < 50, as in our case, the KTVIET and Anderson-Hsiao estimators 
consistently outperform GMM-AB. Moreover, despite having a higher average bias, 
KTVIET turns out to be more efficient than Anderson-Hsiao. Overall, these Monte 
Carlo analyses suggest that a reasonable strategy would be to use the KIVIET 
estimator for smaller panels (T  <10), while Anderson-Hsiao should be preferred for 
larger panels, as the efficiency of the latter improves with T (Anderson-Hsiao has the 
additional advantage of being computationally simpler than the former).
Let us now turn to our specific case. Our Italian regional panel includes the 
period 1963-93 for 19 regions.40 Using the five-year time span implies that we are 
left with T=7 observations for each of the N=19 regions, corresponding to 1963, 
1968, 1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, and 1993. Since, as we noticed above, no technique 
shows a clear superiority in finite samples, in the following we will use several 
estimators and will compare their results in order to assess their robustness. In doing 
this, given the dimension of our panel and the above discussion, the Kiviet-corrected 
LSDV estimator will be used as our benchmark.41
Since all these estimators perform poorly in small samples, to evaluate how 
each of them performs in our case we start our empirical analysis by using the whole 
sample 1963-93. Table 5.1 shows our results for this case. For each regression we
include the estimates obtained and the implied i ,  i.e. the speed of solovian 
convergence parameter 42
Let us start by comparing the results obtained by using the pooling-OLS 
estimator and the (uncorrected) LSDV estimator. As expected, when we introduce 
the pooling-OLS estimator (Model 1), the coefficient on the lagged dependent
39 See Kiviet (1995) and Judson and Owen (1996).
40 The Italian regions are 20. We have excluded Valle d’Aosta because it represents an outlier. 
Nevertheless, results do not change if we include this region.
41 To implement the Kiviet’s small-sample correction we use the STATA routine proposed by Adam 
(1998).
42 From (5 = e~h
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variable is high compared with other individual effects estimators, with a 
corresponding speed of solovian convergence of 3%. Among the regressors, only the 
coefficients on the lagged dependent variable and on population growth are 
significant, while both the coefficient on the investment share and on human capital 
are not significant43. These results are robust as they remain stable when other 
estimation procedure are introduced. When equation (5.17) is estimated with LSDV 
(Model 5) we find a lower AR(1) coefficient and a correspondingly higher speed of 
solovian convergence of 9%.
Let us now extend our comparison to the other available estimators. Both the 
GMM-AB and the Kiviet correction require us to drop one initial observation.44 
Consequently, in order to compare the results of all the different estimators we 
perform again the regressions discussed in the previous paragraph excluding the first 
observation. With this reduced sample, the estimated AR(1) OLS parameter (Model 
2) is lower than before and equal to 0.80, while the estimated AR(1) LSDV 
parameter (Model 6) declines to 0.51. The use of the Kiviet correction procedure 
increases the LSDV parameter from 0.51 to 0.67, with a decline in the corresponding 
speed of convergence coefficient from 13% to 8%. Note that KIVIET only corrects 
the bias in the LSDV estimated parameters but does not produce alternative or 
corrected standard errors. This is why they are not shown among results.
The GMM-AB estimates are shown together with the p-value of the AB-2 
statistic and the Sargan test as in Arellano and Bond (1991). The first statistic tests 
for the presence of serial correlation. In particular, since the final regression equation 
is in first differences, it tests for second order serial correlation in the error term. The 
latter must be absent for the assumption of no serial correlation in the model in levels 
to be accepted. The presence of second-order serial correlation would imply that the 
estimates are inconsistent. The second statistics tests the validity of overidentifying 
restrictions. The consistency of this estimation procedure crucially depends on the
43 Note that, contrary to the model assumptions, the sign of the savings rate coefficient is even almost 
invariable negative (the only exception is represented by model 5) but never significant. This result 
is not new in the literature on regional Italian convergence; see for example Cellini and Scorcu
(1997) and Paci and Pigliaru (1995). The latter study justify the negative and non significant sign 
on investments arguing that in Italy a large part of private investments have been in fact influenced 
by public policies where these have not been necessarily governed by efficiency criteria.
44 To compute the estimated bias the methodology requires the use o f a consistent estimator, such as 
Anderson-Hsiao or GMM, and the routine used to calculate KIVIET cannot handle missing 
observation. See Adam (1998).
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identifying assumption that lagged values of both income and other explanatory 
variables are valid instruments in these growth regressions. The GMM-AB estimator 
may be performed under very different assumptions on the endogeneity of included 
regressors45. In this study we specify two different hypothesis on the x ' s . First, 
Model 3 (or model GMM-AB 1) in Table 1 assumes that all regressors are weakly 
exogenous, that is E[xitujs] *  0 for s < t , and E \x ituis\ = 0 for s > t .  Second, Model 
4 (or model GMM-AB2) assumes instead that all x 's  are strictly exogenous, that is, 
E \xitUis ] = 0 for all t and s.
The results in Table 5.1 show that both specifications are valid: the p-values 
of the AB-2 and Sargan tests say that it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of 
absence of second-order autocorrelation and that the over-identifying restrictions are 
valid. Then, the choice between these two specification is not obvious, even if the 
increase of the p-value of the Sargan test in GMM-AB 1 indicates that treating the 
included regressors as predetermined makes it more difficult to reject the null and,
thus, that Model 3 should be preferred to Model 4.
However, these estimates may be biased. To detect a possible bias in our 
GMM-AB models we follow the procedure suggested by Bond, Hoeffler and Temple 
(2001). Given that it is well known that OLS is biased upwards in dynamic panels 
while LSDV is biased downwards, these authors suggest that a consistent estimate 
should therefore lie between the two. Since we expect that the true parameter values
A A
lie somewhere between J30ls and PLSDV, in our case we expect its value to be 
between 0.80 and 0.51. The estimated AR(1) coefficient on GMM-AB2 is higher 
than that obtained with OLS, where the latter should be characterized by upward 
bias. Consequently, we exclude GMM-AB2 from the following analysis. Conversely, 
the estimated AR(1) coefficient on GMM-AB 1, 0.696, is very similar to that
obtained in KTVIET, 0.669. With a value included between p ols and fiLSDV 46, this
estimate does not suggest any obvious presence of bias.
Thus, to sum up, in this section we have seen that previous Monte Carlo
45 We always use all available lags in the estimation.
46 The AR(1) coefficient in GMM-AB 1 is lower than that in GMM-AB2 also because treating 
included regressors as predetermined instead o f strictly exogenous increases the size of the 
instrument matrix and, while additional instruments increase efficiency o f  the GMM procedure, 
they may also increase the downward bias in a small panel. See also Ayiar and Feyrer (2002).
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analysis suggest KIVIET as the best estimation procedure to estimate model (5.17) 
with samples with similar characteristics as ours. Nevertheless, since LSDV and 
GMM-AB are both employed estimators in this literature, in the following section we 
will use LSDV, KIVIET and GMM-AB 1 to compute our regional TFP levels and 
compare the results obtained.
5.5. Testing for TFP heterogeneity
With these estimates in hand we now move on to compute our regional TFP 
measures. In our LSDV estimates the regional dummy coefficients,/),, are almost
invariably statistically significant. As for the GMM-AB (1 and 2) estimator, note that 
the latter controls for fixed effects by transforming data in first difference and, thus, 
the individual effects are not directly estimated. Following Caselli, Esquivel and 
Lefort (1996), we obtain estimates of f t  by:
(A + “«) = 5;« - ^ , 4 - Z V j r H '^ - l  (519)
j =1
A = £ Z ( A + S . )  (5.20)
The same procedure has been used to obtain f t  and, through equation (5.16) 
/4(0)., using KIVIET. In all cases, the TFP estimates are then used to compute the
ratio A ( 0 ) j A ( 0 ) Lom , with A(ti)Lom being the estimated TFP value for Lombardia,
currently the richest, most industrialised and arguably the most technologically 
advanced Italian region.
Table 5.2a includes the estimates of the relative (to Lombardia) levels of 
regional TFP obtained by applying each different estimator. Moreover, to make the 
interpretation of results easier, Table 5.2b shows the ranking that each region obtain 
with the different methodologies.
Overall, these results suggest that different econometric methodologies 
produce similar TFP estimates. This conclusion is confirmed by the analysis of the 
Spearman rank order coefficient in Table 5.3.
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Table 5.3: Spearman rank order correlation coefficient







As expected, the estimates of the regional relative TFP levels obtained by 
LSDV and KIVIET are very similar, with a correlation coefficient equal to 0.98. 
Eight regions out of nineteen hold the same ranking, three regions (Abruzzo, Liguria 
and Sardegna) change their rank by two positions, while for the remaining regions 
the rank changes by only one position. A lower but still very high ranking 
correspondence if found between the LSDV, KIVIET and GMM-AB 1 estimates.47
To sum up, the close correspondence found in this section among the TFP 
estimates obtained with different estimation procedures support the conclusion that 
our results can be easily regarded as robust.
More generally, the overall picture emerging from our estimates is an 
interesting one. In particular, it strongly confirms that TFP differences can be 
significantly large even across regions, and that an important part of the Italian 
economic divide seems to be due to such differences. For instance, in 1968 the GDP 
per worker in Basilicata (the poorest region) was 53% of Lombardia value; in our 
estimates, the corresponding relative TFP value is even higher (an average of 67,7%: 
see Table 2a). Moreover, we find confirmation that the northern and richer regions 
are also the most technologically advanced areas in the country, and that at the 
bottom end are the southern, less developed areas.
The pattern and the magnitude of TFP heterogeneity as measured by our 
estimates suggest that a potential for technological catch-up does exist for the 
lagging regions. In turn, this implies that any analysis of aggregate convergence
47 For GMM-AB2 the Spearman rank correlation coefficient was lower, ranging from 0.94 (with 
GMM-AB 1) and 0.92 (with LSDV). We have also checked the rank correlation between the initial 
level o f income and the different TFP measures obtained. In this case, the Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient is 0,87 (with LSDV), 0,82 (with KIVIET), and 0,76 (with GMM-AB 1).
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across Italian regions should take this potential source of convergence into account. 
This is what we will do in the next section.
5.6. Detecting technological convergence: Empirical results
In the previous section we have shown that a high degree of TFP heterogeneity does 
exist across the Italian regions. In this section we investigate whether this degree of 
hereogeneity is either stationary or is the source of a process of TFP convergence. As 
suggested by Islam (2003) and Pigliaru (2003), to test for the presence of TFP 
convergence we need to generate TFP-level indices for several consecutive time 
periods, so that the TFP dynamics can be directly analysed. The indices produced by 
panel methods may be used to this end as “...they contain ordinal as well as cardinal 
information, which can both be helpful in answering questions regarding TFP-
4 0
convergence”. The main difficulty with this procedure is that, in order to generate 
different TFP-level indices for consecutive time periods we need to further reduce 
the time dimension of the estimated samples, thus worsening the problems associated 
with small sample bias discussed above. Note that using a time span equal to 5 
implies that we are left with T=7 observations, which in turn implies T=6 in LSDV 
because of the presence of the lagged dependent variable among regressors, and T=5 
with Kiviet since it uses the Anderson-Hsiao estimates to calculate the bias.49
With such a dataset it is possible to obtain two sub-samples and to apply 
LSDV to estimate regional TFP levels, but the implementation of the KIVIET 
correction procedure to these short sub-samples becomes infeasible. A possible 
alternative is to gain degrees of freedom by using a shorter time span. For example, a 
time span equal to three ( r  = 3) yields T = ll (i.e., T=10 with LSDV and T=9 with 
KTVEET). Clearly, using a shorter time span has the obvious disadvantage that it 
increases the problems related to short term disturbances and serial correlation of the 
error term.50
Given these problems, firstly we estimate TFP levels using LSDV with a
48 See Islam (2003), page 349.
49 In this case data are taken in first difference and levels o f the dependent variable (lagged twice and
further) are introduced as instruments. For more details see Baltagi (2003).
2 0 0
standard time span equal to five (see Table 5.4, columns 1 and 2). Secondly, we 
apply KIVIET to a sample with (non-standard) r  = 3 (Table 4, columns 3 and 4) and 
compare the results.
Let us start with analysing the results with the standard time span of five 
years in Table 5.4. Our LSDV estimates in columns 1 and 2 are based on two sub­
samples of 4 observations each, with one overlapping year: the first sub-sample 
includes 1963, 1968, 1973 1978, and the second 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993. As before, 
we estimate equation (5.17) and save the two different series of //,.
The solovian (conditional) convergence coefficient is significant only in the 
first subsample, 1963-78: we do not observe evidence of solovian convergence 
during 1978-93. Other explanatory variables are never significant while the regional 
dummies coefficients,//,, are almost invariably significant. Again, we use equation
i ( 0 )  «. ,
(5.14) to obtain -4(0)., and transform the data as -v— * , with Ay0)L being the
A(0)Lom
estimated fixed effect of Lombardia. This procedure yields two different estimates of 
regional effects, the first corresponding mainly to the 1970s and the second mainly to 
the 1980s. Table 5.5 presents the results and shows the TFP relative values for the 
two sub-periods. A well-defined dynamic pattern emerges. First, relative TFP values 
increase for most southern laggard regions in the second period, while they decrease 
for most northern regions. Second, regional TFP dispersion decreases: the variance 
of (relative) TFP’s is higher in the first period (with a value of 0.027) than in the 
second (0.010).
These results are strongly consistent with the hypothesis that a process of 
technological convergence does exist and represent an important component of the 
aggregate convergence observed across these two sub-periods. This conclusion finds 
a clear confirmation in Figure 5.1, where the relationship existing between the TFP 
estimated for the 1963-79 interval and the subsequent one is shown.
The dotted 45 degree line shows the locus where the relative TFP level in each 
region would be unchanged between the two periods. Most southern regions are
50 In this case we need to assume that measurement error is not three-order serially correlated. 
Moreover, it has been argued that short time spans may not be appropriate for studying growth 
convergence. See Islam (1995) p. 1140 and Caselli Esquivel and Lefort (1996) among others.
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clearly above the 45 degree line51 as they performed consistently better in term of 
relative TFP growth, while six (northern) regions are below the 45 degree line. This 
pattern is consistent with the hypothesis of TFP convergence.
The same data may be rearranged to analyse this result in terms of a typical 
growth-initial level convergence relationship. In Figure 5.2 the Y-axis represents the 
rate of growth of relative TFP, while the X-axis represents the initial relative TFP 
level. Convergence implies a negative correlation between the initial level of TFP 
and its subsequent growth rate. This is exactly what our data reveal. Nevertheless, in 
spite of this clear convergence pattern the distance between northern and southern 
regions in terms of relative TFP was still significant in the second sub-period, as 
shown by Table 5.5.
Let us now go back to Table 5.4, columns 3 and 4, in order to assess the 
robustness of our LSDV result by applying the Kiviet-corrected LSDV estimator. 
When we use the latter, the two sub-samples each include 5 observations, with one 
overlapping year. The first sub-sample includes 1969, 1972, 1975 1978, 1981, while 
the second 1981, 1984,1987,1990,1993.s2
Models 3 and 4 in Table 5.4 suggest that, in contrast with LSDV, the solovian 
(conditional) convergence coefficient is significant in both sub-periods. In the first 
subsample analysed, the other variables included are never significant, while in the 
second both ln(.s) and ln(« + 8 + g) are negative and significant. Human capital is 
never significant.
With respect to the TFP estimates, our previous result based on the LSDV 
estimator does not change significantly. Again, the estimated variance of relative 
TFP’s is higher in the first period (with a value of 0.020), than in the second (0.011). 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the relationship existing between the relative TFP levels 
estimated for the 1969-81 interval and the following ones. Similarities with Figure 
5.1 are remarkable. As a consequence, our previous result pointing to the presence of 
a clear pattern of TFP convergence appears to be robust to the use of the Kiviet
51 These are Molise, Basilicata, Calabria, Puglia, Abruzzo, Umbria Sicilia and Campania.
52 Note that there is not a perfect correspondence between the samples used in LSDV and KIVIET 
and, thus, the evidence obtained in the two cases is not perfectly comparable.
2 0 2
c * l
correction. In particular, eleven regions out of eighteen confirm the pattern revealed 
in Figure 5.1. The most substantial difference is observed for a group of three regions 
(Abruzzo, Umbria, Sardegna) that were among the (relative) winners in Figure 1 and 
now are among the (relative) losers.
5.7. Technology convergence and the role of human capital
Finally, our measures of regional levels of TFP may also be used to test one of the 
main hypothesis of the catching-up literature and, in particular, of the Nelson and 
Phelps (1966) approach. In Chapter 1 we have seen that in these models TFP growth 
is determined by the technological distance from the leader and by the level of 
human capital, where the latter influences the capacity for both discovering new 
technologies and adopting innovations from abroad. In other words, human capital 
levels determine the capacity of adopting new technologies from abroad and, thus, 
the possibility of a catch up process among countries. As a consequence, we should 
expect TFP levels to depend on human capital stocks. This is exactly what our data 
reveal. The correlation coefficient between the regional human capital level in 1963 
and TFP levels estimated using LSDV ( r  = 5) is equal to 0.94, while that calculated 
between the level of human capital in 1978 and the subsequent TFP levels is 0.87. 
When we use KIVIET, the results are almost identical. The correlation coefficient 
between the level of human capital in 1969 and the estimated TFP levels (KIVIET, 
r -  3) is 0.93, while that calculated for the level of human capital in 1981 and 
subsequent TFP levels is lower and equal to 0.89. The same relationship may be 
observed in Figures from 5.4 to 5.7, where we include regional relative TFP 
estimates in the Y-axis and the initial level of human capital in the X-axis. Figure 5.4 
and 5.5 introduce respectively the TFP levels estimated with LSDV ( r  = 5) and 
KIVIET ( r  = 3) in the first sub-period of the analysis, while Figure 5.6 and 5.7 
introduce the same analysis for the second sub-period. In general, this evidence, 
together with the absence of significance of the human capital variable in our 
regressions, corroborate the hypothesis of a relationship between human capital and 
TFP as described by the Nelson and Phelps approach.
53 Being the benchmark region, we exclude Lombardia from this analysis.
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5.8. Summary
The aim of this study was to assess the existence of technology convergence across 
the Italian regions between 1963 and 1993. Different methodologies have been 
proposed to measure TFP heterogeneity across countries, but only a few of them try 
to capture the presence of technology convergence as a separate component from the 
standard solovian (capital-deepening) source of convergence. To distinguish between 
these two component of convergence, we have proposed and applied a fixed-effect 
panel methodology.
First of all, our results identify the presence of a TFP heterogeneity across 
Italian regions. This result is robust to the use of different estimation procedure such 
as simple LSDV, Kiviet-corrected LSDV, and GMM a la Arellano and Bond (1991). 
Second, we find strong support to the hypothesis that a significant process of TFP 
convergence has been a key factor in the observed aggregate regional convergence 
that took place in Italy up to the mid-seventies. To the best of our knowledge, this is 
the first time that evidence on TFP convergence across Italian regions has been 
produced in a context in which the traditional Solovian-type of convergence is 
simultaneously taken into account.
Moreover, our results show that a period of significant convergence in TFP 
has not generated a significant, persistent decrease in the degree of cross-region 
inequality in per capita income. The solution to this puzzle may be a simple one. Our 
evidence shows that technology convergence took place between the two sub-periods 
of our analysis (1963-78 and 1978-93), while nothing can be inferred on what has 
happened, in terms of technology diffusion, within the second sub-period. So, one 
possibility is that the halt of aggregate convergence in this sub-period is due to a halt 
of technology diffusion. More data and research are needed to test this additional 
hypothesis.
Finally, our human capital measures has been found to be highly positively 
correlated with TFP levels. This result confirms one of the hypothesis of the Nelson 
and Phelps approach, namely that human capital is the main determinant of 
technological catch-up. This latter result suggests an explanation for the existence of 
persistent differences in regional GDP per worker: this might be due to the fact that 
the backward regions never caught-up with the northern and richest ones in terms of 
their human capital endowments.
A PPENDIX V-A
Table 5.1: Estim ation o f  the augm ented Solow model
Sample: Italian regions (1963-93)
Dependent Variable ln(y i,,)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
OLS OLS GMM-AB1 GM M -AB2 LSDV LSDV KIVIET
Observations 114 95 95 95 114 95 95
Infyu-t) .852 .800 .696 .834 .630 .514 .669
(.045) (.051) (.097) (.135) (.078) (.090)
ln(s u. ,) -.024 -.063 -.047 -.044 .027 -.019 -.022
(.018) ( .020) (.043) (.037) (.026) (.030)
ln(n u.j +g+d) -.085 -.108 -.125 -.108 -.073 -.074 -.089
(.022) (.025) (.031) (.028) (.025) (.028)
human capital .015 .024 .001 -.028 -.022 -.010 0.00
(.010) ( .011) (.021) (.022) (.017) (.019)
A 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.08
Sargan test (p-value) 0.79 0.35
AB-2 test (p-value) 0.31 0.20
Notes:
19 Italian regions included (Val d'Aosta excluded)
Standard errors in parentheses.
LSDV is the Least Squares with Dummy variables estimator.
GMM-AB 1 is the Arellano-Bond estim ator under the assumption that x's are predeterm ined  
GMM-AB2 is the Arellano-Bond estim ator under the assumption x's strictly exogenous
KIVIET is the LSDV estim ator with the K iviet (1995) correction. KIVIET only corrects the bias in the LSDV estim ated  
param eters, but does not produce alternative or corrected standard errors. This is why they are not shown among results. 
The figu res reported fo r  the Sargan test are the p-values fo r  the null hypothesis , valid  specification.
The figu res reported fo r  the AB-2 test are the p-values o f  the Arellano-Bond test that average  
aucovariance in residuals o f  order 2 is 0.
Lambda is the corresponding (conditional) convergence coefficient
Table 5.2a: Regional relative TFP levels by different estimation procedures
ln(y) 1968 L SD V G M M -A B  1 K IV IE T
Lazio 3.69 Lom bardia 1.00 Lom bardia 1.00 Lom bardia 1.00
Liguria 3.67 L azio 0.97 Lazio 0.99 Lazio 0.98
Lom bardia 3.61 Liguria 0.95 Friuli 0.94 Em ilia Romagm 0.95
Toscana 3.55 Em ilia Romagnc 0.94 E m ilia Rom agna 0.94 Friuli 0.95
Trentino 3.54 Friuli 0.92 Veneto 0.94 Liguria 0.95
E m ilia Romagnc 3.51 Veneto 0.90 Liguria 0.93 Veneto 0.92
Veneto 3.49 Piem onte 0.89 Trentino 0.89 Piem onte 0.90
Piem onte 3.47 Toscana 0.86 Sardegna 0.89 Trentino 0.88
Sardegna 3.45 Trentino 0.86 Piem onte 0.87 Toscana 0.86
Friuli 3.40 M arche 0.82 Toscana 0.86 A bruzzo 0.85
Cam pania 3.39 Sardegna 0.81 A bruzzo 0.85 M arche 0.85
Sicilia 3.38 A bruzzo 0.81 M arche 0.85 Um bria 0.84
M arche 3.36 Um bria 0.81 Um bria 0.84 Sardegna 0.83
Um bria 3.35 S icilia 0.76 S icilia 0.81 P u glia 0.78
Abruzzo 3.24 Puglia 0.75 Puglia 0.79 Sicilia 0.78
P uglia 3.23 Cam pania 0.73 Cam pania 0.77 Cam pania 0.75
C alabria 3.21 M olise 0.68 B asilicata 0.72 M olise 0.73
B asilica ta 3.17 C alabria 0.65 M olise 0.70 C alabria 0.68
M olise 3.06 B asilica ta 0.64 C alabria 0.68 B asilica ta 0.67
Notes:
ln(y) 1968 is the logarithm o f GDP per worker in 1968
LSDV includes the regional individual effects estimated using the LSDV estimator (95 observations)
GMM-AB 1 includes the regional individual effects calculated using the GMM-AB 1 estimator
KIVIET includes the regional individual effects calculated using the LSDV estimator with the KIVIET correction
l
Table 5.2b: Regional TFP ranks by different estimation procedures
Regions Rank with LSDV Rank with GM M -AB 1 Rank with GM M -AB2 Rank with KIVIET
Abruzzo 12 11 9 10
Basilicata 19 17 18 19
Calabria 18 19 19 18
Campania 16 16 15 16
Emilia Romagna 4 4 6 3
Friuli 5 3 1 4
Lazio 2 2 2 2
Liguria 3 6 4 5
Lombardia 1 1 3 1
Marche 10 12 12 11
Molise 17 18 17 17
Piemonte 7 9 10 7
Puglia 15 15 16 14
Sardegna 11 8 11 13
Sicilia 14 14 14 15
Toscana 8 10 13 9
Trentino 9 7 7 8
Umbria 13 13 8 12
Veneto 6 5 5 6
Notes:
LSDV includes the rank o f regional individual effects estimated using the LSDV estimator (95 observations)
GMM-AB 1 includes the rank o f regional individual effects calculated using the GMM-AB 1 estimator
KIVIET includes the rank o f regional individual effects calculated using the LSDV estimator with the KIVIET correction
Table 5.4: Estimation o f  the augmented Solow model (two subsamples)
Sample: Italian regions 1963-978 and 1978-93 
Dependent Variable ln (yit)
1 2 3 4
time span=5 time span-5 time span=3 time span=3
1963-1978 1978-1993 1963-1981 1981-1993
LSDV LSDV KIVIET KIVIET
Observations 57 57 95 95
In&v-j) .480 .015 .760 .386
(.141) (.124)
ln(s khl) .055 -.051 -.068 -.061
(.049) (.036)
ln(n 4,.; +g+d) -.061 -.069 -.047 -.062
(.052) (.027)
human capital -.051 .006 -.30 .013
(.052) (.044)
X 0.15 0.84 0.09 0.32
Notes:
19  Ita lian  reg ion s in clu ded  (V a l d 'A osta  excluded)
S tan dard  errors  in paren theses.
L S D V  is the L east Squ ares w ith  D um m y variab les estim ator.
K IV IE T  is the L S D V  estim a tor  w ith  the K iv ie t (1995) correction  a n d  on ly  corrects  the b ia s  in the e stim a ted  param eters. 
I t d o es  n o t p ro d u c e  a ltern a tive  o r  co rrec ted  stan dard  errors. This is w h y they a re  n o t show n am on g results.
L am bda is the correspon d in g  (conditional) convergence coeffic ien t
Table 5.5: Estimated Relative regional TFP levels 1963-78 and 1978-93
REG IO NS
Relative T FP levels 
1963-78
Relative T FP levels 
1978-93
Change o f  rank
Piemonte 0.907 0.885 + 1
Lombardia 1.000 1.000 +1
Trentino Alto Adige 0.925 0.849 -2
Veneto 0.891 0.882 +2
Friuli Venezia Giulia 0.926 0.892 -1
Liguria 0.996 0.952 -2
Emilia Romagna 0.926 0.932 +1
Toscana 0.904 0.858 0
Umbria 0.732 0.792 -1
Marche 0.814 0.800 0
Lazio 1.103 0.946 -2
Abruzzo 0.707 0.796 +3
M olise 0.523 0.721 +2
Campania 0.710 0.741 -2
Puglia 0.654 0.758 +1
Basilicata 0.553 0.644 -1
Calabria 0.561 0.666 -1
Sicilia 0.728 0.767 -1
Sardegna 0.787 0.797 0
Variance 0.027 0.010
Notes:
The initial TFP level correspond to the TFP estimated using the sample 1963-1978, 
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Figure 5.6: h u m a n  c a p ita l  a n d  TFP (KIVIET), in i t ia l  p e r io d
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Figure 5.7: human capital and TFP (KIVIET), final period
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study examines different issues concerning the estimation of the convergence 
equation. First of all, we underline a few problems in the econometric methodologies 
proposed so far for estimating the convergence parameter and propose an alternative 
approach. In fact, despite the abundance of different econometric techniques 
introduced in the empirical literature on convergence, it is usually assumed that 
shocks are uncorrelated across countries. This is surely unlikely for most of the data 
sets considered and we investigate a possibility so far ignored, namely the annual 
panel estimator where shocks are allowed to be correlated. Our analysis is restricted 
to the case of more time periods than countries (T>N) which allows us to estimate by 
Maximum Likelihood with an unrestricted variance-covariance matrix of cross­
country shocks. The thesis examines by Monte Carlo the robustness against certain 
possible mis-specifications, namely measurement error and heterogeneity of the 
convergence coefficients. Our analysis indicates that Maximum Likelihood 
estimators are robust to plausible measurement error and variation of convergence 
rates across countries and are more efficient than conventional estimators for 
plausible values of cross-country error correlation. We consider in detail the 
relationship between the distribution of the Maximum Likelihood estimator and the 
initial conditions. Applying our findings to a panel of OECD countries for the post­
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war period, we show that Maximum Likelihood is effectively unbiased and more 
efficient than conventional panel estimators or OLS on a cross-section of countries. 
We argue that the reason this estimator is so well behaved is that many OECD 
countries were far from their equilibrium values at the beginning of the period.
Secondly, in this study we investigate the connection between growth and 
human capital in a convergence regression framework. The relationship between 
human capital and development has always been considered as a close one. Despite 
the importance placed on this relationship by both the theoretical growth literature 
and development strategists, empirical evidence on aggregate returns to schooling is 
weak: econometric analysis that uses international data sets usually find that human 
capital is insignificantly or even negatively correlated with the process of 
development. This study estimates the social returns to education at regional level for 
two different Southern European countries: Italy and Spain. In the case of Italian 
regions, we introduce a new data set on human capital. We use measures of the stock 
of regional human capital and estimate the social returns to schooling by including 
measures of average primary, secondary, tertiary years of education and a measure of 
total average years of schooling. It is well known that convergence in the South 
slowed after about 1975. We deal with this problem by two different methods. First, 
we allow the convergence rate to slow after 1975; and then we allow the South to 
converge to its own, potentially different level. We find marginally significant 
returns to total education by both methods. When we allow the parameters to differ 
between regions, however, we find that increased education seems to contribute to 
growth only in the South. Dividing total schooling into its three constituent parts, we 
find that primary education in the South seems to be important. We also find weak 
evidence of positive results for secondary education in the North. Thus, these results 
suggest that Italian growth mainly benefited from the elimination of illiteracy in the 
South, during the ‘60s.
Differences in the characteristics of the two data sets do not permit us to 
exactly replicate for Spain the analysis conducted for Italian regions. Nonetheless, 
we are still able to find comparable results. Overall, Spanish regional evidence is 
similar to that found for Italian regions. In particular, thanks to their sectoral 
disaggregation, Spanish data enables us to investigate more thoroughly if excluding 
the human capital allocated in the public sector influences the analysis of returns to
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schooling. Some results seem to stress the. importance of allocation of human capital 
in the public sector in the analysis of returns to education. In particular, when we 
divide the total stock of human capital into components corresponding to primary 
secondary and tertiary education we find that only primary school seems to have an 
unambiguous positive role for growth, but when we exclude the public sector from 
our human capital variables, the tertiary education coefficient becomes positive and 
marginally significant.
However, the analysis on clubs does not confirm all these results and suggests 
a different and possibly more consistent picture. When we allow for some parameter 
heterogeneity and analyse separately the effect of education in two clubs of poor and 
rich Spanish regions we observe that the coefficients on human capital variables do 
not change significantly when we take the public sector into account. Thus, this 
relationship needs to be further investigated. In future work, it would be interesting 
to extend our analysis on the relationships between sectoral allocation of human 
capital and growth using more disaggregated data sets. Moreover, we find that 
returns to education are different in the two areas. In particular, human capital 
computed as average years of education is positive and significant only in the more 
developed regions club. Further, when we divide human capital into the three 
different levels of education we find significant differences in the two clubs. Among 
poor regions only primary schooling seems to positively affect growth rates: as in the 
Italian case, our estimates indicate high returns to basic education in the poorest 
areas of the country. Conversely, for rich regions we find a positive result only for 
secondary schooling. Again, these results are similar to those obtained for Italian 
regions, even if the positive coefficient on secondary schooling in Italy is only 
marginally significant.
Thus, overall these results seem to confirm one standard result on the effects 
of education on earnings in microeconometric literature which, however, has hitherto 
been difficult to confirm and even to properly investigate with macroeconomic data. 
That is, we find high returns to primary education in low developed, disadvantaged 
areas. However, we also find evidence that suggests the existence of a relationship 
between the level of development of an economy and returns to different levels of 
education: if primary schooling seems to contribute to growth in poorly developed 
areas, skilled human capital has a stronger growth-enhancing effect in more
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developed economies. In other words, our evidence emphasizes that there is likely to 
be heterogeneity in rates of returns to education across economies since the effect of 
schooling in growth regressions is influenced by the level of development of an 
economy. Failing to take this heterogeneity into account in empirical analysis may 
produce misleading results.
Finally we propose a fixed-effect panel methodology based on Islam (2000) 
to assess the existence of technology convergence across the Italian regions between 
1963 and 1993. Our results find strong support for both the presence of TFP 
heterogeneity across Italian regions and for the hypothesis that TFP convergence has 
been a key factor in the process of aggregate regional convergence observed in Italy 
up to the mid-seventies. However, this period of TFP convergence has not generated 
a significant, persistent decrease in the degree of cross-region inequality in per capita 
income. Our human capital measure has been found to be highly positively correlated 
with TFP levels. This evidence confirms one of the hypothesis of the Nelson and 
Phelps approach, namely that human capital is the main determinant of technological 
catch-up. Our results are robust to the use of different estimation procedure such as 
simple LSDV, Kiviet-corrected LSDV, and GMM a la Arellano and Bond (1991). To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that evidence on TFP convergence 
across Italian regions has been produced in a context in which the traditional 
Solovian-type of convergence is simultaneously taken into account.
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